---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 03 Sep 2011 22:16:39 -0400
Subject: "Blue Nile State (Sudan) and the Resumption of Country-wide War"
To: [email protected]
"BlueNile State (Sudan) and the Resumption of Country-wide War"
The only beneficiaries of thisruthlessly destructive military action
against Blue Nile State are the mostextreme members of the National
Islamic Front/National Congress Party cabal,and senior members of the
security and military apparatus; the calculation onwhich their
decision has been made could not be more brutal
(on-line here)
Eric Reeves
September 3, 2011
Those hoping that Sudan's 2005"Comprehensive Peace Agreement" (CPA)
and the July secession by SouthSudan as an independent nation would
bring an end to war in this ravagedcountry have been bitterly
disappointed by recent events. Aside from continuingto wage a ghastly
war of civilian attrition in Darfur, the Khartoum regimehas militarily
seizedthe contested border region of Abyei (May 20), has begun a
widespread campaign ofethnically targeted destruction in South
Kordofan (June 5)---targeting theNuba and relentlesslybombing the Nuba
Mountains---and in recent days has launched a majormilitary offensive
in Blue Nile State. Many thousands have fledinto neighboring
Ethiopia, the state capital of Damazin has been over-run,and there are
reports of large numbers of civilian casualties and destructionof
civilian infrastructure. There are also many reports of
indiscriminatebombing attacks by Khartoum's air force elsewhere in
Blue Nile---continuing a pattern of more than twentyyears---and
fighting seems to be escalating rapidly.* Calls for animmediate
ceasefire by the UN and other international actors have fallen ondeaf
ears in Khartoum.
Blue Nile has many similarities withSouth Kordofan, which is also part
of what is now North Sudan; this includes inparticular a close
alliance militarily and politically with the SPLM/A of theSouth during
the long civil war (1983-2005). Its elected governor, MalikAgar,
heads the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North. Like
thecomparable political and military entity in South Kordofan, the
SPLA-North inBlue Nile is made up of indigenous soldiers, who cannot
be "sent home to theSouth" because they are home.And as was true for
South Kordofan, Blue Nile was promised by the CPA"popular
consultations," which were to have determined the nature ofthe ongoing
relationship with Khartoum after a Southern
self-determinationreferendum. There have been no meaningful
"popularconsultations" in either South Kordofan or Blue Nile, nor does
Khartoumintend to permit such.
As was also the case in South Kordofan(and in Abyei as well),Khartoum
militarily provoked the fighting in Blue Nile and then claimedthat
they had been responding to attacks by rebels. But the recentarrival
of a brigade-sized force near Damazin---accompanied by a dozen
tanksalong with 40 trucks carrying heavy Dushka machine-guns---makes
nonsense of theclaim. And again, as was the case in South Kordofan,
it is clear thatthis military offensive had been well-planned in
advance (in South Kordofan,for example, the Sudanese Red Crescent
Society [SRCS] has confirmed thatKhartoum gave them some 2,500 body
bags and plastic tarps prior to the fightingand ethnically targeted
executions that began on June 5; by the end of themonth the SRCS was
publiclydeclaring the need for more body bags).
The offensive in Blue Nile has longbeen threatened, and MalikAgar said
two months ago that the longer the conflict in South Kordofanwent
unresolved, the more likely it was that Blue Nile would be drawn into
thefighting. And several months ago, internal UN situation reports
containedominous intelligence about large troop movements and military
threats in thegeneral region of Blue Nile. It's not clear whether the
UN andinternational actors of consequence simply didn't believe that
Khartoum wouldmove against Blue Nile---or disingenuously chose not to
believe so. Butthe failure of anticipation is staggering, and
suggests diplomatic incompetenceof the first order. Certainly much
was revealed with the breakdown of theimportant framework agreement
signed by Malik and the powerful Nafi'e AliNafi'e of the NIF/NCP on
June 28, and then was promptly disowned by Presidental-Bashir on his
return from China (July 1, 2011). More than disowningthe agreement,
al-Bashirdeclared at Friday prayers:
"'[Al-Bashir] directed thearmed forces to continue their military
operations in South Kordofan untila cleansing of the region is over,'
SUNA quoted Bashir as tellingworshippers during Friday prayers."
(emphasis added)
This should have been a clear signal of what would follow. But
whatever the reason for lack of an effective international
response---thenand now---it yet again shows that there has been far
too little preparationfor, or anticipation of the events of the past
few days, a terribly familiarpattern on the part of the UN, the U.S.,
the African Union, and the Europeansin dealing with Khartoum. All
this is consistent with the exceedinglyslow and still hesitant
acknowledgement of the massive atrocity crimes thatwere committed in
South Kordofan in June, which have been amply documentedin a leaked UN
human rights report on the situation. Moreover, satelliteimagery has
authoritatively confirmed the existence of many mass
gravesites,capable of holding many thousands of bodies. The
photographic evidence isconfirmed in every case by eyewitness accounts
provided to the UN human rightsinvestigators (and included in their
unredactedreport) and to the SatelliteSentinel Project, with human
intelligence assets in Kadugli. ManyNuba escaping from South Kordofan
into South Sudan have also reported massgravesites.
Isresumed war too costly for Khartoum?
In recent months it has become conventional wisdom to assertthat
however brutal and ruthless the National Islamic Front/National
CongressParty Khartoum regime may be, they simply can't afford to
re-engage in war withthe South---that it would be too costly for the
regime, especially givena Northern economy that is in shambles, with
high (and rising) inflation,the prospect of substantially diminished
oil revenues, and a vast external debt(more than $38 billion) that
can't be serviced, let alone repaid, withoutsignificant help in debt
relief from the international community. Butthis conventional wisdom
has framed the question the wrong way; the questionthe NIF/NCP regime
is posing in present circumstances is whether itsstranglehold on
national wealth and power can survive without war, war that the regime
of course hopes to keep on theperiphery. And that question is being
answered, increasingly clearly, bythe most ruthless elements within
the military and their hard-line allies inthe political cabal. There
has been a "creeping militarycoup" in Khartoum, and as one source
close to the regime has declaredin a confidential statement, "It is
the hour of the soldiers."
What Khartoum fears most is that with the secession of SouthSudan, the
forces rebelling against marginalization and discrimination---aswell
as against the relentless denial of political freedom and a fair share
ofnational wealth and power---are now all in the North. If
thesevariously rebellious forces are allowed to create a powerful
militarycoalition---reaching from eastern Chad to Ethiopia and
northward to the Bejaregion near the border with Eritrea---they could
topple the regime, evenwithout much help from the traditional Northern
political opposition, which isin any event badly weakened after
twenty-two years of NIF/NCP tyranny.
Several observers of the recent large-scale military actionsin Blue
Nile have made this point, if in somewhat different fashion.
ChrisPhillips from the Economist Intelligence Unity put it this way to
Reuters: "(Khartoum's)objective is to knock out the SPLM-North before
they become a serious militaryforce." Fouad Hikmat of the
International Crisis Group argues that Khartoum believes the SPLM in
theNorth is "a threat for them politically, not justmilitarily" and
that what we are seeing "could be a vanguard tomobilise the new South
of the North of Sudan." In other words, whatSouth Sudan was to
Khartoum during the civil war could take new form in theNorth---what
Hikmat calls "the new South of the North of Sudan."
But by attacking Blue Nile, and targeting the house of itselected
governor Malik Agar, the Khartoum regime has burned its bridges to
anegotiated settlement with the SPLM/A-North. It was Malik who
brokeredthe agreement between the SPLM/A-North leader in South
Kordofan, Abdel Azizel-Hilu, and senior regime official Nafi'e Ali
Nafi'e; it is now exceedinglydifficult to see how negotiations might
even resume while the governor himselfis being attacked and pursued.
The greatest danger here is that the potent military forcesof South
Sudan become involved in the fighting. Juba and the SPLA haveshown
remarkable restraint to date in the face of relentless
militaryprovocation: Khartoum's repeated bombing of the South in Unity
State andNorthern and Western Bahr el-Ghazal going back to November
2010, as well as theseizure of Abyei, which aborts any chance for a
fair self-determinationreferendum for the region. But it will become
increasinglydifficult for the SPLA in Juba to watch as their war-time
allies in SouthKordofan and Blue Nile are mercilessly pummeled by
Khartoum's air force, andmany thousands of civilians are sent
streaming into Ethiopia, into the South,and even toward Khartoum (the
UN High Commission for Refugees has alreadyreceived reports of "some
16,000 civilians fleeing" fromBlue Nile into Ethiopia; other estimates
are much higher). The growingthreat of a humanitarian catastrophe in
the Nuba Mountains---Khartoum continuesto block all significant
humanitarian access---and the prospect of a similarcrisis in Blue Nile
are already weighing heavily on the leadership in Juba.
War as it is unfolding in South Kordofan and Blue Nile is inno one's
interest---not in the South and not in the North. The only oneswho
see themselves as beneficiaries are the most ruthless and brutal
members ofthe NIF/NCP cabal and the military and security apparatus:
for they wellunderstand that if they lose power, most will end up in
The Hague facingprosecution for crimes against humanity, genocide, and
war crimes.
"The hour of the soldiers." The phrase is cited by Julie Flint,a
highly reliable and well-informed reporter on Sudan, and comes from
awell-placed source in Khartoum, close to the regime, who is trying to
give anaccount of how such immensely destructive violence against
civilians has becomethe chosen course of action: "It is the hour of
the soldiers---a vengeful,bitter attitude of defending one's interests
no matter what; a punitive andemotional approach that goes beyond
calculation of self-interest."
This is the face of power in Khartoum, and until the worldawakes to
the consequences of this "vengeful, bitter" outlook, warwill continue
moving closer and closer to engulfing all of Sudan.
*************************************
*There is no fully and independently confirmed account ofall that has
occurred in Blue Nile beginning September 1, 2011. Of theaccounts I
have read, from regional sources and wire service reports withsources
in Sudan, the most detailed and persuasive is this from the African
Centrefor Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS). Unsurprisingly, it
comports veryclosely with the accounts of the SPLM-North, and flatly
contradicts a greatmany statements already made by spokesmen for the
SAF and by regime-controlledmedia:
Sudan---BlueNile Civilians at Risk, Peace Prospects Diminishing
Contact: Osman Hummaida, Executive Director
Phone: +447956 095738
E-mail: [email protected]
3 September 2011
"On the 28th and 29th of August, the Sudanese rulingNational Congress
Party (NCP) moved significant military forces---comprised ofPopular
Defense Forces (PDF), national security, and Sudanese Armed
Forces(SAF)---with heavy military equipment into Blue Nile state. [
...]
"On September 1st at 11:00 PM the jointforces of SAF and the PDF
opened fire on a three-car SPLM convey carrying adelegation out of Al
Damazein at the town's southern checkpoint. The fire wasreturned and
fighting moved inside the town to the areas of Al Nahda, the
cropsmarket, the industrial area and the nearby NCP military
headquarters.
"Later the same night, the popular militia, broughtfrom Khartoum by
aircraft, attacked the SPLM residential area in Al Mustshareensector
and open fire on the house of Governor Malik Agar, killing members
ofhis guards and arresting others. Witnesses say that the Sudanese
governmentforces fired on anyone that appeared to be affiliated with
the SPLM andarrested some others.
"Heavy military equipment from the North has beendistributed inside
the civilians sectors in the town including in Hai Alganeswhere
witnesses say they saw five tanks and three military landcruisers
withdoshka guns mounted to them. Witnesses said that around 30
civilians werekilled as a result of the fighting and many others were
injured.
"The NCP and SPLM have suffered more than 200fatalities and
approximately 500 more were injured in the fighting. Followingthe
initial fighting, the SPLM is in control of Albao, Kurmuk and Gisaan
andthe rest of the state remains under NCP control.
"The fighting has caused around 50,000civilians---mostly women,
children, and elderly men---to flee Al Damazein and AlRusairis towns
into Sennar state. The Northern military forces have closed themain
road linking Blue Nile to Sennar, causing those fleeing the areas
offighting to have to take more difficult roads impacted by the rainy
season.
"On 2 September, Sudanese President Omar Al Bashirdeclared a state of
emergency in Blue Nile and suspended the application of theinterim
constitution there. A series of presidential orders were
issued,including one removing the elected governor Malik Agar and
installing a militarygovernor to replace him. Far from protecting
civilians, the state of emergencyallows the Northern militias and the
SAF to arrest and try anyone suspected ofaffiliation with the SPLM.
In this context, it is possible that anyonewho is not a member of NCP
may be targeted for arrest and summary trial.
"On 3 September, aircraft continued to bomb SPLM areas.The main water
reservoir in Al Damazein was destroyed in the bombardment,possibly in
a deliberate attempt to deprive the population of this
essentialresource. About 75 bodies have been confirmed to bepresent in
the Al Damazein morgue. The hospital has declared an emergency.
Clashes have continued in the Hai Alziraarea. The NCP has called all
remaining civilians in Al Damazein and AlRusairis to gather inside
themilitary headquarters as a safe area.
"The seriousness of the situation in Blue Nile and thepotential for
repetition of serious violations of international law in
SouthernKordofan and Darfur require urgent action by the international
community. Atthis stage, it will be urgent to focus on the protection
of civilians, ensuringhumanitarian access, and facilitation of
ceasefire negotiations. It will becritical to ensure that the citizens
of Blue Nile State have access tohumanitarian assistance in the coming
days and weeks. The NCP should not beallowed to prevent this access as
they have done in the Nuba Mountains in SouthKordofan."
_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
[email protected]
413-585-3326
Skype: ReevesSudan
www.sudanreeves.org
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