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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDDS-17679?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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ASF GitHub Bot updated HDDS-17679:
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Labels: pull-request-available (was: )
> SCM issues container tokens under the read-only administrator check, although
> a container token is not limited to read operations
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HDDS-17679
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDDS-17679
> Project: Apache Ozone
> Issue Type: Bug
> Affects Versions: 1.4.0, 2.0.0, 1.4.1, 2.1.0, 2.2.0, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2.1,
> 2.2.2
> Reporter: Siyao Meng
> Priority: Major
> Labels: pull-request-available
> Attachments: H-1-require-full-admin-for-container-token.patch
>
>
> h3. Mechanism
> {{SCMClientProtocolServer.getContainerToken}} authorizes the caller with
> {{checkAdminAccess(remoteUser, true)}}, the read form of the SCM admin check.
> {{StorageContainerManager.checkAdminAccess}} passes that form for a principal
> in {{ozone.administrators}} and also for a principal that is only in
> {{ozone.readonly.administrators}} or
> {{ozone.readonly.administrators.groups}}. The method then calls
> {{ContainerTokenGenerator.generateToken(user, containerID)}} for any
> container ID, with no further check.
> A container token ({{ContainerTokenIdentifier}},
> {{ContainerTokenSecretProto}}) carries the owner, the container ID, an expiry
> and the signing key id. It carries no access mode, unlike the block token
> ({{OzoneBlockTokenIdentifier}}), so it is accepted for every container
> command that requires a container token, not only the read commands. The SCM
> operations that change a container's state use the full admin form of the
> check and refuse the same read-only principal.
> HDDS-4729 (1.2.0) added the token behind the full admin check. HDDS-8456
> (1.4.0) classified every SCM client operation as read or full admin and put
> {{getContainerToken}} on the read side; the JIRA and the pull request do not
> discuss what the token authorizes.
> h3. Trigger
> # A secure cluster ({{ozone.security.enabled=true}},
> {{ozone.authorization.enabled}} at its default of {{true}}) with
> {{hdds.container.token.enabled=true}}. With container tokens disabled (the
> default) the generator is the no-op one and no command requires a container
> token, so the classification has no effect.
> # A principal in {{ozone.readonly.administrators}} or its groups, and not in
> {{ozone.administrators}}, asks SCM for a container token through
> {{getContainerToken}}. SCM issues it.
> Present from the 1.4.0 release tag onwards (HDDS-8456), by reading the code
> at each release tag up to 2.2.2 and on master at 7294fc2da1.
> h3. Impact
> * A principal the configuration defines as read-only holds, for any container
> ID, a credential that is not limited to read operations, while the SCM
> operations that change a container's state refuse that principal.
> * The SCM audit log records each issuance ({{GET_CONTAINER_TOKEN}} with the
> user and the container ID). A token already issued stays valid until its
> expiry ({{hdds.block.token.expiry.time}}, default 1d), also after the
> principal leaves the read-only list, which is a reconfigurable key.
> h3. Reproduction
> The regression test in the attached patch covers it and fails on unmodified
> source:
> {{TestSCMClientProtocolServer.testGetContainerTokenRequiresFullAdmin}}
> ({{hadoop-hdds/server-scm}}). The SCM starter user, a full admin, obtains a
> token, and a principal that is only in {{ozone.readonly.administrators}} must
> be refused with {{AccessControlException}}. Without the change the second
> assertion fails with {{Expecting code to raise a throwable}}. The test uses
> the SCM setup of that class, where container tokens are not enabled, so the
> generator is the no-op one; the authorization decision is the same code path.
> The issue has no standalone reproduction.
> h3. Patch
> [^H-1-require-full-admin-for-container-token.patch], against
> ec5ed5f7ea0e4b406aee53aae4906616819cba2b. It also applies to master at
> 7294fc2da1.
> {{SCMClientProtocolServer.getContainerToken}} calls
> {{checkAdminAccess(remoteUser, false)}}, so only a full SCM administrator
> obtains a container token, as before HDDS-8456 and as for the SCM operations
> that change a container's state. The token contents, the generator, the audit
> action and the protocol are unchanged, and the tokens SCM embeds in its own
> commands are not affected.
> What changes for operators: with container tokens enabled, a principal that
> is only a read-only administrator is now refused by the client commands that
> fetch a container token through
> {{ContainerOperationClient.getEncodedContainerToken}}, which are
> {{ContainerStateVerifier}} and {{ChunkKeyHandler}} under {{ozone debug}} and
> {{DNRPCLoadGenerator}} under {{ozone freon}}. With container tokens disabled
> nothing changes, since {{getEncodedContainerToken}} does not call SCM then.
> The alternative that keeps those commands available to read-only
> administrators is an access mode in {{ContainerTokenSecretProto}}, mirroring
> the block token, with read-only tokens issued under the read check and
> enforced where the token is checked. That needs a protocol field, a change at
> every place that issues a container token, and a decision for tokens without
> the field during a rolling upgrade, so it is left for a follow-up if the
> project wants it.
> With the patch {{TestSCMClientProtocolServer}} passes (9 tests) and
> checkstyle on {{hadoop-hdds/server-scm}} is clean.
> Found by code review of the datanode container state machine apply and block
> commit paths, as part of the TLA+ verification effort under HDDS-15926, on
> commit ec5ed5f7ea0e4b406aee53aae4906616819cba2b. Checked against HDDS issues
> and apache/ozone pull requests for duplicates before filing. Related but not
> duplicates: HDDS-4729 (introduced the container token behind the full admin
> check), HDDS-8456 (classified {{getContainerToken}} as a read operation),
> HDDS-15620 (authorization of {{ozone admin}} status commands for read-only
> administrators), HDDS-17440 (block token verification). The attached patch is
> a proposal for review. Generated with Specula (Claude Fable 5.1).
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