Eritrean Experience: Lessons to South Sudan
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South Sudan and building a new nation: Lessons from the Eritrean experience

By Dawit O. Woldu & Irvin H. Bromall*

Similarities between revolutionary Eritrea and South Sudan:

September 10, 2011 — South Sudan and Eritrea are the two youngest
countries on the African continent, even though the latter became
independent in 1993, nearly 20 years before South Sudan. The wars for
independence fought by the two states share several other
similarities. Both countries fought against nations of which they were
a part, and the two wars are probably the longest independence
struggles in the history of the continent. Both were bitter and costly
in terms of the post-war acrimony that remains, the thousands of lives
lost, and the millions of disabilities incurred. Also lost by South
Sudan was the little physical infrastructure it possessed and any
quality of live its peoples ever enjoyed. The two independence
struggles were seen by most of the world as just, right, and deserved.
For both, the reward was the freedom to choose.

While both Eritrea and South Sudan waged righteous struggles, after
its independence, Eritrea adopted a range of policies that were
aggressively hostile in spirit and belligerently vindictive in
implementation. It looked inwards when it most needed to look outwards
toward the world. The current state of Eritrean society bears witness
that its post-revolutionary policies did not build the just society
that the revolution had promised. It behooves South Sudan to take a
lesson from Eritrea, and not repeat the mistakes Eritrea made in all
sectors of policy-making and implementation.

Eritrea’s policy choices:

Domestic political sphere: The Eritrean government took a retaliatory
political position, arresting, imprisoning, or murdering anyone
thought associated with anti-regime elements or who had connections
with former Ethiopian authorities. Eritrea’s bêtes noirs became the US
and its supposed vassal, Ethiopia, forever plotting to destroy the new
state, and used to justify the most extreme and severe domestic
repression. Instead of adopting an approach to heal the wounds of
struggle, post-independence Eritrea institutionalized policies that
only served to make those wounds worse.

At the elite levels of Eritrean society, a deep cleavage was
institutionalized between ex-liberation fighters and the rest of the
professional community. The latter were glorified and rewarded richly;
the former were denigrated and denied the ability freely to share
their talents and skills. The Diaspora was seen as good primarily for
its remittances, not for its talents and skills. All political
appointments, even at the lowest levels, were of ex-fighters,
completely lacking in administrative and management skills. Ineptitude
and inertial, cloaked by a harsh military veil, were built into the
post-revolutionary Eritrean system of government. As time went by,
political failures built on each other, in-fighting took its toll, and
petty haggling with gottcha triumphs replaced shrewd decision-making.
The ruling circle constricted, and power became even more
concentrated. Defections abroad further worsened the situation. A
national-service obligation for all youth was implemented. Supposedly
a two-year obligation, the terms of national service were often
unlimited and conscripted persons served as indentured servants – some
would say, modern slaves – of the revolutionary regime. A constitution
– worthy of the most democratic of democratic states – was written and
ratified, and then promptly forgotten and, thrown to the dustbin of
history.

International relations and diplomatic spheres: In international
relations, the Eritrean government adopted an aggressive and
confrontational stance. The political elite and its tool of control,
the media, saw and painted the world in binary terms: “He who is not
with us is against us” was the political word of the day. Rather than
engaging in a sophisticated game of Realpolitik, the Eritrean regime
was often schizophrenic in its actions. For example, the relationship
with the West and the Arab world was an ongoing on-and-off
relationship, friends one day, enemies the next; one was played
against the other. Eritrea confronted its neighbors, and other African
states, with threats and military actions. The bloody war over
demarcation of the border with Ethiopia is a prime example of this
aggressive policy. It is telling that more people died during the
nearly 20 years of independence than during the 30-year independence
struggle itself.

Defections plagued the diplomatic and foreign-affairs sector of
government; the same was true in other spheres of Eritrean life. What
few skills the regime possessed were quickly draining away.
International decisions became concentrated the top of the ruling
pyramid, and those players were woefully lacking in diplomatic
proficiency.

The Eritrea government advocated a policy of self-sufficiency. Donor
countries, on whom Eritrea heavily relied, found it difficult to work
with the Eritrean government. NGOs, the source of much needed aid and
technical support, were ordered to leave the country. Government
agencies, who worked closely with these NGOs, faced major strains on
their financial and human resources. Refusing to let donor countries
and NGOs operate defied all rationality, especially when Eritrea was
in the midst of a major humanitarian crisis – the famine that reached
its high point in 2005.

Together, the policies the regime elected to pursue in the domestic
and international spheres constituted the base on which other policy
choices were decided.

Economics and development: In a general assault on the private sector,
the government ordered the closing of all privately owned companies.
The revolutionary government assumed control of all corporations, and
it controlled all business and economically related
national-development projects. Local businesspersons were arrested and
foreign investors were ordered to leave the country. Needed foreign
investments came no more. Import and export processes, agriculture,
real estate, the building of roads and bridges and other
infrastructure, not to mention the media, all fell to state control. A
free market did not exist, and neither did the concept. Citizens were
forbidden to hold foreign currencies and the local Eritrean currency,
the nakfa, was worthless outside of the country. National development
was at a standstill.

Education: Even though the Eritrean government made pleasant noises
about improving the educational system, the truth of the matter is the
revolutionary Eritrean government was always wary of educated and
free-thinking persons. The intelligentsia was viewed as bourgeois and
individualistic, not in tune with the regime’s Marxist ideology. The
regime perceived the rebels fighting while the intelligentsia was
safely abroad, freely pursuing its interests. Eritrean intellectuals
were portrayed as lacking nationalistic feelings and serving as the
pawns of foreign powers. Instead of expanding higher education, the
revolutionary regime took drastic measures against it. The country’s
revolutionary president officially announced that the University of
Asmara, the only institution of higher learning in Eritrea, was a
waste of time and was becoming anti-government and anti-Eritrean. He
ordered its closure. University students were subjected to severe
punishment and arrest for asking for their rights and for the rights
of the Eritrean people. Recently, the Eritrean government has even
started to involve its military in all higher educational matters.
Eritrea’s ’colleges’ were placed under the aegis of the military. “Who
will guard the guardians?” is as much a never-answered question as it
is an eternal one.

Health: The Eritrean government took stern measures against health
professionals, replacing all hospital management and administration
with former rebel associates and healthcare providers with insurgent
physicians, nurses, and other loyal medical personnel. These persons
were often under-trained and unfit for the positions to which the
government assigned them. Private clinics and hospitals were closed.
Doctors working for government hospitals were ordered into national
service and assigned to government hospitals. Private hospitals became
a thing of the past. Complex medical procedures were to be performed
abroad. The state of healthcare has been deteriorating rapidly since
the last Eritrean-Ethiopian war.

Human Rights: The current Eritrean government is one of the most
repressive in the world. There is an absolute lack of freedom of
speech, press, religion, and movement. Government informers are
everywhere. The media present a bland blend of carefully censored
information and glorification of the revolutionary struggle and its
heroes. The Internet is carefully filtered. Telephones are limited in
their availability and potential owners are rigidly screened.
Communications, especially with the outside world, are limited and
what few calls there are monitored.

In such a situation, any decent information comes from abroad, but
foreign broadcasts are jammed, foreign publications are unobtainable,
and other informational imports are restricted. The media speak the
regime’s voice. The system of national service looms over the lives of
many. The military has been used to indoctrinate the youth and to
intimidate any dissent in the country. The Eritrean people have been
taught well to keep their mouths shut. Because of this repressive
policy, many of Eritrea’s youth are leaving the country in mass, along
with others, joining those who have left before in the Diaspora.
Eritrea is one of the top source countries for refugees in the world.

Eritrea’s lessons for South Sudan:

To avoid what we have defined as mistakes made by revolutionary
Eritrea, it is tempting to develop a list of perfect policies that
South Sudan should adopt. Such is not the way of a political state
surviving in a geopolitically dynamic world. Rather, we will offer
some general recommendations, grouped under three general principles,
that we offer as lessons for South Sudan.

General principles:

I. Principle of the diminishing usefulness of revolutionary actors –
At the end of the day, those who bring a nation into being – no matter
the sacrifices they may have made, how heroic they may have been as
warriors, whatever good intentions they may have – make poor managers
of ongoing, developing states.

II. Principle of the importance of rational diplomacy and
international affairs – South Sudan must develop a reasoned diplomatic
agenda that achieves its national interests, as it defines national
interest. Logically, this would entail finding ways to enter into a
working relationship with the North, but this is the sum total of the
dynamics of the political situation.

Seeking the favor and assistance of economically powerful states is a
wise policy and it is clear that South Sudan must seek out and accept
foreign aid from abroad, but in so doing, it must not become a vassal
state to anyone. This aid, however, should be accepted and targeted at
building a self-reliant South Sudan. Hands-on, village-by-village
development projects have been shown to have lasting and significant
impact on development. Moreover, South Sudan must encourage capable
and willing non-Southerners to assist in development efforts. The
state’s vigorous participation in international bodies can only
enhance its survival possibilities.

III. Principle of reasoned development – History’s lesson is that free
markets, properly regulated, can bring prosperity for wide swathes of
the population. History also teaches that a driving force of a society
is its intelligentsia and South Sudan must recognize the value of that
critical grouping, both at home and in the diaspora. It would be
foolish not to emulate the example of other states and encourage the
return of talent from abroad. Intellectuals, part of whose jobs it is
to be annoying, have the capacity to help greatly in the building of a
new nation, providing needed vision, and sharing their
even-more-needed intellectual and technical skills. The careful care
and feeding of the intelligentsia is a task South Sudan must learn and
it must learn it well.

IV. Principle of national perpetuation – “Universities are the nucleus
of national development. No country can prosper without strong
institutions of higher learning.” This statement was made by South
Sudanese President Salva Kiir on his 13 August 2011 visit to the
University of Juba. There, he committed to the establishment of an
academic “think tank.” Since the government recognizes that
universities are the spawning grounds of the elite cadres needed to
assume full future control of the South Sudanese state, President
Kiir’s has made an excellent start. Now, he must follow up with fiscal
commitment and political support and South Sudan must remember that a
public school system is a basic foundation of nationhood and national
self-perpetuation.

What we have presented is by no means a road map for South Sudanese
success. It is more a catalog of the road blocks that another state
faced when it was in the position South Sudan now finds itself. In
Oyee Sudan, proud southerners sing “...Oh God, bless South Sudan!” We
can only join in that chorus!

*Dawit O. Woldu, a native of Eritrea, is a Ph.D. Candidate in medical
anthropology at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Irvin H.
Bromall, Ph.D., a former professor and senior federal manager, is a
free-lance consultant in Moab, Utah.

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