On Mon, 24 Feb 2020 14:40:12 -0500 Laura Abbott <la...@labbott.name> wrote:
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/drivers/char/random.c?id=c95ea0c69ffda19381c116db2be23c7e654dac98 > > And the thread if you'd like to read > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-api/cover.1577088521.git.l...@kernel.org/ Thank you Laura! That is just what I was looking for. Though not what I was hoping for. :-) They've just decided to make the kernel robust to the situation found in server farms. So, I can patch back to what I need to feed entropy into the kernel with no security concerns. Actually, it will be more secure since the kernel in a home system uses no where near the output of the rtl2832 (~ 90 KBytes / sec). Not enough for monte carlo, but plenty for the kernel and small simulations. The kernel entropy pool is 4096 bits, 512 bytes. As they say, it probably isn't necessary because the PRNG is secure under most (all?) conditions, but this can be thought of as suspenders, just in case there *is* a back door in the cha cha algorithm. _______________________________________________ kernel mailing list -- kernel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to kernel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/kernel@lists.fedoraproject.org
