On Tue, 2023-08-29 at 15:34 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > On Mon, Aug 21, 2023 at 7:08 PM Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > On Mon, 2023-08-21 at 15:05 -0700, Sush Shringarputale wrote: > > > On 8/14/2023 3:02 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > On Mon, 2023-08-14 at 14:42 -0700, Sush Shringarputale wrote: > > > >>> This design seems overly complex and requires synchronization between > > > >>> the "snapshot" record and exporting the records from the measurement > > > >>> list. None of this would be necessary if the measurements were copied > > > >>> from kernel memory to a backing file (e.g. tmpfs), as described in > > > >>> [1]. > > > Even if the Kernel maintains the link between a tmpfs exported and an > > > in-memory IMA log - it still has to copy the tmpfs portion to the > > > Kernel memory during kexec soft boot. tmpfs is cleared during kexec, > > > so this copying of tmpfs back to kernel memory is necessary to preserve > > > the integrity of the log during kexec. But the copying would add back > > > the memory pressure on the node during kexec (which may result in > > > out-of-memory), defeating the purpose of the overall effort/feature. > > > Copying to a regular *persistent* protected file seems a cleaner > > > approach, compared to tmpfs. > > > > From a kernel perspective, it doesn't make a difference if userspace > > provides a tmpfs or persistent file. As per the discussion > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/caoq4uxj4pv2wr1wgvbcdr-tna5dszt3rvddzkgah1aev_-r...@mail.gmail.com/#t > > , userspace provides the kernel with the file descriptor of the opened > > file. > > > > > We prototyped this solution, however it > > > does not seem to be a common pattern within the Kernel to write state > > > directly to files on disk file systems. We considered two potential > > > options: > > > > If no file descriptor is provided, then the measurements aren't copied > > and removed from the securityfs file. If there are write errors, the > > measurements aren't removed from the securityfs file until the write > > errors are resolved. > > It sounds like this approach would require the file/filesystem to be > continuously available for the life of the system once the log was > snapshotted/overflowed to persistent storage, yes? Assuming that is > the case, what happens if the file/filesystem becomes inaccessible at > some point and an attestation client attempts to read the entire log?
The main purpose of the change is to addres kernel memory pressure. Two designs are being discussed: Sush's "snapshotting" design and Amir's original suggestion of continously exporting the measurement records to a tmpfs or regular file. Both designs require verifying the initial attestation quote by walking the entire measurement list, calculating the expected TPM PCR value(s). That doesn't change. -- thanks, Mimi _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
