The current description of “none” at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-03.html#name-the-none-algorithm
is not evenhanded. It lists 9 cases where defective implementations or
deployments caused problems but fails to list the 2 legitimate and safe uses of
“none” that I provided in my review. The document will not be ready for
working group last call until this is addressed.
Neil, please add this or similar text that section so that the legitimate uses
are called out for readers, providing a balanced treatment of the subject:
One of the legitimate use cases for Unsecured JWSs is OpenID Connect ID Tokens
secured by sending them over a TLS connection, as described in Section 2 of
[OpenID.Core]. Another legitimate use is unsigned request objects, as
described in Section 6.1 of [OpenID.Core].
That, or consider deleting all the references to the illegitimate uses.
Thank you,
-- Mike
From: Neil Madden <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2025 2:19 AM
To: Brian Campbell <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Cc: Michael Jones <[email protected]>; Neil Madden
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [jose] Review of draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02
I’ve published a new draft -03 that addresses Mike’s review comments, except
for adjusting the text around “none” as per the feedback on the list that the
current text is fine.
Chairs - I believe this is ready for WGLC now.
Name: draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15
Revision: 03
Title: JOSE: Deprecate 'none' and 'RSA1_5'
Date: 2025-09-19
Group: jose
Pages: 7
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-03.txt
Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15/
HTML:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-03.html
HTMLized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15
Diff:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-03
Cheers,
Neil
On 31 Jul 2025, at 14:00, Brian Campbell
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
That link
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02.html#section-1.1-4
points to the last paragraph of section 1.1. The 'none'
algorithm<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02.html#name-the-none-algorithm>
that has the text:
'Although there are some legitimate use-cases for Unsecured JWS, these are
relatively few in number and can easily be satisfied by alternative means. The
small risk of breaking some of these use-cases is far outweighed by the
improvement in security for the majority of JWS users who may be impacted by
accidental acceptance of the "none" algorithm.'
Which is the text I'm suggesting already provides pretty good and even-handed
treatment of the topic and shouldn't be changed.
On Wed, Jul 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM Michael Jones
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
The use cases that I’m asking to have added for reference are about “alg”:
“none”, so readers will know why it exists and how it is used – not “RSA1_5”.
I agree with Brian that the text describing “RSA1_5” is already fine.
-- Mike
From: Brian Campbell
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2025 11:02 AM
To: Neil Madden <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: Michael Jones
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [jose] Re: Review of draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02
On Wed, Jul 30, 2025 at 2:53 AM Neil Madden
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
1.1.
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02.html#section-1.1>
The 'none'
algorithm<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02.html#name-the-none-algorithm>:
After the sentence beginning “Although there are some legitimate use-cases for
Unsecured JWS”, I suggest adding this text:
One of the legitimate use cases for Unsecured JWSs is OpenID Connect ID Tokens
secured by sending them over a TLS connection, as described in Section 2 of
[OpenID.Core]. Another legitimate use is unsigned request objects, as
described in Section 6.1 of [OpenID.Core].
I’m open to adding something along these lines. I’ll raise a PR.
I thought the text in
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15-02.html#section-1.1-4
provies pretty good and even-handed treatment as is. I think it'd be a mistake
to list specific cases in the text here.
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