>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: The Militarization of the European Union: A civilizational mistake > > >Network members - > >Here is an excellent analysis by Jan Oberg of the EU's drive to >militarize itself in the wake of the war in Kosovo. Important links are >made here between military and economic motives. > >Steve Staples > >**** >http://www.transnational.org/pressinf/2000/pf107_EUmilitarisation.html > >The Militarisation of the European Union: A civilisational mistake >PressInfo # 107 > >December 7, 2000 >By Jan Oberg, TFF director > > It was quite predictable that the EU would militarise itself. In fact, >one of the world's leading peace researchers, TFF adviser Johan Galtung, >predicted that in his book about the EU from 1972, "A Superpower in the >Making." It is not in the nature of big powers to see greatness in >nonviolence, dialogue, tolerance or in playing the role of one among >many. The EU - - whose main players are former colonial powers and >present nuclear powers and/or culturally violent - - began their >militarisation some ten years ago with the French-German military >co-operation, and it got another boost with the French-British agreement >in 1998 in Saint Malo. > > And today's EU Nice Summit is likely to put the militarisation of EU on >an irreversible path, most likely to a new Cold War. > > > > Today it is the so-called Eurocorps which is formally in charge of >NATO/KFOR in Kosovo. Internally, the EU struggles with ever deeper >vertical integration, i.e. more and more standardisation and >harmonisation of ever more areas, and with horizontal integration of >more and more countries. Externally, it decided a year ago at its summit >in Finland to become a world player by setting up a sizeable military >Rapid Reaction Force by the year 2003. > > There are various proposals in the direction of a "United States of >Europé" (USE), there is a common currency, a common foreign and security >policy, common or harmonised laws, a structure with functions that look >increasingly like a super-state with a President. There is a stepped up >civilian and military industrial integration and rationalisation. And at >its summit in Nice in southern France, beginning December 6, a European >Charter is on the table. > > > > Rhetoric and reality > > We are told that a European "Army" is not in the offing. But can the EU >really move on with integration in virtually all other regards and not >end up having something that looks surprisingly much like an integrated >military? If so, it will be unique in history. Isn't it in the nature of >defence and military matters that they require more centralisation, >central control, harmonisation, interoperability, standardisation and >integration than most civilian spheres? > > The Headline Goals for the force in the year 2003 was planned a year >ago at 60.000 troops. Already committed, however, are almost 70.000. >With reservists this will add up to 225.000 under arms. And not exactly >traditional peace-keeping arms. Among other resources, Sweden for >instance has assigned AJS 37 Viggen fighters, a submarine, corvettes and >a mechanised battalion. Britain has pledged 18 warships and up to 72 >combat aircraft. > > Ministers tell the citizens that it is for disaster relief, >humanitarian aid, natural catastrophes, mine clearing and peacekeeping. >It will serve as a back-up for diplomacy and it will only be used as a >last resort when everything else has been tried to avert conflicts from >erupting into violent struggle. But if it is modelled upon the case of >Kosovo, that is the example par excellence of the failure of preventive >diplomacy, of diplomacy backing up force. > > > > The civilian aspects of crisis management > > We are also told that the EU's most important part is civilian and that >civilian crisis management, coupled with early analysis, early warning >and violence-preventive diplomacy is the main thing; however, the >present structure and balance of resources does not bear out that point. > > Earlier, the Commission has developed an inventory of 25 categories >(encompassing 300 specific actions) for civilian crisis management. >Among them we find virtually anything such as counter-terrorism >operations, support to free media, training of intelligence and judicial >staff as well as conflict resolution training centres. So, some >priorities had to be set up. > > According to the documents from the EU Feira European Council summit in >June this year, an Interim Committee for civilian aspects of crisis >management had its first meeting only three days before the Summit (June >16) and could hardly have developed much of an identity. > > Appendix 3 of the Feira document approaches the civilian aspect in this >manner: "The reinforcement of the Union's capabilities in civilian >aspects of crisis management should above all, provide it with adequate >means to face complex political crises by: > > - acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts; > > - consolidating peace and internal stability in periods of transition > > - ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of >crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks." > > How is that operationalised? The priority areas outlined next to this >goal formulation is: > > (I) Police - co-operation during crisis and in relation to: > > (II) Strengthening the rule of law -- e.g. assist in the >re-establishment of a judicial and penal system in societies in >transition and/or conflict/post-war reconstruction. > > (III) Strengthening civilian administration -- training experts for >duties in the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems; > > (IV) Civil protection -- such as search and rescue in disaster relief. > > It should be clear for everyone to see: every reference to civilian >conflict management - - conflict analysis, early warning, attention to >the human dimensions of conflict, training of mediators, peace workers, >social workers, psychologists, conflict-resolution experts, negotiators >and activities to empower civil society, reconciliation and forgiveness >-- is conspicuously lacking. > > > > The EU versus the UN and OSCE > > The Feira summit decided that the EU force should be deployed "both in >response to request of a lead agency like the UN and the OSCE, or, where >appropriate, in autonomous EU action." It also decided to "propose to >NATO the creation of four 'ad hoc working groups' between the EU and >NATO on the issues which have been identified in that context: security >issues, capabilities goal, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets >and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for >EU-NATO consultation." > > At the peak point of its history as a peacekeeping organisation, the UN >deployed some 70.000 Blue Helmets. By the end of October 2000, it was >down to 37.000, a figure which include observers, civilian police and >troops. Britain which will deploy 12.500 troops to the EU force has 312 >UN peacekeepers. Sweden will contribute 1500 to the EU force and has 192 >UN peacekeepers of whom 46 are soldiers. > > If Europe's strongest nations wanted the UN to be the leading >peacekeeper it is strange that that organisation has been systematically >drained in terms of funds, manpower and legitimacy -- while the EU seeks >to build an operative force twice as big in just three years. It's the >same countries that could never deliver enough well-trained UN Blue >Helmets (e.g. to Srebrenica in time) with lighter and less sophisticated >military equipment to the world's most important peace-making >organisation. They are also the ones which, during last year's bombing, >violated the Charter of the UN's basic value of creating 'peace by >peaceful means' and ignored the provision of having a UN mandate. > > The Swedish prime minister maintains that the EU force will be a >contribution to the UN too. But that immediately raises the question: >why did the US and the EU not decide to finally make the UN what it >ought to be and had a chance to become after the end of the old Cold >War? > > > > From Kosovo to EU turbo-militarisation > > The single most important event in creating the political atmosphere >with which the turbo-militarisation of the EU now takes place is the >experience in Kosovo last year. European leaders assess that the >Americans took over the show, took the diplomatic lead and backed it up >with overwhelming military power which almost cast the European NATO >partners in the role of onlookers. Leading EU/NATO partners recognised >the structural weakness and the inability to shoulder the burden and >back up their diplomatic efforts by force. > > In passing one may notice that Kosovo is the best singular illustration >of the inability to a) diagnose the conflict, b) conduct early warning, >c) apply early listening and d) come up with a set of reasonably >creative and acceptable series of conflict-mitigation and mediation >initiatives. It is also the case of clandestine arms trade and military >training, intelligence infiltration of peace missions, double games and >Western alliance-making with hardline secessionist nationalists and >ignoring moderate, nonviolent political factors. > > The simple facts remain, whether or not covered in the mainstream >Western press: we are further from a solution to the real issues than >ever before. It has been recognised that some Western leaders told their >citizens quite a few things last year to justify the 78-days bombing >which turned out to be either not the whole truth or blatant lies. None >of the deep and complex conflicts have been settled in the region -- >five years after Dayton and 18 months after the bombing. > > The present international missions are strapped for funds and have not >been able to prevent ethnic cleansing, lawlessness and authoritarianism >in Kosovo, in spite of having more troops and civilians than Belgrade >ever had to maintain law and order. Kosovo has become a strongly >divisive issue, if not a turning point, in Euro-Atlantic relations; it >left the EU grumbling aloud in response to what the Americans are de >facto saying: we fixed the bombing and got our base there, we paid by >far the most - now it is your turn to fix the peace. Circles close to >George W. Bush more than hint that the United States is not going to >stay for much longer. So the European may be stuck with an extremely >expensive cul-de-sac protectorate-like situation for the next few >decades. > > So, first there was Kosovo, then Kosova and for the foreseeable future >there will be "Kaosovo." A diplomatic, moral and peace-making fiasco is >now being turned into a recipe. By the EU. > > Finally, history's non-violent irony deserves mention. The >Kosovo-Albanians started out on a non-violent path and got nothing but >lip service by the West. They ended up with an extremely violent >political force with Western backing. In contrast, the nationalities >that make up Serbia were imprisoned for a decade or more in Milosevic' >internal cage and the outer cage of the West -- in short major violence. >However, they avoided what we all feared, namely civil war and other >terrible internal violence and broke out of that cage by means of >non-violence. Officially, they are supported by the West. But for how >long if they do not comply with Western demands? (If Mr. Kostunica >remains the Vojeslav Kostunica I know - - and I think he will - - he is >not the man the West will see as a long-term partner). > > > > And Kosovo was about 10 other things > > It is not difficult to see that Kosovo was not only, perhaps not even >predominantly, about Kosovo. It was > > 1) one element in the build-up of a common foreign and security policy >within the EU on its way "up" ; > > 2) a stepping stone to and in NATO expansion, > > 3) a chance to contain the very much weakened Russia, and > > 4) a chance to improve the access to the oil in the Caucasus. Further, > > 5) it could be used as a focal point for changing the three >inter-related conflict formations and strategic theatres: the Balkans, >the Middle East and the Caucasus. It antagonised Russia, quite a few >neighbours in the region, India and China and could well be described by >future historians as the beginning of a new Cold War formation between >the West and these formidable powers. > > The Serbia-Kosovo conflict could also be used > > 6) to promote market economy; it was written into the Rambouillet text >that Kosovo should operate a market economy -- like it had been in the >Dayton Accords. The West could get a foothold once and for all, >spreading Western values and institutions -- and boots -- all over >Kosovo; in short > > 7) non-violence had lost, the military won. In addition, > > 8) the whole affair could be used as evidence that the US and NATO, not >the EU and certainly not the UN (which was never considered for a Kosovo >mission before the war) or the OSCE was the peacekeeper, the peace >enforcer and the peacemaker. The UN was forced to leave Macedonia where >it had had one of its most successful missions only a few weeks before >the bombing started. So, the UN (the only organisation which could be >synonymous with the much-used term 'international community') was >defeated as the world's new peacekeeper. Next, > > 9) with the CIA's infiltration of OSCE's KVM mission that was also the >end of that organisation as an important and strong regional >organisation. And, finally, > > 10) the US could use the opportunity, like it had in Bosnia and >Croatia, to show that the Europeans could not get their act together and >that it had to fix a few problems in Europe's backyard; in short, the EU >as EU was humiliated. The rapid militarisation of it now signals a >"never again." > > So, if the West's operation in the Balkans was about peace, it was a >very special peace brought about in a special way. One must hope that >this is not what the EU plans to repeat in various conflict spots up to >2.500 miles or 4.000 kilometers -- or in any hotspot around the globe. >The Swedish defence minister Bjorn von Sydow recently confirmed that no >geographical limits have been defined beyond which the EU force should >not intervene. > > > > The U.S. attempt at world domination > > In short, the Balkans and Kosovo in particular was a gift to those who >wanted to promote NATO and undermine the UN and other more civilian >organisations. It was a springboard for those who want the United States >to move forward, not as a force for civilisation and creative new >conflict-management, but in the role of world police, world judge and >world dominator. > > Is it far fetched to hypothesise that the United States aims at world >dominance in this period of history between a very weakened Russia and >an ascending Asia? > > Consider the simultaneous attempts by the U.S. to control modern >computer-related technologies and bio-technology, the world market and >world trade, the world's peace keeping, world space, world oceans, the >world's resources and world environment. (The latter is being done not >by agreeing with global norms in Kyoto and the Hague but by >environmental modification techniques for war purposes such as HAARP). >The U.S. is also the only state that plans to be able to fight a nuclear >war even for political purposes and not only in response to an attack; >while such a war means potential world destruction, the U.S. intends to >survive it by means of the planned self-protective BMD, Ballistic >Missile Defence. > > Furthermore, no other country in human history has fought as many wars, >intervened in so many places, used its intelligence agency so widely and >sold so many weapons. Finally, add to all this the strength with which >American culture, media and news bureaus are the strongest world-wide in >shaping people's perception of the world and listening in on their views >clandestinely (through e.g. Echelon and other listening devices around >the world) -- and you have some, not exactly negligible, indicators for >that hypothesis. > > > > The EU should make another contribution to peace > > So, the EU sees its chance now. It also wants to guard itself against >excessive US dominance in the future. The most recent example of the >rapidly widening disagreement, if not worse, between the EU and the US >came with Secretary of Defence, William Cohen's warning to European >defence ministers in Brussels on December 5 in effect saying "don't even >try to compete with NATO, co-ordinate with it and let us -- US -- >control force planning and interventions." > > The EU's chosen means to play a world role is economic first and from >now on, military. While the former may succeed, the latter won't in the >foreseeable future. If a small power wants to fight a bigger one, the >first rule of thumb is: don't choose the field in which the opponent is >much stronger. So, if the EU chooses to militarise itself it will remain >a European sub-division of NATO. > > If on the contrary it does things differently, draws some other lessons >from Kosovo and decides to deal with conflicts around the world in a new >way, it may become much stronger and even a moral force - - and stronger >than the US on most power scales. It may become a power of the future >rather than a replica of its colonial past and of the present NATO. It >would probably also create less suspicion among people and governments >within a radius of 4000 kilometres, and beyond, who would have less >reason to ask: what on earth is the EU up to for the future? > > We may indeed ask whether the EU leaders have the required creativity >and a vision of Europe in the future world to see some new 'mission >civilisatrice" like that? > > > > > > PressInfo 108 will deal with further aspects of EU's militarisation. A >later PressInfo will outline what the alternatives to it could be. > > > >© TFF 2000 > > > > > >-- >International Network on Disarmament and Globalization >405-825 Granville Street, Vancouver, British Columbia V6Z 1K9 CANADA >tel: (604) 687-3223 fax: (604) 687-3277 >[EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.indg.org > >To subscribe to the e-mail list, send an e-mail to >mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >SUBSCRIBE mil-corp "FirstName LastName" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >as the first and only line in the message body. > > _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi _______________________________________________________ Kominform list for general information. Subscribe/unsubscribe messages to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Anti-Imperialism list for geopolitics. 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