An effendi’s democracy
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By Magdi El Gizouli

August 7, 2011 — Failing to think in other than their self-defeating
legalistic categories the leaders of the Khartoum opposition, lumped
together in the rather wobbly National Consensus Forces (NCF), could
only ruminate yet again the claim that President Bashir’s government
has lost its ‘legitimacy’. The opposition had made the same
pronouncement at each and every major milestone of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), notably after the April 2010 elections,
following the announcement of the results of the January 2011
referendum on the future of Southern Sudan, and now that the South has
been christened an independent state. The argument this time is that
the Interim National Constitution, an amalgam of the CPA and the
National Congress Party’s (NCP) 1998 constitution is no longer valid
considering that the CPA has reached its final station. On each
occasion, the secretary of the NCF leadership, Farouq Abu Issa, busied
the local media with the pledge of a nation-wide political campaign to
challenge the NCP, a declaration of next to no substance.

The ‘legitimacy’ argument while formally presentable cynically exposes
the opposition for what it currently is; a domestic but detached
observation mission with little political muscle to back its
proclamations. During their years of abstinence from power the crown
leaders of Khartoum’s political parties have done little more than
rehearse a fantasy of post-NCP ‘democracy’ that will restore the
status quo ante of the pre-1989 Khartoum and simultaneously do away
with the country’s many ills in an instantaneous puff of freedom.
Paradoxically the major proponent of this Newfoundland beyond the
NCP’s Sudan is Hassan al-Turabi. To that end the veteran leader of the
Islamic Movement has recently developed a new look altogether.
Revising his political career he declared himself the prime leader of
the 1964 October Revolution against the military government of
President Abboud and reinterpreted his entire adventure with power as
a continuous battle to wrestle freedom from the grip of evil
dictators.

The democracy in question I suppose, paraphrasing Georges Sorel, is
the paradise of which unscrupulous effendiya dream. Of course, the
standard wisdom of Khartoum’s opposition it to blame the chronic
crises of the country on the recurrence of military rule, and
thereupon to conclude that once democracy is restored the suitable
conditions for the resolution of the country’s incessant dilemmas
would be created. The argument obviously supposes an unqualified
divorce between form and content, a rift through which the tanks of
the army have repeatedly rolled. Rarely does it cross the minds of
Khartoum’s elite that the doom of their democracy may not necessarily
be an imposition of fate but a consequence of its very nature.

In its heyday the Communist Party attempted with a degree of nuance to
address this question and develop an alternative historical narrative
of the post-colonial Sudan. To overcome the impasse of Sudan’s
abortive democracy, formally sound but by necessity reliant on a
rural-urban schism whereby Sudan’s hinterlands are condemned to
provide the rulers in Khartoum with votes and resources, the Party
suggested alternative forms of government borrowed from the experience
of third world liberation movements. In the 1960s the Communist Party
advocated for ‘direct democracy’ or ‘popular democracy’ led by a
‘national democratic front’ uniting the nation’s progressive forces as
it were. Once the fantasy became reality under Colonel Nimayri the
communists were quick to reconsider and soon rediscovered the safe
mode of parliamentary rule albeit with a taste of bitterness. Shocked
by the bloody confrontation with state power in 1971 the Party simply
dropped its critique of the concrete Sudanese mode of democracy
without further investigation, to the detriment of both itself and the
country.

While the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan has
chosen its particular response to Khartoum’s democracy, namely
breakaway, the Khartoum opposition, if it is to develop into a
credible alternative to the NCP, has to rethink its own. What
democracy, and for whom?

The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes
regular opinion articles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan. He can
be reached at [email protected]

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