>From: Rick Rozoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG > >http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/032000.ASP > >GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE > >Balkan Futures >20 March 2000 > >Summary > >Nearing the anniversary of the Kosovo war, it is time >to consider winners and losers. Things are not as >clear as they were a year ago. President Slobodan >Milosevic has survived his defeat and the territorial >integrity of the rest of Belgradeís domain appears >intact. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is eager to >establish an Albanian state in Kosovo but is blocked >by NATO. And the alliance ñ unable to suppress the >guerrillas, unable to withdraw and unwilling to >negotiate with Milosevic ñ is devoid of options. A >year later, Milosevic seems both secure and hopeful >that events are moving his way. In an odd parallel to >Saddam Husseinís experience, being defeated by the >West may open doors rather than close them. > >Analysis > >Itís been almost a year since the beginning of the >Kosovo war and it is time to take stock. In many ways, >it is easier to understand what has happened than what >is going to happen, not only because the future is >inherently unknowable, but because the future of the >Balkans is particularly opaque. It is made opaque by >three facts. First, NATO has enabled the Kosovo >Liberation Army (KLA) to come close to its goal of >creating an Albanian state in Kosovo. Second, NATO has >failed to break the Serbian nation and to deprive it >of the means to influence events in Kosovo. Third, >NATO does not want to see an Albanian state in Kosovo >nor does it want to see Serbian power re-emerge. > >In short, the two national competitors, Serbs and >Albanians, remain in place while NATO stands opposed >to both of their national aspirations. To further >complicate matters, because it lacks the necessary >military power, NATO is neither in a position to >impose its will, should it actually redefine its >policy, nor is NATO in a position to withdraw. Thus, >we are in a three-player game in Kosovo in which none >of the parties will or wishes to abandon the field and >none can prevail. NATO has maneuvered itself into a >position where it threatens the national aspirations >of both Serbs and Albanians simultaneously, yet lacks >the force to govern directly. This is a prescription >for chaos. > >To fully appreciate the danger of the situation, we >need to understand that both the Albanians and Serbs >find themselves in very similar strategic positions. >Both sides have achieved the underlying preconditions >necessary to move from a defensive to offensive >position. Each side is probing the othersí (and >NATOís) weaknesses. Thus, each side is daily becoming >more aggressive. > >A year ago, the Albanians as a whole and the KLA took >advantage of what Serbia was providing, an image of an >ethnic population undergoing massive violations of >human rights. The goal of this campaign was to trigger >a NATO intervention against Yugoslavia. The Albanians >had a fairly sophisticated understanding of the >consequences of NATO intervention. NATOís actions >would expel Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, which in >turn would force at least a partial withdrawal of the >Serbian population, who would make one of two >assumptions: > >1. That NATO was in favor of a Kosovo cleansed of >Serbs and that it was, in effect, a full ally of >Albanian national aspirations. > >2. That NATO, whatever its intentions, was ineffective >in defending the Serbian population from KLA attacks. > >The KLA took advantage of Serbian actions, Western >perceptions and political realities within NATO >capitals. NATO intervention allowed the KLA to lay the >foundation for an effective strategy toward some clear >goals. > >Letís consider the KLAís strategic goals: > >1. Becoming the preeminent political force among >Albanians in Kosovo. > >2. The creation of a KLA-dominated government in >Kosovo. > >3. The unification of Kosovo with Albania proper under >a government dominated by the KLA and its allies. > >4. The extension of Albania to all areas populated by >Albanians. > >5. The creation of an Albanian entity that is secure, >regionally dominant and that controls the primary >trade routes from Turkey to central Europe. > >The KLA achieved its first goal when the United States >and NATO were forced to rely on it to enable ground >operations in Kosovo. NATO depended on the KLA for >intelligence, to pin Serb ground forces down during >the bombing operation and to enable NATOís special >forces to carry out operations in the region. This >dependency gave the KLA three advantages. First, as a >primary intelligence source for NATO, the KLA was able >to shape NATOís understanding of what was happening on >the ground. This, in turn, shaped NATO operations in >favor of the KLA not only in relation to the Serbs, >but also in relation to other, non-KLA Albanian >political forces. Second, by supplying and supporting >KLA forces during the conflict, NATO strengthened the >KLA in relation to other Albanian factions, while >providing the KLA with a political imprimatur as >NATOís anointed. Finally, in relying on the KLA for >civil administration after the war, NATO made the KLA >the de facto government of Kosovo. > >Having achieved its first goal, the KLA is now engaged >in pursuing its second: the creation of a >KLA-dominated government in Kosovo. This has led to >an interesting reversal. NATO, the KLAís enabler in >its first phase, is now the KLAís primary block in >achieving its second goal. NATO cannot tolerate the >KLA achieving its second strategic goal for domestic >political and geopolitical reasons. Domestically, an >Albanian state in Kosovo, with the inevitable ethnic >cleansing of Serbs, would provide armed political >opponents of NATO governments. Some of these >countries, like the United States, are currently in >the midst of elections that are devoid of >international content. The triumph of the KLA would >give George Bush a weapon that Clinton must deny him. > >There is also a deeper geopolitical reason. The >creation of an Albanian Kosovo would inevitably lead >to its integration with Albania proper. It would >create the demand for border rectifications with >countries like Macedonia that have Albanian >populations, making Albania a dominant regional power. >Although Albania is one of the most impoverished areas >of Europe it must be remembered that there is a >massive throughput of narcotics that could provide >resources for improving Albanian military capability, >if not standards of living. This is not something that >other countries in the region want to see. In >particular, Greece and Italy, both NATO members with >important national interests in the Balkans, would be >upset with this evolution. Therefore, NATO, having >helped the KLA achieve its first strategic goal, must >now act to block its second strategic goal. > >Complicating the situation dramatically is the fact >that the Serbs themselves now find themselves in a >much more favorable strategic position than they were >just a few months ago. Consider Milosevicís strategic >interests: > >1. Stay in power in Belgrade. > >2. Prevent the further disintegration of the >Yugoslavian Federation. > >3. Reclaim lost territories and integrate areas that >are predominantly Serbian. > >4. Make Serbia the preeminent power in the Balkans. > >It seems clear, a year after the war began, that like >Saddam Hussein, Milosevic is not going to fall. The >facile assumptions made after the war that he could >not survive his humiliation by NATO have proven false. >Milosevic was certainly despised by many factions for >leading his country into war and being outmaneuvered >by NATO, but he retained substantial support. NATOís >persistent anti-Serbian policy had persuaded many >Serbs that NATO, for some uncertain reason, meant to >obliterate the Serbian nation. Milosevic was seen as a >champion of Serbia and as NATOís victim. He presented >himself as a man who had thwarted NATOís true >ambitions by confining Serbiaís defeat to Kosovo. > >At the same time, the democratic opposition that NATO >had fantasized about was neither as democratic as NATO >believed, nor as united. Certainly, it was not as >powerful as NATO believed. Whatever bitterness there >was toward Milosevicís mishandling of the war, the >opposition was perceived as being opportunists, or >worse, as tools of NATO. His opponents were made to >look like traitors. Therefore, in spite of intense >efforts by NATO to topple Milosevic after the war, all >that it achieved was to flush Milosevicís opposition >out into the open, and force it to display its >impotence. This substantially strengthened Milosevicís >hand. As with Saddam, the mere fact that Milosevic >survived helped restore his credibility. > >Milosevic then was able to block the further >disintegration of Serbia by outmaneuvering Montenegrin >separatists until even NATO no longer had any >confidence in them. Milosevicís ability to sustain the >presence of federal forces in Montenegro was the first >step. When Montenegroís political evolution led to its >remaining inside the Yugoslav federation, the logic of >disintegration was aborted. Vague discussions of >Vojvodinaís seceding to Hungary, the entry of NATO >forces into Serbia proper and other territorial >fantasies petered out over the year. The breaking >point came recently. When the KLA tried to generate >anti-Serb actions among Albanians still living inside >Serbia, NATO itself was forced to protect the Serb >frontier. During raids carried out last week, it >actually struck at KLA bases along the border. NATO is >now protecting the territorial integrity of the rest >of Serbia. The main threat to Serbiaís territorial >integrity, NATOís covert and overt operations, has >dissolved. What is left of Belgradeís domain will >survive. > >That leaves Milosevic with his third goal: reclaiming >lost territories, beginning with Kosovo. Milosevic now >sees time on his side. Milosevic never understood the >alliance between NATO and the KLA. He never understood >that there was no deep, geopolitical community of >interest between the two, but that what bound them was >NATOís domestic political situation and the KLAís >ambitions. He did not expect NATO and the KLA to split >because he never understood how shallow the ties were. >Milosevic is undoubtedly delighted by his new >understanding of the situation. As the KLA pressed >forward with its second strategic mission, it forced a >split with NATO that directly benefited Serbia. > >NATOís entire mission is now based on a rapidly >dissolving foundation. Unless NATO can convince the >KLA to abandon any further strategic ambitions ñ which >is unlikely ñ it is going to find itself trapped >between the absolutely unforgivable Milosevic and the >utterly ungrateful KLA. NATO cannot withdraw without >being made to look imbecilic and it canít stay without >great danger. > >>From where Milosevic sits, this is an ideal situation. > If NATO leaves, the Serbs still enjoy military >superiority over the Albanians and will be in a >situation to intervene. On the other hand, the longer >NATO remains, the less sympathy there will be in the >West for the Albanians. If NATO stays, it will >inevitably become dependent, at least covertly, on >Serbs in Kosovo, and perhaps on the other side of the >border as well. > >The KLA cannot hold back. They have their own intense >credibility problem. NATO is now clearly going to try >to create a non-KLA political alternative among the >Albanians. More important, NATO has a strategic card >to play against the KLA. We give substantial credence >to reports that not only is KLA a critical part of the >global narcotics traffic system, but that it is using >Kosovo as a transshipment point. NATO does not have >sufficient forces in Kosovo to bring peace, but it has >sufficient capability to interrupt parts of the drug >trade. If the KLA hangs back it risks the emergence of >new political forces under NATO sponsorship. If it >strikes at NATO, NATO can strike back at a fundamental >interest of the KLA. In either case, the KLA cannot >pursue its other strategic interests while NATO is >still there. > >The KLA always wanted NATO out, but expected it to >destroy the Serb Army for them. That hasnít happened >and that has created a tremendous dilemma for the KLA. >It cannot tolerate NATO in Kosovo and it is not yet in >a position to defend against Serbia. It can no longer >expect NATO to finish off the Serbs and it can no >longer expect NATO to ignore KLA operations. The KLA >has been trying to get NATO to strike across the >border, but instead NATO struck at the KLA. > >NATO is desperately signaling the KLA to rein itself >in. But if the KLA complies then its dream of a >KLA-dominated Kosovo must be abandoned and the >narcotics trade that finances it will be vulnerable to >NATO pressure. It canít make the deal that NATO has >offered: temporary control over part of Kosovo at the >discretion of NATO. It just isnít enough. > >The winner, at this rate, is going to be Milosevic. If >NATO and the KLA come to blows, then time is entirely >on his side. Either NATO will increase its presence in >Kosovo in order to crush or cow the KLA ñ unlikely ñ >or NATO will have to open lines of communication or >coordination with the Serbs. Alternatively, NATO can >withdraw, in which case the correlation of forces will >favor the Serbs against the Albanians. > >A year after the war began, Milosevic remains in power >in Belgrade and time appears to be on his side. > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Talk to your friends online with Yahoo! Messenger. >http://im.yahoo.com > > >______________________________________________________________________ >To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] >______________________________________________________________________ >Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
