War in the Nuba Mountains, again – By Nanne op ’t Ende

August 23, 2011
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Since June 5, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army Nuba (SPLA Nuba) have been fighting in South Kordofan,
and for two and a half months I did not know what to make of it. All I
could think of were the people who returned to their homes since the
cease fire in 2001 and who are now, once again, caught up in that
horrible cycle of violence, fear, death and loss.

by Nanne op ’t Ende, The Netherlands, August 20, 2011

Returnees

Years ago, I wrote about the need for the SPLM Nuba to persuade Nuba
people in Khartoum and other cities to return to their state so their
numbers would add weight to the political aspirations of the former
rebel movement – to obtain substantial autonomy for the Nuba. Only
electoral success would allow SPLM Nuba to set the agenda for the
popular consultation that would evaluate and possibly improve on the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provisions for South Kordofan.

They came. Hundreds of thousands of people took their chances hoping
that the war was over and it was safe enough to start farming again.
>From a mere 200,000, the population in areas controlled by the SPLA
Nuba grew to at least half a million (from a total of 1,100,000.) And
yet it was not enough to gain the SPLM Nuba a majority in the state
elections. The National Congress Party (NCP) did not even have to rig
the elections extensively. The Carter Centre saw no reasons to
disapprove, but the SPLM Nuba refused to acknowledge the result.

Now the same people who returned to their broken homes to start over
again, despite dismal levels of public services like clean drinking
water, education and medical care, are fleeing the plains again,
seeking refuge in the mountains or leaving the area alltogether. It is
as if nothing has changed, as if ten years of peace were just an
interlude, a perverse play of two parties going through the motions
without once considering the interest of the people of Southern
Kordofan.

Failed peace

Really, there never was much chance that the CPA process in South
Kordofan would reach a satisfying conclusion. The lack of trust
between NCP and SPLM Nuba prevented cooperation and frustrated
progress. Neither party wanted to give in – NCP hardliners felt that
they had given up too much already by allowing the South to secede,
and the SPLM Nuba felt that their right to self-determination had
already been traded off against Southern interests.

The NCP did what it had been expected to do – frustrate any progress
in the state while SPLM Governor Ismael Khamis was in charge – start
building roads and hospitals once it held the Governorship, draw up
constituencies in South Kordofan favorable to its goal of winning the
elections, manipulate the census to disadvantage the SPLM, probably
buy some votes left and right and claim a fair electoral victory.

SPLM Nuba struggled to come up with an answer. Replacing Ismael Khamis
with Daniel Kodi and Daniel Kodi with Abdelaziz al Hilu, the party
concentrated on retaining control over the areas it had dominated
throughout the years of civil war and avoiding collaboration with the
NCP. Contesting the census results, the division of the constituencies
and the election results, the SPLM Nuba stuck to political means to
fight the NCP for ten long years from the signing of the cease fire
until the outbreak of violence in Kadugli last June.

It is my estimation the SPLM Nuba, left to their own devices by the
SPLM in South Sudan, already counted on a political endgame between
them and Khartoum that would lead straight back to war. There was
always a small chance that things would turn out differently, if only
because nothing is ever certain, but adherence to the CPA process was,
in a way, more important than the anticipated outcome. An image of
legitimacy can be crucial for a rebel movement.

Ready

Sure enough, SPLA Nuba was ready for the return to war. Ever since the
CPA was signed in December 2004, any SPLA Nuba officer who ran into a
journalist or researcher would vent his disapproval of the
arrangements for South Kordofan. “If we have to fight, we’ll be
ready,” was their grim mantra. Apart from the Joint Integrated Units
there were large numbers of SPLA Nuba soldiers in or near Southern
Kordofan at all times. Call it an insurance policy.

By the end of May 2011, the SAF had been amassing troops and heavy
equipment in the state and a few days before the fighting broke out
SPLM Nuba leader and vice Governor of South Kordofan, Abdelaziz al
Hilu, considered war to have become inevitable. He expected prolonged
fighting with severe impact on the civilian population. There was a
short scenario for the initial stages of the conflict: Kadugli and
other towns would no longer be safe, people would be displaced,
humanitarian access would be blocked and then areas deeper in the
Mountains would come under attack.

Abdelaziz al Hilu would not have been the renowned commander he is,
had he not had an answer to such a scenario ready. Judging from the
obvious inability of SAF to ‘crush the rebellion’ with air raids and
tanks and the hurried transport of more troops to the region, it seems
that the SPLA Nuba were far better prepared for the outbreak of
conflict than SAF. Now it is up to Governor Ahmed Haroun to use his
organizational talents to rally the Arabic nomads in South Kordofan to
join the fighting, like he did before with the nomads in Darfur.

International community

The last issue to be settled during the CPA negotiations in 2004, was
the question of Nuba autonomy – SPLM Nuba wanted self-determination,
the NCP and Nuba aligned with Khartoum refused. Under strong pressure
from international mediators SPLM Nuba accepted the complex and
cumbersome construction of popular consultation. Although the
international community cannot be held responsible for the failure of
the peace process in South Kordofan, it did fail to help make it work.

Khartoum let the South go but it is not ready to give up control over
Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Shortly after occupying Abyei,
SAF escalated the fighting in Kadugli to all-out war in South Kordofan
with, reportedly, numerous violations of the Geneva Conventions. In
the fourth week of the fighting, Sudan’s President, Omer Hassan el
Beshir, personally annulled an agreement signed by his aide Nafie Ali
Nafie and by Malik Agar Eyre on behalf of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (North) that recognized the SPLM North as a
legitimate political party in Sudan and set an agenda for a political
solution of the conflict in South Kordofan.

Some people cry genocide (which is nonsense) and others say nearly
half a million people are displaced (which is nonsense too) but scores
of innocent people have been killed during the first days of fighting
in Kadugli and many have been killed or injured by indiscriminate
bombing. At least tens of thousands of people have been displaced, so
much is clear, and their numbers will grow as the violence continues.
Farming has been disrupted, so somewhere down the line people are
going to run out of food.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council failed to even raise a resolution
that would condemn the violence in South Kordofan and called for an
end to the bombardments. Sudan is featuring on the US list of states
sponsoring terrorism – its head of state is wanted by the ICC for
crimes against humanity, and South Kordofan Governor Ahmed Haroun is
wanted by the same ICC for war crimes committed in Darfur – but China
has invested heavily in Sudan’s oil industry and Russia supplies
Khartoum with fighter jets and helicopters.

Looking at the feeble response to the obvious violations of the Geneva
Conventions in Syria, it is unlikely that anything short of mass
murder in South Kordofan would prompt the UN Security Council to
undertake action against the Government of Sudan. The US and (members
of) the EU might be inclined to support the SPLA Nuba, especially
given the pressure they put on the Nuba to sign an unfavorable
agreement, but they are already heavily involved in various conflicts
in the region and elsewhere – they face an economic crisis; and they
probably fear the risk of a complete disintegration of Sudan…

So despite the suffering of the Nuba population endured between 1987
and 2001, and despite knowledge of the crimes committed against the
population of Darfur by the same people now conducting war in South
Kordofan, there is a slim chance that anyone will give substantial
support to the SPLA Nuba unless SAF or the Popular Defense Forces
truly go berserk. Perhaps the SPLA of South Sudan would at some point
feel compelled to help their former comrades in arms, provided there
were sufficient reason to risk war with Khartoum…

Escalation

A solution to the conflict seems to be nowhere in sight. Khartoum
remains determined to bring rebel leader Abdelaziz al Hilu to justice
– al Hilu on his turn has signed an agreement with several Darfurian
rebel movements to join forces in a coordinated effort to overthrow
the Government of Sudan. They may soon be joined by Malik Agar, SPLM
Governor of Blue Nile, whose relationship with Khartoum is getting
more tense with every passing day.

Whether a coalition of rebel forces from Darfur, Nuba and Blue Nile
will be able to topple the regime of Omer el Beshir remains to be
seen. In Libya the insurgents only managed to corner Khadafi with
massive support from its Western allies – and still the dictator is
not completely defeated. JEM proved it was possible to raid Khartoum,
but it would require a much more powerful force to actually take the
capital. Chances are that the fighting will remain concentrated in the
periphery of the country – beyond today, it’s all speculation anyway.

Eyes

I once wrote a book, called Proud to be Nuba, about the struggle of
the SPLA Nuba against the Government of Sudan. Written after the
signing of the CPA it documented people’s stories of their lives
before and after the war. To me it concluded a ten year period of
intense involvement with the Nuba. I so much hoped things would turn
out for the best. Now the faces of the people I met during these long
years keep coming back to me. Their defiant eyes stare at me from the
pages of the book. And I don’t know what to say.
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