> > Isn’t this somewhat overstating the likely privacy benefits? If the prover > reveals _any_ PII to the verifier then the verifier can collaborate with > the issuer to discover everything about that user. >
JWP as a container aims to make unlinkability _possible_ for applications to build, not a guarantee. There are many extremes an application may choose to design for to accomplish different scales of unlinkability (from multiple verifiers colluding, from the verifier and issuer colluding, from multiple presentations to the same verifier, etc). In my mind it's akin to you can cryptographically validate the contents and signature in a JWS, but how you decide if you trust the signer is up to the application or higher level protocols. And we know from many studies on deanonymisation that it is very easy to > accidentally reveal enough information to be identifiable. ZK proofs are > nice and everything but they only ensure zero *additional* knowledge is > gained by the verifier. In practice what is explicitly revealed is often > enough. > That's exactly why we believe this work is very important, having a container to support algorithms where zero *additional* knowledge is revealed by the container and crypto layers. It *is* very easy to incidentally reveal linkable factors, which is why JWP is hard to get right, and critical to do so to enable this capability. IMO if you want to have any hope of actually achieving the privacy you want > then you really need to design the entire protocol, including specifying > exactly what information is to be revealed. I think designing a generic > “privacy preserving” message container is likely to give people unrealistic > expectations. > We have the lowest level privacy algorithms becoming well established like BBS (and CL signatures, etc), next we need a privacy-capable container to make those algorithms more accessible and interoperable, then we need privacy protocols to leverage those containers, then privacy aware applications, ecosystems, and user experiences. Jer
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