>Login is a [EMAIL PROTECTED] which says use Kerberos
>if you just say lara it will use the local machine. 

Yaa, of course I logged in as [EMAIL PROTECTED]
In the logon box, I chose the username as lara and the domain ADIANTO.COM not LOCAL 
MACHINE....
 
>NO! standard Kerberos does authentication. AD uses Kerberos
>for authentication, then adds in its authorization data, 
>the "PAC", into the ticket. 

>But there is a way to tell AD that it should add a PAC. 
>You wold have to setup the user account in AD and tell it
>that it can accept external Kerberos authentication for
>the user. We don't use this, so you wil have to look around
>for the instrustions. 
I have set that up before. Using name mapping in AD and registering [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
as the kerberos name for lara. I also setup the cross-realm trust between windows AD 
and MIT KDC.
 
It worked before ! See belw for the tickets cached in the windows client, using 
klist.exe. In this scenario user lara logged in to MIT REALM ADIANTO.COM using a 
win2000 machine (testw2k8.adianto.com) then accesses resource in test_w2kserver which 
is a member of windows domain LARASARI.COM (as opposed to ADIANTO.COM which is a 
workgroup). This is possible with cross realm setup (hence lara is not asked for 
password anymore to access test_w2kserver).
 
Here are the tickets after the cross-realm negotiation:
Cached Tickets: (5)
   Server: krbtgt/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
      KerbTicket Encryption Type: Kerberos DES-CBC-CRC
      End Time: 6/1/2004 7:07:00
      Renew Time: 6/7/2004 21:07:00
   Server: krbtgt/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
      KerbTicket Encryption Type: Kerberos DES-CBC-CRC
      End Time: 6/1/2004 7:07:00
      Renew Time: 6/7/2004 21:07:00
   Server: krbtgt/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
      KerbTicket Encryption Type: Kerberos DES-CBC-CRC
      End Time: 6/1/2004 7:07:00
      Renew Time: 6/7/2004 21:07:00
   Server: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
      KerbTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
      End Time: 6/1/2004 7:07:00
      Renew Time: 6/7/2004 21:07:00
   Server: host/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
      KerbTicket Encryption Type: Kerberos DES-CBC-CRC
      End Time: 6/1/2004 7:07:00
      Renew Time: 6/7/2004 21:07:00
 
However, after reinstalling test_w2kserver and hence re-setup the domain controller in 
LARASARI.COM, it didn't work anymore. when lara contacts krbtgt/LARASARI.COM, it 
failed with KRB5KDC_AP_ERR_MODIFIED.
 
Requests to krbtgt/LARASARI.COM:
-----------------------------------------------------
Frame 92 (628 bytes on wire, 628 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug  2, 2004 11:47:52.819555000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000915000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 22.781995000 seconds
    Frame Number: 92
    Packet Length: 628 bytes
    Capture Length: 628 bytes
Ethernet II, Src: 00:06:22:00:aa:37, Dst: 00:01:02:c8:42:01
    Destination: 00:01:02:c8:42:01 (192.168.168.110)
    Source: 00:06:22:00:aa:37 (192.168.168.105)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 192.168.168.105 (192.168.168.105), Dst Addr: 
192.168.168.110 (192.168.168.110)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 614
    Identification: 0x0669 (1641)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 128
    Protocol: UDP (0x11)
    Header checksum: 0x5ff5 (correct)
    Source: 192.168.168.105 (192.168.168.105)
    Destination: 192.168.168.110 (192.168.168.110)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1104 (1104), Dst Port: kerberos (88)
    Source port: 1104 (1104)
    Destination port: kerberos (88)
    Length: 594
    Checksum: 0x9826 (correct)
Kerberos
    Pvno: 5
    MSG Type: TGS-REQ (12)
    padata PA-TGS-REQ
        Type: PA-TGS-REQ (1)
            Value: 6E8201A6308201A2A003020105A10302...
                Pvno: 5
                MSG Type: AP-REQ (14)
                Padding: 0
                APOptions: 00000000
                    .0.. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Use Session Key: Do NOT 
use the session key to encrypt the ticket
                    ..0. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Mutual required: Mutual 
authentication is NOT required
                Ticket
                    Tkt-vno: 5
                    Realm: ADIANTO.COM
                    Server Name  (Unknown): krbtgt LARASARI.COM
                        Name-type: Unknown (0)
                        Name: krbtgt
                        Name: LARASARI.COM
                    enc-part des-cbc-crc
                        Encryption type: des-cbc-crc (1)
                        Kvno: 1
                        enc-part: 0958DB85841224F4BCDAAEB1B020FA76...
                Authenticator des-cbc-crc
                    Encryption type: des-cbc-crc (1)
                    Authenticator data: BC32419B702A6D1DBD6366F698C7598D...
    KDC_REQ_BODY
        Padding: 0
        KDCOptions: 40810000 Forwardable Renewable
            .1.. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Forwardable: FORWARDABLE tickets 
are allowed/requested
            ..0. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Forwarded: This is NOT a 
forwarded ticket
            ...0 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Proxyable: Do NOT use proxiable 
tickets
            .... 0... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Proxy: This ticket has NOT been 
proxied
            .... .0.. .... .... .... .... .... .... = Allow Postdate: We do NOT allow 
the ticket to be postdated
            .... ..0. .... .... .... .... .... .... = Postdated: This ticket is NOT 
postdated
            .... .... 1... .... .... .... .... .... = Renewable: This ticket is 
RENEWABLE
            .... .... ...0 .... .... .... .... .... = Opt HW Auth: False
            .... .... .... .... .... .... ..0. .... = Disable Transited Check: 
Transited checking is NOT disabled
            .... .... .... .... .... .... ...0 .... = Renewable OK: We do NOT accept 
renewed tickets
            .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 0... = Enc-Tkt-in-Skey: Do NOT encrypt 
the tkt inside the skey
            .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ..0. = Renew: This is NOT a request to 
renew a ticket
            .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ...0 = Validate: This is NOT a request 
to validate a postdated ticket
        Realm: LARASARI.COM
        Server Name  (Service and Instance): cifs Testw2kserver
            Name-type: Service and Instance (2)
            Name: cifs
            Name: Testw2kserver
        till: 2037-09-13 02:48:05 (Z)
        Nonce: 2100943361
        Encryption Types rc4-hmac 0xffffff7b 0xffffff80 des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-crc 
rc4-hmac-exp 0xffffff79
            Encryption type: rc4-hmac (23)
            Encryption type: Unknown (65403)
            Encryption type: Unknown (128)
            Encryption type: des-cbc-md5 (3)
            Encryption type: des-cbc-crc (1)
            Encryption type: rc4-hmac-exp (24)
            Encryption type: Unknown (65401)
 
REPLY from LARASARI.COM
--------------------------------------------
Frame 96 (138 bytes on wire, 138 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug  2, 2004 11:47:52.822420000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.001100000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 22.784860000 seconds
    Frame Number: 96
    Packet Length: 138 bytes
    Capture Length: 138 bytes
Ethernet II, Src: 00:01:02:c8:42:01, Dst: 00:06:22:00:aa:37
    Destination: 00:06:22:00:aa:37 (192.168.168.105)
    Source: 00:01:02:c8:42:01 (192.168.168.110)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 192.168.168.110 (192.168.168.110), Dst Addr: 
192.168.168.105 (192.168.168.105)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 124
    Identification: 0x08c2 (2242)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 128
    Protocol: UDP (0x11)
    Header checksum: 0x5f86 (correct)
    Source: 192.168.168.110 (192.168.168.110)
    Destination: 192.168.168.105 (192.168.168.105)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: kerberos (88), Dst Port: 1104 (1104)
    Source port: kerberos (88)
    Destination port: 1104 (1104)
    Length: 104
    Checksum: 0xa625 (correct)
Kerberos
    Pvno: 5
    MSG Type: KRB-ERROR (30)
    stime: 2004-08-02 03:47:10 (Z)
    susec: 844582
    error_code: KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED (41)
    Realm: LARASARI.COM
    Server Name  (Service and Instance): krbtgt LARASARI.COM
        Name-type: Service and Instance (2)
        Name: krbtgt
        Name: LARASARI.COM
 
thanks,
lara

"Douglas E. Engert" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


Lara Adianto wrote:
> 
> --- "Douglas E. Engert" wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> > Lara Adianto wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > I have a strange problem with cross-realm
> > authentication.
> > > It's a windows 2000 machine authenticating to an
> > MIT KDC, then it accesses a computer in a windows
> > domain. This should be possible theoritically with
> > ksetup, and all the necessary steps described in the
> > step by step kerberos interoperability document.
> > >
> > > However, this is what happen in my environment:
> > > 1. The user is able to login into windows 2000
> > machine with his credential in MT KDC. The windows
> > 2000 is configured to be a member of workgroup.
> > However, when I examine the setting setup using
> > ksetup, this is what I got:
> > > ksetup:
> > > default realm = ADIANTO.COM (external)
> > > ADIANTO.COM:
> > > kdc = kerberos.adianto.com
> > > Failed to create Kerberos key: 5 (0x5)
> >
> > I don't see the Failed message on my machine which
> > is setup similiarly, but I do
> > have some Mappings of principals to local accounts.
> >
> 
> I should have made it clearer.
> I did a name mappings with ksetup as well
> ksetup:
> default realm = ADIANTO.COM (external)
> ADIANTO.COM:
> kdc = kerberos.adianto.com
> Mapping [EMAIL PROTECTED] to lara
> 
> Besides the above info, I also added RealmFlags set to
> 8, LogLevel set to 1 in the registry.
> 
> But, when I logged in as lara, and checked ksetup.

Login is a [EMAIL PROTECTED] which says use Kerberos
if you just say lara it will use the local machine. 


> It shows this:
> default realm = ADIANTO.COM (external)
> ADIANTO.COM:
> kdc = kerberos.adianto.com
> Failed to create Kerberos key: 5 (0x5)
> 
> > > I'm not sure whether the last line is fatal.
> >
> > Since you where able to login, and you next note
> > show you got
> > a host/[EMAIL PROTECTED] ticket during
> > login,
> > the kerberos on the w2000 box looks good.
> >
> > >
> > > 2. When the user tried to access a computer in a
> > windows domain (should be possible due to the cross
> > realm setup), the following error occured:
> >
> > What do you mean "tried to access a computer in a
> > windows domain"?
> >
> > What applicaiton are you using?
> 
> What I mean is opening the network neighborhood,
> opening a windows domain to access one of its
> computer.
> It should be a single sign-on right ? 

NO! standard Kerberos does authentication. AD uses Kerberos
for authentication, then adds in its authorization data, 
the "PAC", into the ticket. 

But there is a way to tell AD that it should add a PAC. 
You wold have to setup the user account in AD and tell it
that it can accept external Kerberos authentication for
the user. We don't use this, so you wil have to look around
for the instrustions. 


In our enviroment we do just to opposite. The users are
in a AD domain, so if ther get tickets they have the PAC.
But they can get tickets for cross realm to a standard kerberos
realm that uas a number of unix servers. In this case the PAC 
is just ignored. 


> But instead, it
> prompts me with user logon and password !
> This is because the cross-realm auth failed with
> KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED (I checked it through ethereal)
> 
> > > Event Type: Error
> > > Event Source: Kerberos
> > > Event Category: None
> > > Event ID: 594
> > > Date: 7/29/2004
> > > Time: 7:37:30 PM
> > > User: N/A
> > > Computer: TEST
> > > Description:
> > > A Kerberos Error Message was received:
> > > on logon session
> > InitializeSecurityContext
> > > Client Time:
> > > Server Time:
> > > Error Code: 11:36:30.0000 7/29/2004 (null) 0x29
> > > Extended Error: KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED
> > > Client Realm:
> > > Client Name:
> > > Server Realm: WINDOMAIN.COM
> > > Server Name: krbtgt/WINDOMAIN.COM
> > > Target Name: HOST/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > Error Text:
> > > File:
> > > Line:
> > > Error Data is in record data.
> >
> >
> > Doing a google search for KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED shows
> > this in one of the messages:
> >
> > The kerberos client received a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED
> > error from the server
> > COMPANY$. This indicates that the password used
> > to encrypt the kerberos
> > service ticket is different than that on the
> > target server. Commonly,
> > this is due to identically named machine accounts
> > in the target realm
> > (COMPANY.NET), and the client realm. Please
> > contact your system
> > administrator.
> 
> I know what the error code means :-)
> I did a search in google as well. But I dont' have
> identically named machine account...
> 
> > This might also mean the cross realm keys don't
> > match, i.e. the user's realm
> > issued a tgt for the service realm, but the service
> > realm can not decrypt it.
> > Did you ever get any cross realm to work with the
> > user in the MIT realm, and the
> > service in the AD?
> > Did the UMich modification make any changes in this
> > area?
> 
> This is more possible for me. I noticed (with
> ethereal) that the checksum is wrong. Not sure why
> though...
> No, I don't try Windows KDC and MIT client...
> In fact, I got my setup working before. User can login
> to windows machine using MIT credentials, then access
> resources in win domain and even does a password
> change ! But yesterday, it suddenly failed...:-(
> Not sure why...maybe bec I just reinstalled my the
> win2k server that serves as win KDC...
> maybe bec I modified the ksetup in win client...
> sigh...
> 
> >
> > >
> > > Win2kServer is the computer that Test tried to
> > access, belonged to WINDOMAIN, which is a windows
> > domain.
> > >
> > > My guess is that the Failed to generate key caused
> > the KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED...
> > > but I can't confirm it...
> > > I'm not sure what caused it to fail to generate
> > the key...
> > >
> > > I've followed the steps in the step by step
> > kerberos interoperability document carefully...
> > >
> > > Any clue ?
> > >
> > > regards,
> > > lara
> > >
> > >
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > La vie, voyez-vous, ca n'est jamais si bon ni si
> > mauvais qu'on croit
> > >
> > - Guy de Maupassant -
> > >
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > __________________________________________________
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> > > ________________________________________________
> > > Kerberos mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
> >
> > --
> >
> > Douglas E. Engert 
> > Argonne National Laboratory
> > 9700 South Cass Avenue
> > Argonne, Illinois 60439
> > (630) 252-5444
> >
> 
> =====
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> La vie, voyez-vous, ca n'est jamais si bon ni si mauvais qu'on croit
> - Guy de Maupassant -
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> __________________________________
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-- 

Douglas E. Engert 
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Avenue
Argonne, Illinois 60439 
(630) 252-5444


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                                                                        - Guy de 
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