> >STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG > >http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special46.htm > > >Stratfor >Kosovo: One Year Later >0303 GMT, 000317 >Summary > >Nearly one year after NATO first intervened in Kosovo, >it appears the alliance has failed to fulfill its >chief objectives, both in waging the war and keeping >the peace. Increasingly, Kosovo seems beyond the >allianceís control as crime, weapons and drug >trafficking resurface. Alliance forces are now on the >defensive against former allies within the ethnic >Albanian community; the guerrillas of the Kosovo >Liberation Army (KLA) now appear to hold positions of >considerable power. Nine months after the war, the >West faces a choice. It can increase its grip on >Kosovo, committing more troops and confronting the >KLA, or the alliance can resign itself to losing >control of Kosovo. > >Analysis > >NATOís war against Yugoslavia set a precedent at >considerable cost. It was the first instance of >unilateral NATO intervention in a sovereign nation >during the allianceís 50-year history. NATO sent more >than 1,000 aircraft to fly more than 38,000 sorties, >at an eventual estimated cost of tens of billions of >dollars. The alliance deployed 38,000 peacekeepers, >drawn from 28 countries, with no foreseeable end to >their mission. Reconstruction has barely begun and is >expected to cost another $32 billion. > >But one year later, the allianceís peacekeeping >mission, known as KFOR, is failing. Not only does >ethnic violence persist, but the alliance appears to >be further losing control. The murder rate in the >rural breakaway province now equals that of the >worldís largest cities. Sources on the ground report >that weapons are increasingly in the hands of former >guerrillas. NATO troops have come under attack by the >ethnic Albanian majority as well as the Serb minority. >The alliance is steadily headed toward a daunting >choice. It must increase its grip on Kosovo or resign >itself to providing a garrison force that safeguards a >tumultuous province, which is effectively in the hands >of the KLA. > >Kosovoís State of Violence >KFOR entered the province to fulfill three missions: >to ensure safety, enforce compliance with the June >1999 cease-fire agreements and temporarily assist the >United Nations with civilian functions, such as >policing and reconstruction. But Kosovo has steadily >become an upside-down world of reversed roles. The >guerrillas were supposed to disarm and disband but >have in fact maintained a strong hold on power. >Increasingly, KFOR troops are defending themselves not >just against remaining pockets of Serbs, but >apparently against their wartime allies in the KLA. > >It appears that elements of the guerrillas are >orchestrating violence that threatens international >forces. Even Western military officials have come >grudgingly, though privately, to the conclusion that >extremist elements of the KLA are making a bid for >outright independence. NATO troops were stoned last >October in the western city of Pec. The recent >violence in the northern city of Mitrovica included a >grenade attack that wounded 17 KFOR troops. In >February, KFOR Cmdr. Gen. Klaus Reinhardt said, ìWhen >NATO came into Kosovo we were only supposed to fight >the Yugoslav army if they came back uninvited. Now >weíre finding we have to fight the Albanians.î > >Violent crime is falling but the largely rural >province is far from safe. In the southeast corner of >Kosovo, the American sector, there were 615 incidents >of hostile fire, 15 mortar attacks, 20 altercations >with unruly crowds, 129 grenade attacks and 58 >landmine explosions ñ in the first six months of >peacekeeping, according to NATO figures. The murder >rate for the entire province has dropped from 127 >murders per 100,000 people at the end of the war to 23 >murders per 100,000. Still, the murder rate of rural >Kosovo now equals the murder rate of Los Angeles, >California ñ one of the worldís largest and most >densely populated cities. > >Under the June cease-fire agreement, the KLA was >supposed to disband and disarm, but there is evidence >that former guerrillas now enjoy easy ñ even >sanctioned ñ access to weapons. Some 5,000 former KLA >guerrillas have joined the Kosovo Protection Corps >(KPC), a sort of national guard for emergency and >disaster response. They are allowed to carry sidearms >with the proper permit cards. But the permit cards are >being copied and distributed to other former >guerrillas, according to an international police >source. > >The Power of the KLA and Drug Trafficking > >In many ways, the state of affairs in Kosovo is the >result of a lack of government. The United Nations has >never had a complete plan to set up a government; nine >months after peacekeeping began there is none. In this >vacuum, the KLA has flourished. > >While the KLA was to have disbanded, two important >wartime figures remain at the core of the still >existent KLA power structure. Hashim Thaci, who led >the KLAís political wing and became the chief contact >for the West, is now Kosovoís most important ethnic >Albanian politician. The commander of the KLAís >military wing, Agim Cequ, commands 5,000 former >guerrillas who are now in the Kosovo Protection Corps. > > >The KLA is indebted to Balkan drug organizations that >helped funnel both cash and arms to the guerrillas >before and after the conflict. Kosovo is the heart of >a heroin trafficking route that runs from Afghanistan >through Turkey and the Balkans and into Western >Europe. It now appears that the KLA must pay back the >organized crime elements. This would in turn create a >surge in heroin trafficking in the coming months, just >as it did following the NATO occupation of Bosnia in >the mid-1990s. > >Two to six tons of heroin, worth 12 times its weight >in gold, moves through Turkey toward Eastern Europe >each month. The route connecting the Taliban-run opium >fields of Afghanistan to Western Europeís heroin >market is worth an estimated $400 billion a year ñ and >is dominated by the Kosovar Albanians. This ìBalkan >Routeî supplies 80 percent of Europeís heroin. > >For the KLA, the Balkan Route is not only a way to >ship heroin to Europe for a massive profit, but it >also acted as a conduit for weapons filtering into the >war-torn Balkans. The smugglers either trade drugs >directly for weapons or buy weapons with drug earnings >in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, >Montenegro, Switzerland or Turkey. The arsenal of >weapons smuggled into Kosovo has included: >anti-aircraft missiles, assault rifles, sniper rifles, >mortars, shotguns, grenade launchers, anti-personnel >mines and infrared night vision gear, according to a >NATO report cited in the Washington Times in June >1999. > >There is already anecdotal evidence that the drug >trade is flourishing in Kosovo, in full view of >international authorities. The bombed out, unpaved >streets of Kosovo are the new home to sleek European >sports cars with no license plates. There are 20 >percent to 25 percent more cars in Kosovo than there >were before the war, according to an international >police official recently returned from several months >in Kosovo. The refugees claim Serbs took the plates, >but the black Mercedes are signs of a prospering drug >trade. > >Beyond Kosovo >Drug smuggling will make an impact beyond the Balkans >and deep into the rest of Europe. Ethnic Albanians are >the predominant smugglers in the Western European >heroin market, according to Interpol data. > >Some 500,000 Kosovar Albanians live in Western Europe. >Those living off the heroin trade rely on clan >loyalties to tightly control their business partners. >They gain access to Western European cities by >exploiting their reputation as refugees. This gives >them a distinct advantage over the Turks or Italians. > >Although Albanian speakers comprise about 1 percent of >Europeís 510 million residents, they made up 14 >percent of all Europeans arrested for heroin smuggling >in 1997, according to Interpol. The average quantity >of heroin confiscated from arrested smugglers was two >grams; ethnic Albanians arrested for the same crime >carried an average of 120 grams, the agency said. > >The U.S. government has been ñ and likely continues to >be ñ well aware of the heroin trade coming through >Kosovo, as well as the KLA connection. Just two years >before the war, the Clinton administration wanted >national security waivers for 14 countries ñ including >Yugoslavia ñ in order to send arms and stem drug >trafficking. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency reported >in 1998 that ethnic Albanian organizations in Kosovo >are ìsecond only to Turkish gangs as the predominant >heroin smugglers along the Balkan route.î > >Today, Kosovo poses for NATO an ironically similar >problem to the one it posed in 1999. Kosovoís problems >ñ smuggling, crime and violence ñ threaten to spill >out into the Balkan region. Tensions between the Serbs >and ethnic Albanians challenge stability in Montenegro >and Serbia, the remaining Yugoslav republics. The >alliance must not only contain Kosovoís problems, but >prevent renewed war between the KLA and Yugoslav >forces in Serbia. > >Montenegro threatens to become the next hot spot as a >result of the Kosovo war. The provinceís leadership >has taken its cues from the international communityís >defense of Kosovo. Montenegrin President Milo >Djukanovic has announced that the West is ready to >offer help in the event of a Serb attack. Officials >from the U.N. and human rights groups have made >increasingly loud requests for Western attention to >Montenegro. > >NATOís Next Move > >NATO now faces a dilemma. It must take control of the >situation in Kosovo by increasing its troop presence >and confronting its former allies in the KLA. Or the >alliance can accept a role as vassal to the >guerrillas, essentially safeguarding Kosovo from a >Serbian invasion. The guerrillas, in turn, would run >Kosovo as they see fit. > >Withdrawing altogether from Kosovo is out of the >question; Yugoslav forces would quickly pour into the >province. The prospect of vastly increasing forces is >unpleasant. As it stands now NATO members are >reluctant to deploy even enough troops to meet the >current mandate of 50,000 peacekeepers. > >To maintain control, though, the alliance must do more >than increase its presence; it must reconsider its >allies in Kosovo. There are signs that the West may >play a longtime moderate, Ibrahim Rugova, against >Thaci. During his recent trip to Kosovo, State >Department spokesman James Rubin met with Rugova, the >first high-level public contact between U.S. officials >and Rugova since he was abandoned last year. The >prospect is stark. NATO would have to crush the KLA, >risking more violence and a public relations >nightmare. > >NATOís other option is probably even more unappealing: >handing the KLA the keys to Kosovo. In such a >scenario, the alliance would give ethnic Albanian >political and civil leaders ñ with a few Serbs thrown >in to demonstrate multi-ethnic governance ñ political >control. But in fact the KLA would retain the upper >hand. Alliance troops would remain to safeguard >whatever state the former guerrillas choose to build. >CIS Intelligence Center > > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Talk to your friends online with Yahoo! Messenger. >http://im.yahoo.com > > >______________________________________________________________________ >To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] >______________________________________________________________________ >Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
