Pl. read an authentic version of *Ten misconceptions about the nuclear
deal* by
Dr. P.K Iyengar ex-Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. This is an eye opener
on how the Congress Party and the Greedy Money making MPs are out tyo sell
the country. This is the Patriotism at the highest level.
Dr.V.N.Sharma
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: m.j. akbar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: 2008/7/20
Subject: FW: dr p.k.iyengar
To: "Chaudhuri, Udit" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
This is the best and simplest analysis done by the ranking expert on the
subject...this is for your understanding and for widest possible
distrubution
MJ
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*
*
*Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal*
In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the
national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it
because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.
1. *The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the US
government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India.*
Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement is *
not* a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us with
uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits nuclear
cooperation with India because we have not signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant a 'waiver' from that
law, so that American companies can now pursue nuclear trade with India.
However, if India conducts a test at any time, the waiver is revoked.
1. *Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and
cost-effective. *
Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of uranium
and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces – there are no
guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the contrary, there is
every reason to believe that it will be expensive. The cost of uranium in
the international market has gone up four-fold in the last few years, and
will rise further with further demand. The same is true of the cost of steel
and other materials used in a reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the
West. The example of the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that
importing power plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We
would do well to learn from that experience.
1. *The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security. *
It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore essential
for our *long-term* energy security. But this does not translate into the
nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power from the nuclear
reactors that we buy will definitely be more expensive than indigenous
nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors running, we will always be
dependent on imported uranium, which is controlled by a cartel – the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the nuclear deal, by making us dependent
on the cartel, will only compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous
nuclear power programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any
case, for the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our
total electricity production.
1. *Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present power
crisis.*
Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes through,
it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have examples of the
French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in Kudankulam, India. It
will actually take longer to setup foreign reactors compared to indigenous
ones. Just the negotiations and legal formalities could take years. It will
be at least eight years before we see the first power. So importing reactors
is certainly no quick solution. For the short term, we will still have to
rely on coal and hydroelectricity.
1. *The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing,
and therefore does not compromise our national security.*
It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to
national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123
Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very clearly
states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further nuclear trade is to
stop, and the nuclear materials that have already been sold to us have to be
returned. No future Indian government would dare to jeopardise such a huge
investment in nuclear power, by testing. So, for all practical purposes the
nuclear deal caps our strategic programme – which is precisely what the
Americans intend.
1. *We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will
protect our strategic programme. *
Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on
the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable participation
of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a law saying that we
will retain the right to test, it will have no influence on the actions of
the US. If and when we test, they can simply quote the 123 Agreement and the
Hyde Act, and pull out all their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated.
The only option here is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause
inserted there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since
it goes against their non-proliferation policy.
1. *The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status
of a nuclear power. *
While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India being
treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements. In fact,
the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is closely based on
the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear weapon states. The
safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon countries have signed with the
IAEA require them to put very few reactors under safeguards, and allow them
to take reactors out of safeguards. India, however, will have to place most
of its reactors under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly
not being treated as a nuclear weapons country.
1. *Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our
domestic nuclear programme.*
The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have enough
indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years. We are not
yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium availability for
operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning, and inadequate
prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing 40,000 MW of nuclear
power, which will cost not less than $100 billion or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If
even 10% of this money were spent on uranium mining in existing mines in
Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching for new uranium deposits, and
negotiating with non-NSG countries, there will be enough uranium for a
robust indigenous nuclear power programme, until such time as thorium
reactors takes over.
1. *The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even
if India conducts a nuclear test. *
The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's
concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies. However,
the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such commitment is
given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that India may take
'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
It does not specify what these measures will be, it does not provide for any
role for the IAEA in this, and it does not bestow legitimacy on any such
measures that India may take. It may well be that any such measures that we
suggest, such as importing fuel from another country, will be disallowed by
the nuclear cartel (the NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for
India to explore and mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment
capability to provide fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to
uncertainty.
1. *The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy.*
The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure
India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including its
capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that Iran, as an
NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in light-water
reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, and can only be
related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent statements by Gary
Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, regarding
Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such suspicions.
It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in
the national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our
strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward with the
deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security that we are
seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as vulnerable to the
nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.
It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually
no cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap
our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net, through the back door,
as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear activities,
including R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and subjugate us to the
wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no cartel, we could have easily
extended the Kudankulam agreement for more reactors, and avoided the present
situation. If these are not reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear
deal, then there are no reasons that reason can find.
*P. K. Iyengar*
Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission
