This issue was introduced in fce96cf04430 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest
driver") and thus affects 5.19 kernels and newer.

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2013198

Title:
  Fix (+follow-up) needed for SEV-SNP vulnerability

Status in linux package in Ubuntu:
  Incomplete
Status in linux-gcp package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in linux-gcp source package in Jammy:
  Fix Committed
Status in linux source package in Kinetic:
  Fix Committed

Bug description:
  From email discussions with Dionna Glazee from Google:

  
  > This email details a critical vulnerability in SEV-SNP attestation
  > report integrity protection that must be patched in SEV-SNP-enabled
  > kernels.
  >
  > I'm reaching out since I've been tracking our progress towards a
  > stable offering of customer access to SEV-SNP "guest requests". I'd
  > like to know how or if y'all test the /dev/sev-guest driver.
  >
  > The reason I ask is because our host KVM injects failures into the
  > guest if requests come too frequently. Test suites that request
  > attestation reports in quick succession will fail without very recent
  > patches or workaround code in user space.
  >
  > Technical details, tl;dr
  > * Nov 21, 2022: Linux Kernel 6.1 included a security patch 47894e0fa
  > that will cause attestation to fail frequently (in GCE). Peter found
  > and patched this vulnerability.
  >
  > Details of security patch 47894e0fa:
  > This patch to sev-guest causes more fail-closed situations. All VMM
  > errors other than INVALID_LEN will wipe out the VMPCK and close the
  > guest's ability to communicate with the security processor.
  > Ratelimit failures will also cause a fail-closed situation.
  >
  > As you may know, guest requests are encrypted by the guest with
  > AES_GCM (not AES_GCM_SIV) and then passed through unencrypted memory
  > to the host's KVM. KVM forwards that to the crypto/ccp driver to
  > deliver to the AMD secure processor to respond to. When the VMM
  > returns an error instead of forwarding a request to the secure
  > processor, then the guest driver *does not* increment its IV. It can
  > therefore reuse an IV on multiple messages with different contents.
  > This breaks AES_GCM's security guarantees.
  >
  > Ratelimiting looks to the guest not as a stalled vCPU, but rather a
  > special error response that AMD will include in their next published
  > version of the GHCB protocol (I believe v2.02). This allows the guest
  > VM to schedule other threads and remain productive while waiting up to
  > 2 seconds for a request to be serviced. The special error code to an
  > unpatched kernel is just forwarded to the guest as an EIO. User space
  > may continue to issue requests, even if it is unsafe to do so.

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