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STRATFOR.COM
Weekly Global Intelligence Update 22 February 2000 Forging a New Japan Summary Last week, Japan's foreign ministry announced that Tokyo is considering deploying vessels to patrol the Strait of Malacca, where shipping has been plagued by piracy. The announcement coincides with a much broader debate over Japan's use of the armed forces and the very constitution that has limited their use for the last half-century. Forced by economic circumstance, Japan is beginning to undergo a sea-change in its thinking. Japan is beginning to come to grips with a reality it has tried to deny - It is a great power with strategic interests as pressing as its economic ones. Analysis Last week the Japanese government announced that it is considering sending ships from its Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0002180030.htm, the equivalent of the U.S. Coast Guard, to help patrol the Strait of Malacca, in order to stop piracy. Yasako Kurihama, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, was quoted as saying that Japan might formally propose such patrols at a conference to be held in Singapore in March. The Strait of Malacca is among the most strategically valuable waterways in the world, connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans and serving as the major waterway between Japan and its oil sources in the Persian Gulf. The Strait has been the site of increasing acts of piracy. Increasing numbers of the more than 2,000 ships that move through the Strait daily are subject to hijacking. The Japanese are positioning themselves to join forces from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, China and South Korea to patrol the waterway. But there is a much larger context than merely the control of piracy. Tokyo's proposal comes during a growing debate over the possible revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The device with which Japan swore off militarism after World War II, Article 9 states that, "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." Leading Japanese politicians are calling for changing the constitution, which was in large part the handiwork of the United States. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has been a key figure advocating the constitution's modification. Early this month, The New York Times quoted him as saying, "We have had the experience of the last 50 years, and all of the shortcomings of the defects of our constitution have become visible. Now, as we go into the 21st century, there is a surging trend of wanting to review or revisit the structures of the state." Last week, an unprecedented debate on revising the constitution opened in the upper house of parliament, with the dominant Liberal Democratic Party and the Liberal Party calling for a constitutional amendment and the Communist and Social Democratic Parties opposing any change. The Democratic Party of Japan and the New Komeito, a Buddhist party, appear willing to discuss change in general, without necessarily agreeing to the revision of Article 9. But in effect, the Japanese establishment, represented by the LDP and to a lesser extent by the Liberals, are now of the opinion that Article 9 should be revised in the context of possible broader institutional changes. This is a sea change in Japanese thinking. The Liberal Party's Sadao Irano said that "a Japan that forgot history and tradition in post-war years is being buffeted by sham pacifism, belief in the undisciplined market, biased human rights and collapse of education. The cause of such a state of affairs lies in the after effects of our defeat in the war and the occupation regime, the so- called Potsdam syndrome." In other words, the constitution is an American invention, imposed on Japan in opposition to the country's own traditions, that needs to be revised. These views still represent the extreme of public discourse, but they are very much part of a newly respectable viewpoint that is critically reviewing three issues: pacifism, the uncontrolled free market and Western definitions of human rights. While the focus of political debate has been Article 9, the constitutional debate really addresses the larger issue of Japan's emergence from the post-World War II world. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the Japanese have argued - often disingenuously - that Article 9 prohibits Japan's involvement in U.S. military adventures. In fact, Article 9 does not limit Japan's ability to use its armed forces; it prohibits Japan from maintaining an armed force at all. Japan established its armed forces in complete opposition to the constitution, with U.S. encouragement. Article 9 was something that the United States very quickly came to regret. As the Cold War intensified, Washington could only wish it had imposed the same standards on Japan that it had on Germany. German forces, after all, were an integral part of U.S. containment strategy in Europe. But in Asia, Article 9 prevented a similar use of Japanese forces in Korea and Vietnam. Three things must be understood about Article 9: ·Japan has been in complete violation of Article 9 since the 1950s, when it began to build the Self-Defense Forces. Today, Japan spends more on defense than any country except the United States. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Forces consist of over 150,000 men, larger - if not as well equipped - as the British Royal Army. Tokyo maintains the most sophisticated Asian navy, with more major surface combatants than China. ·The Japanese have used Article 9 as a shield against the Americans. By redefining Article 9 to exclude the clause on maintaining a military establishment, but clinging to the section that precludes the use of the military, Tokyo has been able to deflect U.S. demands for Japanese forces. ·The United States has paradoxically been both arbiter and object of Japan's constitution. The United States invented and imposed the constitution during occupation. In a very real sense, the United States owned and arbitrated the constitution. But the figurative founder of the Japanese constitution has also condoned the maintenance of the armed forces. And so, the Japanese establishment has used Article 9 to cling to definitions that serve the Japanese national interest. Article 9 has given Japan enormous control over its foreign policy - while allowing it to develop its military power at its own discretion. Now, the current debate in Tokyo is attacking the fundamental premises of this broad, post-war bargain. The first premise under attack is the notion that Japan can defend its national interests, although it is unwilling to use its armed forces. The second, and much more important attack, is forcing a fundamental re-examination of the appropriateness - the very relevance - of the constitution. The reason for this re-examination is simple - the terms no longer work. Japanese grand strategy has consisted of three elements. First, the U.S.-Japanese relationship was the foundation of Japanese foreign policy, leading to the acceptance of U.S. forces in Japan and subordination to the wishes of the United States. Second, Japanese politicians were to use Article 9 to avoid any direct exposure of Japanese forces in American conflicts. Third, Japan was to exploit Washington's interest in an economically strong and socially stable Japan to build a powerful industrial base heavily dependent on exports. All along, the third was the payoff for the first. But the payoff is missing. Japan has been in a long-term economic malaise since the early 1990s. Despite economic forecasts to the contrary, Japanese government officials have admitted that when figures for the last quarter of 1999 quarter are published, they will show a sharp drop in Japan's gross domestic product. This follows a one percent contraction in the previous quarter. Japan remains mired in recession. The best news that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) could produce was that the all-industries index, which measures output, will likely decline only by 0.1 percent. Some view this with comfort. But the fact that economic output remains flat while consumption declines is even more frightening, indicating a backlog of supply, even if consumption picks up. With the foundations of its grand strategy shattered and its economic miracle at an end, Japan's must revise its institutions at home and its strategic relationships abroad. This development will cut two ways. At home, the success of Japan's post-war generation is now in question. Everything from pacifism to the free-market to Western notions of human rights must eventually be justified anew. If these notions fail the test, they will be jettisoned; they are not backed by centuries of tradition. Abroad, the weakness of the economy will strain relations with the United States. Japan's core economic problem is extremely low capital formation. Even with high savings rates, Japan's ability to turn money into capital is limited by the country's banking crisis. As U.S. interest rates rise, Japan's ability to raise capital internally and externally will fall further. Already protectionist, Japan will become more aggressive in protecting its markets and asserting its export policy. In the current economic circumstance, this is a tolerable situation. But if the United States experiences a slow-down, which is likely, then the U.S. response will be testy. Japan very much wants to maintain its relationship with the United States. Becoming more helpful in security matters is a good way to create a new dimension of dependency as the economic relationship frays. Thus, one way to express the constitutional debate is to say that it will permit Japan to participate in international peacekeeping operations. It is both useful for domestic political consumption and positions Japan well in its relationship to the United States. But there is a deeper reality, only now being openly expressed: Japan is a great power, the world's second-largest economy with global economic interests. Japan must have unfettered access to oil from the Persian Gulf and to secure that oil, Japan must be certain that the Strait of Malacca is open to shipping. It is a matter of fundamental national interest. Until now, Japan has relied on another player, the United States, to guarantee fundamental national interests. But from a rational Japanese standpoint, American reliability is in doubt. It is simply not certain that the United States is prepared, under any and all circumstances, to pay the price required to secure Japan's national interest. With U.S. and Japanese economic realities diverging, the probability that the two countries have identical geopolitical interests declines. With economic friction growing, the possibility that they will have opposing geopolitical interests can no longer simply be ruled out. Given Japan's history, this is not merely a matter of declaring a new policy. It requires a fundamental reinterpretation of what Japan is as a society and as a nation. Over time, Japan will have to radically reconstruct its constitution. It is, after all, a document written by Americans. That the constitution has evolved into something else merely demonstrates that it is not a permanent feature of Japanese life. It will evolve again, or be replaced. Much more important is the re-emergence of Japan as a normal and great power, with political and military power and interests that parallel economic power and interests. Over time, likely the course of a generation, Japan will become an important element in the new, global politics. The terrific pressure that Japanese society feels today from its economic failures cannot be underestimated. Massive economic pain can rapidly produce major social and political changes. This may be neither what the Japanese intend nor what they want. But no one in Japan today wanted the current economic situation or its consequences. What Japan wants to do and what Japan will have to do are very different things. (c) 2000, WNI Inc. __________________________________________________ _______
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