On 3 May 2016 at 19:10, Tomasz Sterna <[email protected]> wrote: > W dniu 03.05.2016, wto o godzinie 09∶40 -0700, użytkownik > [email protected] napisał: > > I suspect you wouldn't want s2s to use a self signed cert, so > > allowing two level of verification (c2s and s2s) sounds complex. You > > fix one thing in software and you break something else. > > So, why would you allow self-signed on C2S? > > Why do you want to use encryption in the first place? > So, no one is able to read the conversation, right? > But self-signed cert does not give you this... Just a false illusion > that you are protected from evesdropping. > But self-signed does not protect you from man-in-the-middle attack, so > basically still anyone able to tap the wire your transmission is going > through is able to read it, with just slightly more effort. > > I used to agree with you, but I've changed my mind over the years - it turns out that because it forces an attacker to switch from passive eavesdropping to active MITM, this is a blocker for the majority of attackers, especially opportunistic or mass-surveillance actors.
So a self-signed cert is better than no cert at all (even if you want something independently verifiable ideally). > > > I noticed the online documentation doesn't completely match the xml, > > but there are enough comments in the xml that I could get close to > > setting it up. It is just the certs that are confusing. > > Yeah. The real and up to date source of documentation are the comments > in the configuration files. > > > -- > /o__ > (_<^' Practice is the best of all instructors. > > > _______________________________________________ > JDev mailing list > Info: http://mail.jabber.org/mailman/listinfo/jdev > Unsubscribe: [email protected] > _______________________________________________ > >
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