No, kadmin is never authenticated by a password. It's a Kerberos-authenticated 
service and generally requires initial tickets, which means you can't use a tgt 
to get a ticket for it.  Instead, in the usual case, the kadmin client will 
obtain an initial ticket for kadmin/admin, for which purpose it generally needs 
to prompt you for a password. The ticket it obtains is kept in memory and not 
ever written to a file where you can see it, but it does exist.  And, like all 
tickets, it has a lifetime.



________________________________
From: Yegui Cai <caiye...@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2019 11:42
To: Jeffrey Hutzelman
Cc: John Devitofranceschi; Greg Hudson; kerberos@mit.edu
Subject: Re: Admin session expiry

Hi Jeffrey.

I did some experiments with kadmin. It looks like by default, remote admin 
sessions are authenticated with admin password. And in that case, the sessions 
will never expired because there is no tickets in the system.

Does it mean I need to disable kadmin password authentication? if it is do-able?

Thanks,
Yegui

On Sun, Jan 13, 2019 at 11:33 AM Jeffrey Hutzelman 
<jh...@cmu.edu<mailto:jh...@cmu.edu>> wrote:
It's not necessary to disable the admin principal or expire the session to get 
this effect. The admin service is itself a Kerberos-authenticated service, and 
Kerberos tickets expire. Without valid tickets for the admin service, it is not 
possible to make a request, regardless of whether or not you happen to have a 
TCP connection open to the server.


By setting the max ticket lifetime for admin principals and/or the kadmin/admin 
service principal, you can limit the time these tickets are valid, and this the 
time during which it is possible to make admin requests.


-- Jeff

________________________________
From: John Devitofranceschi <j...@optonline.net<mailto:j...@optonline.net>>
Sent: Sunday, January 13, 2019 10:34
To: Greg Hudson
Cc: kerberos@mit.edu<mailto:kerberos@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Admin session expiry

On Jan 13, 2019, at 1:49 AM, Greg Hudson 
<ghud...@mit.edu<mailto:ghud...@mit.edu>> wrote:
>
> On 1/11/19 11:08 AM, Yegui Cai wrote:
>> Any plan to add the capability of expiring admin sessions into a future
>> release?
>
> We can consider it, although it would come at a complexity cost in the
> network code.  Can you describe why that feature is important in your
> deployment?
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> https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos

Banks and other highly regulated environments have requirements to implement 
controls around  the access of individuals to systems and data.

This includes “just in time” access provisioning and time-bound access to 
sensitive systems.

For a detailed example, see ch. 11.1 of the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s 
“Technology Risk Management Guidelines” (TRM Guidelines 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financial%20Stability/Regulatory%20and%20Supervisory%20Framework/Risk%20Management/TRM%20Guidelines%20%2021%20June%202013.pdf>)

"The [Financial Institution] should only grant user access to IT systems and 
networks on a need-to-use basis and within the period when the access is 
required.”

Now, these kinds of things are often vague and you can probably satisfy the 
requirements in a number of ways.

You *could* whack the admin session at the network level OR you *could* expire 
the admin principal that was used to authenticate the session (in an out of 
band process that’s been set up to manage such access) and demonstrate that 
even with a connected admin session the expired principal renders the session 
useless.

One of the key points for such controls is being able to provide evidence that 
the control is being met since it is not sufficient to do the right thing, you 
have to also be able to *prove* that you’re doing the right thing.  This is 
another can of worms entirely.

jd
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