On 15/08/2024 8:10 pm, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote: >> On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >>> Eric Biggers <ebigg...@kernel.org> writes: >>>> That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to >>>> use >>>> SHA-256-only". That implies that you do not, in fact, prefer SHA-256 >>>> only. Is >>>> that the case? Sure, maybe there are situations where you *have* to use >>>> SHA-1, >>>> but why would you not at least *prefer* SHA-256? >>> Yes. Please prefer to use SHA-256. >>> >>> Have you considered implementing I think it is SHA1-DC (as git has) that >>> is compatible with SHA1 but blocks the known class of attacks where >>> sha1 is actively broken at this point? >> We are using the kernel's implementation, addressing what the kernel >> provides is beyond our efforts. Perhaps someone who is interested in >> improving the kernel's SHA1 could submit a patch implementing/replacing >> it with SHA1-DC, as I am sure the maintainers would welcome the help. > Well, someone who is interested to get his "secure" code merged should > have a vested interested to have a non-broken SHA1 implementation if > there is a sensible requirement to use SHA1 in that new "secure" code, > no?
No. The use of SHA-1 is necessary even on modern systems to avoid a vulnerability. It is the platform, not Linux, which decides which TPM PCR banks are active. Linux *must* have an algorithm for every active bank (which is the platform's choice), even if the single thing it intends to do is cap the bank and use better ones. Capping a bank requires updating the TPM Log without corrupting it, which requires a hash calculation of the correct type for the bank. ~Andrew _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
