Em dom 30 mar 2014, às 19:38:14, Thomas Lübking escreveu: > > I disagree. The user already authenticated via their password > > I should have been more precise in the first sentence: > > Unlocking via a dbus command [that requires password authentication] is > imo very problematic [because that will end up exposing the password > on-disk]
How does the password end up on disk? > > before they were able to send the D-Bus command in the first place. > > So why not allow them to unlock? > > Because we protect the session, not the shell. > > Occasional access will already be stopped by having to use gdb in the first > place and even then it's possible to protect the process from manipulation > by the same UID. I maintain that this is not a protection. Unlocking without a password remains possible, but you're making it difficult for those of us who tinker with KDE and sometimes misconfigure the authentication. In the past, I could kill a process when I had improperly installed KDE and the greeter couldn't authenticate via PAM. Now I have to kill ksmserver or cause the session to exit via D-Bus. All processes by the same user should be trusted. -- Thiago Macieira - thiago (AT) macieira.info - thiago (AT) kde.org Software Architect - Intel Open Source Technology Center PGP/GPG: 0x6EF45358; fingerprint: E067 918B B660 DBD1 105C 966C 33F5 F005 6EF4 5358