On 06/24/19 at 10:01am, Dave Young wrote: > On 06/21/19 at 05:03pm, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > From: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]> > > > > This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down > > kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with > > kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature > > verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading > > usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. > > > > This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. > > Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG > > turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be > > loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. > > > > [Modified by David Howells such that: > > > > (1) verify_pefile_signature() differentiates between no-signature and > > sig-didn't-match in its returned errors. > > > > (2) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED if there is a signature for which we > > have a key, but signature doesn't match - even if in non-forcing mode. > > > > (3) kexec fails with EBADMSG or some other error if there is a signature > > which cannot be parsed - even if in non-forcing mode. > > > > (4) kexec fails with ELIBBAD if the PE file cannot be parsed to extract > > the signature - even if in non-forcing mode. > > > > ] > > Seems I do not see EBADMSG and ELIBBAD in this patch, also kexec fails > with proper errno instead of EKEYREJECTED only. > > I may missed something? Other than the patch log issue: > > Reviewed-by: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Hold on :) Noticed another issue, please see comment inline.. > > > > > Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]> > > Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]> > > Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]> > > cc: [email protected] > > --- > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++--- > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++- > > include/linux/kexec.h | 4 +-- > > kernel/kexec_file.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- > > 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > index c1f9b3cf437c..84381dd60760 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > @@ -2012,20 +2012,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE > > config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY > > def_bool KEXEC_FILE > > > > -config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG > > +config KEXEC_SIG > > bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" > > depends on KEXEC_FILE > > ---help--- > > - This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for > > - the kexec_file_load() syscall. > > > > - In addition to that option, you need to enable signature > > + This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid > > + signature of the kernel image. The image can still be loaded without > > + a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if > > + there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid. > > + > > + In addition to this option, you need to enable signature > > verification for the corresponding kernel image type being > > loaded in order for this to work. > > > > +config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE > > + bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall" > > + depends on KEXEC_SIG > > + ---help--- > > + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for > > + the kexec_file_load() syscall. > > + > > config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG > > bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support" > > - depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG > > + depends on KEXEC_SIG > > depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION > > select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > > ---help--- > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c > > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c > > index d178650fd524..4473cea1e877 100644 > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c > > @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, > > unsigned int pelen, > > > > if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) { > > pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n"); > > - return -EKEYREJECTED; > > + return -ENODATA; > > } > > > > chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, > > @@ -408,6 +408,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned > > int pelen, > > * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the > > trust > > * keyring, or: > > * > > + * (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present. > > + * > > * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check > > on a > > * chain. > > * > > diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h > > index b9b1bc5f9669..58b27c7bdc2b 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h > > +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h > > @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ typedef void *(kexec_load_t)(struct kimage *image, char > > *kernel_buf, > > unsigned long cmdline_len); > > typedef int (kexec_cleanup_t)(void *loader_data); > > > > -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG > > typedef int (kexec_verify_sig_t)(const char *kernel_buf, > > unsigned long kernel_len); > > #endif > > @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ struct kexec_file_ops { > > kexec_probe_t *probe; > > kexec_load_t *load; > > kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup; > > -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG > > kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig; > > #endif > > }; > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > index f1d0e00a3971..eec7e5bb2a08 100644 > > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct > > kimage *image) > > return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image); > > } > > > > -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG > > static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf, > > unsigned long buf_len) > > { > > @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int > > kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, > > const char __user *cmdline_ptr, > > unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags) > > { > > - int ret = 0; > > + const char *reason; > > + int ret; > > void *ldata; > > loff_t size; > > > > @@ -207,15 +208,47 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, > > int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, > > if (ret) > > goto out; > > > > -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG > > ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, > > image->kernel_buf_len); > > - if (ret) { > > - pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n"); > > +#else > > + ret = -ENODATA; Use -ENODATA for above case looks not correct, please just remove the #else and move the #endif to the end of the switch chunk. > > +#endif > > + > > + switch (ret) { > > + case 0: > > + break; > > + > > + /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not > > + * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there > > + * must be a valid signature. > > + */ > > + case -ENODATA: > > + reason = "kexec of unsigned image"; > > + goto decide; > > + case -ENOPKG: > > + reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto"; > > + goto decide; > > + case -ENOKEY: > > + reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key"; > > + decide: > > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { > > + pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason); > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + ret = 0; > > + break; > > + > > + /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable > > + * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures > > + * aren't required. > > + */ > > + default: > > + pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > > goto out; > > } > > - pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n"); > > -#endif > > + > > /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ > > if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { > > ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, > > -- > > 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog > > Thanks Dave _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
