Permit me to ask a clarifying question. You state that "the key itself to be
in a clear-text format ... is an explicit no-no" but surely that can't be true
of the public key, since, by definition, it's public. Sure, that's true of the
private key.
Are you trying to share the public key or also the private key? If the private
key, then no matter what representation you use for it (JWK or other), you'll
have to protect to private key by other means - be it TLS encryption or other
context-specific encryption.
Best wishes,
-- Mike
From: Robins, Eric <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2022 9:40 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: Devolder, Eric <[email protected]>; Mike Jones
<[email protected]>
Subject: RFC7517 (JWK) and potential changes for financial services
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Hi:
As a financial services provider, Mastercard works frequently with applied
cryptography, including the use of the JOSE patterns for identity credential
management and message-level encryption and signing. Like many of our
competitors and partners in this space, we make heavy use of hardware security
modules (HSMs) and other such devices for the protection of cryptographic keys
related to the signing and encryption of sensitive PII/PCI data.
We recently ran across an interesting integration with one of our partner
Issuing banks where we'll need to share a sensitive key on a regular basis with
them (an HMAC key in this case) that will be protected on both sides by HSMs.
We're looking at trying to standardize on a format for the sharing of that key
and had considered the use of the JWK/JWE pattern but it appears that doing so
requires the key itself to be in a clear-text format when written as the JWK
(prior to being encrypted as a JWE). This is an explicit no-no for these types
of keys, which never exist in such a format and are only recoverable as
clear-text inside of the HSMs themselves.
Thus, we're at a bit of a crossroad here. We can't - and our partners won't
either - export keys from our HSMs into a clear-text format prior to writing a
JWK. Most HSM vendors don't support exporting keys in a JWK/JWE format since
they predate the JOSE standards, so we need to A>propose changes to the JWK
standard, B>convince all major HSM manufacturers to support JOSE or C>not use
JOSE.
Would whoever manages this standard be open for a quick discussion for proposed
changes to the RFC? Or, do you have recommendations as to how other financial
services may be using this standard today? We'd love feedback here.
Thanks in advance - looking forward to connecting...
Eric Robins
Corporate Security - Business Security Engineering/Architecture
Mastercard
2200 Mastercard Blvd
tel 636-722-7130
[cid:[email protected]]
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