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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NIP-43?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=18108997#comment-18108997
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Matt Burgess commented on NIP-43:
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How does this relate to the bootstrap property {{nifi.bootstrap.sensitive.key}}
that encrypts the sensitive property key? Sorry if I missed that in the
explanation, is it provided by the
PropertyEncryptionProviderInitializationContext?
> Support Pluggable Property Encryption Providers
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> Key: NIP-43
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NIP-43
> Project: NiFi Improvement Proposal
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Reporter: David Handermann
> Assignee: David Handermann
> Priority: Major
>
> h2. Motivation
> Apache NiFi protects sensitive property values, including component
> properties, Parameter values, and stored authorization tokens, using a single
> encryption implementation built into the framework. The Keyed Cipher Property
> Encryptor derives an AES-GCM key from the sensitive properties key configured
> in nifi.properties, using Argon2id or PBKDF2 as the key derivation function.
> This design constrains deployments in several ways. The key material resides
> in nifi.properties on the same host as the flow configuration it protects, so
> the secret and the encrypted values share a single trust boundary.
> Organizations that require key custody in a Key Management System or Hardware
> Security Module have no supported path. Rotating the key requires stopping
> the application and re-encrypting the flow configuration.
> The existing Property Encryptor interface accepts only a value, with no
> indication of what that value represents. Encrypted values carry no binding
> to the component or Parameter that owns them, so a value copied from one
> location in a flow to another decrypts successfully in its new location.
> External key management services expect an encryption context for
> authenticated additional data and audit attribution, which the current
> interface cannot supply.
> h2. Scope
> The scope includes a new framework extension point located in the NiFi
> Framework API, a default implementation that preserves current behavior, and
> configuration in the Flow Controller to select and initialize the configured
> implementation.
> Supplying encryption context requires threading a context argument through
> framework interfaces that currently pass values alone, including the
> Sensitive Value Encryptor and Property Decryptor interfaces in the framework
> core API, along with the Parameter Value Mapper and the flow mapping and
> synchronization classes that call them. These changes do not require any
> modifications or additions to the public Apache NiFi API.
> The existing Property Encryptor interface remains unchanged. The bootstrap
> process and the flow encryptor command run outside the extension framework
> and cannot load implementations from a NAR, so they continue to use the
> current implementation directly.
> h2. Description
> The proposed extension point defines a Property Encryption Provider with an
> identifier, a lifecycle, and symmetric operations that accept the value
> together with the context describing it.
> {code:java}
> public interface PropertyEncryptionProvider extends Closeable {
> String getIdentifier();
> void initialize(PropertyEncryptionProviderInitializationContext context);
> byte[] encrypt(byte[] property, SensitivePropertyContext context);
> byte[] decrypt(byte[] encryptedProperty, SensitivePropertyContext
> context);
> @Override
> default void close() throws IOException {
> }
> }
> {code}
> A single Sensitive Property Context argument on both operations covers
> component properties, Parameters, and stored authorization tokens without
> separate overloads for each case. The context provides a category indicating
> the kind of value being protected, together with attributes such as the
> component identifier, property name, Parameter Context name, and Parameter
> name.
> Implementations backed by a Key Management System can supply these attributes
> as encryption context and rely on the service to record them for auditing.
> Implementations must be thread safe, because the framework holds a single
> shared instance. Failures are reported through a dedicated unchecked
> exception, and the initialization context supplies configured properties
> along with a TLS configuration for implementations that call remote services.
> Loading follows the pattern already established for the Asset Manager and
> other framework extensions. An implementation class property and a properties
> prefix in nifi.properties select and configure the implementation, which the
> framework instantiates through the NAR Thread Context Class Loader and
> invokes using the class loader of its own NAR.
> The default implementation ships with the framework and wraps the current
> Keyed Cipher Property Encryptor, so an installation with no additional
> configuration behaves as it does today. Values are encoded with the
> identifier of the provider that wrote them, so the framework can select the
> correct implementation when reading, and values without an identifier are
> routed to the default implementation.
> h2. Compatibility
> Initial implementation will add the extension point, register the default
> implementation, and connect the framework to the configured provider.
> Existing deployments are unaffected on upgrade. Values encrypted by earlier
> versions continue to decrypt, and installations that configure no provider
> continue to use the built-in implementation with the existing sensitive
> properties key.
> Values written by an alternate provider can be read only by a deployment with
> the same provider installed and configured, so moving a flow configuration
> between environments requires the same provider in both. The Headless NiFi
> Server and the Stateless engine construct encryptors independently of the
> standard server configuration and are not affected.
> h2. Verification
> Unit tests will cover encoding and selection of provider implementations,
> propagation of context attributes from flow mapping and Parameter handling,
> and behavior of the default implementation against values produced by the
> current implementation. System tests will verify a complete flow round trip,
> including component property and Parameter encryption, using a provider other
> than the default. Existing sensitive property tests will be retained against
> the default implementation.
> h2. Alternatives
> Replacing existing key derivation functions would address some trust boundary
> concerns, but require direct implementation within the project. This is a
> smaller change, but it leaves key material on the local file system and
> provides no path to external key custody, encryption context, or centralized
> auditing.
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