On Wed, Apr 14, 2004 at 12:02:46PM -0400, Sam Hartman wrote: > I cannot think of anything that Kerberos applications need other than > network and urandom.
That's perfect. > You probably want to make it difficult for either the KDC or the > kadmind to execute other programs or switch domains to limit the > efficacy of a compromise. Difficult is not enough ;) Yes, for now, i created 3 different contexts, for kdc, kadmind and kerberos applications. The restriction is fairly strict and a compromised kdc should not mean possibility to get a root priviledge, nor change any passowrds in the realm. Now, i have to find an exploit in the kdc to test if i am right ;). Jerome -- -+-- Jerome Walter - EFREI p2004 ----+- Mail *is* private ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos