On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 08:45:00PM +0530, Nayna Jain wrote: > On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel > image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A > soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and > initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the > signatures. > > This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now > loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image > and initramfs signatures. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <na...@linux.ibm.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.ibm.com>
The overall set seems sensible to me, and I see no errors here, Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <se...@hallyn.com> I do think that replacing the 'rc' with xattr_len in the previous line might help future readers save a few cycles. > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index deec1804a00a..9c13585e7d3e 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -294,7 +294,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > iint->ima_hash->length); > if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { > status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; > - } else if (rc) { > + break; > + } > + if (rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) > + rc = integrity_digsig_verify( > + INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, > + (const char *)xattr_value, > + xattr_len, > + iint->ima_hash->digest, > + iint->ima_hash->length); > + if (rc) { > cause = "invalid-signature"; > status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; > } else { > -- > 2.13.6 > _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec