----- Original Message ----- From: Miroslav Antic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: SNN <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Siem News <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Balkan News <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; SerbianNewsNetwork <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: STOPNATO <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sorabia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2000 3:53 PM Subject: [STOPNATO.ORG.UK] Europeans Say Bush's Pledge to Pull Out of Balkans Could Split NATO STOP NATO: ¡NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/25/world/25EURO.html Europeans Say Bush's Pledge to Pull Out of Balkans Could Split NATO By STEVEN ERLANGER RAGUE, Oct. 24 — A promise by George W. Bush that, if elected president, he would negotiate the removal of American troops from peacekeeping duties in the Balkans and leave such work to the Europeans has provoked a collective sigh of anxiety and even weariness among European diplomats, officials and analysts. These officials said the proposal, as expressed in the Republican platform, enunciated by Mr. Bush during a presidential debate and elaborated upon by Mr. Bush's foreign-policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice, in an interview with The New York Times, could divide the NATO alliance, undermine the current European effort to increase its military capacity and question the postwar rationale for NATO's existence, which has revolved around the Balkans. Mr. Bush's idea comes at a time when Kosovo, which is run by the United Nations but patrolled by NATO-led troops, is facing a difficult and even explosive period with the fall from power of the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic. Kosovo Albanians' desires for independence seem farther away than before, and yet they trust Washington and American troops more than the Europeans, whom they see as pro-Serb. Ms. Rice dug new ground with the idea that the American military should be reserved for war-fighting, in the Persian Gulf or the Pacific, while the weaker European forces should concentrate on peacekeeping at home. "Dividing NATO into 'real soldiers' and 'escorts' who walk children to school is the first way to divide the alliance itself," said a senior NATO-country official. "President Bush decided he liked allies fighting alongside the Americans in the gulf war — the American people certainly did." When questioned, no NATO government — including the British, French and Italians — would provide any official reaction, given the prominence Ms. Rice's comments have been given in the endgame of the American presidential campaign. The Democratic candidate, Al Gore, supported by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, moved quickly to use the Rice comments to try to cast doubt on the fitness of Mr. Bush to be president. Any wariness by the allied governments was enhanced by the strong suspicion — expressed for example by Lord Roper, the British defense analyst and Liberal Democratic peer — that Ms. Rice intended her comments politically, to underline the usual Republican charge that, as he put it, "the Democrats get Americans involved in long wars." Still, the Bush-Rice proposal is not new, but an extension of a doctrine put forth by Gen. Colin L. Powell under the last Republican president, Mr. Bush's father. General Powell's belief was that American troops would essentially be reserved for a real crisis where overwhelming force could be brought to bear, to ensure victory and limit casualties. Ms. Rice also made it clear that any American move would be made after consultations with European allies, which means, the officials said, that an American pullout from the Balkans would be highly unlikely and certainly not soon. Lord Robertson, the NATO secretary general, has regularly told visiting American congressmen that the Bush proposal could undermine the whole idea of "risk sharing, which is precisely the glue that holds the alliance together," one NATO official said. "That's where we went wrong in Bosnia, and having corrected that error, it would be tragic to go back." Nearly all of those interviewed made the same point. In 1992-95 in Bosnia, European forces were on the ground under United Nations auspices, while Washington kept out and kept NATO out, while undermining European proposals for a solution. "Different perspectives — being on the ground and not — led to different policy perceptions," one official said. "The problem in Bosnia was NATO's absence, not its presence." When President Clinton finally committed American forces to Bosnia and NATO bombed the Serbs there, a peace deal was rapidly signed at Dayton. A further problem, the official said, is the bipartisan American insistence on controlling NATO policy. "If you're not going to be on the ground, you can't expect to have your policy preferences prevail," he said. Lord Roper said: "You can't not be present and want to call all the shots. Then we really are back to Bosnia in 1992-95. And the Europeans — and not just the French — will say that this idea of the Americans doing all the tough work and the Europeans mopping up afterwards is just another recipe for hegemony." The officials and analysts said that another complicated issue is the role of Russia in the Balkans. The Russians have participated in peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Kosovo under the aegis of the Americans, in order not to be taking orders directly from a NATO general. If the Americans leave, who manages the Russians? "Washington will hardly want the NATO relationship with Moscow managed by anybody else," a senior NATO diplomat said. Another common point expressed was NATO's own reason for existing after the cold war. The Balkans gave NATO a role, to defeat aggression and stabilize southern Europe; if the Americans pull out, what use is NATO? The bombing war in Kosovo highlighted the gaps in European military capacity, and the Europeans have since moved to fill them with the European strategic defense project, which envisages a European force of up to 60,000 troops ready to move quickly into a Kosovo-like crisis. The project is also intended to improve European capacity for troop transport, electronic warfare, jamming, surveillance and smart- bombing — just the kind of "high end" warfare Ms. Rice suggests the United States should handle alone. Washington was initially wary about the Europeans wanting to create a counterpoint to NATO without the Americans. American officials continue to stress in speeches that the European project is intended for crisis management "where NATO as a whole is not engaged," but after alliance-wide consultation and consensus. French officials, too, emphasize that the European force would be used as an option after a NATO consensus, in areas where Washington does not want to be involved on the ground. In this sense, there is an opening for the Bush desire to hand over peace maintenance duties to the Europeans. Already, in Bosnia and Kosovo, American troops are no more than 20 percent of the total, and under 15 percent in Kosovo alone. American aid represents no more than 20 percent of what is being provided in Bosnia and Kosovo. But European officials say that a small presence is different from no presence at all. And if the Americans do not want to use the 82nd Airborne to escort children to school, as Ms. Rice said, then surely, they pointed out, the Pentagon can train some peacekeepers, too. In Yugoslavia itself, Predrag Simic, an adviser on foreign affairs to the Serbian Renewal Movement, said that Mr. Bush's proposal is "another indication of American capriciousness in foreign affairs" and will only give the Kosovar Albanians a "new pretext to push for independence as soon as possible." Both Europeans and Americans will eventually withdraw from Kosovo, Mr. Simic said. "But Washington has to take responsibility first. If America took up the Kosovo brief, if it bombed in Yugoslavia, killing people in the pursuit of its goals and values, then the least America can do is not abandon the region before it can leave behind a stable structure, and some sense of security and well- being for the people of the region. I'd like to believe that the Europeans can do that on their own," he said. "But I know they cannot." Some officials interviewed argued that the risks in Bosnia now are so low that American troops could leave without any real problems, but that Kosovo is another matter entirely, given Albanian sensitivities. But Lord Roper believes that it is Bosnia where Americans must remain, because the troops are there to enforce an American-negotiated peace. One NATO-country diplomat said that the Bush argument for a better division of labor is a strong one, pointing to the Australian peacekeepers in East Timor, for example. "But it is simply not realistic in the Balkans. The Americans have national interests in Europe and they play a deterrent role that is irreplaceable. NATO is not in Kosovo for the Kosovars, but for ourselves." Miroslav Antic http://www.antic.org/SNN/ ______________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Taking Care of Business is always a snap when you shop with the world's largest seller of office products. 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