On 11/15/23 23:22, Goetz Golla wrote:
* Does MIT Kerberos support PKINIT with Elliptic Curves as described
in RFC 5349 ?
A P-384 EC client certificate works in my tests, with either krb5-1.17
or the current code, as long as the KDC is also running MIT krb5.
Ken is correct that there is a hardcoded reference to RSA in the source:
p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption);
and this probably means the CMS signature has a piece of incorrect
metadata when an EC certificate is used. But this field is not used
when generating the signature contents and is ignored by OpenSSL when
verifying the signature (when the KDC is running MIT krb5).
* Could it be that for ECC client certificates the KDC certificate
also needs the be ECC ?
In my tests the KDC certificate was an RSA cert, so no.
Of course, my experience doesn't match yours. From your trace, I
believe that the failure occurs in the client code, not on the KDC, so
inspecting the KDC logs would not help. But the trace log does not
contain any detailed information about the failure.
You can sometimes improve the diagnostics for PKINIT failures by
removing the long-term keys associated with the principal, so that
authentication does not fall back to encrypted timestamp:
kadmin purgekeys -all user
If that doesn't help, it may be necessary to build the code with
debugging symbols and and step through it to find out where it is failing.
________________________________________________
Kerberos mailing list Kerberos@mit.edu
https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
