" ....44% of Poles have good memories of the People's Republic. Indeed, according to another survey, 47% think that socialism is a good idea that went wrong in practice, while only 41% think capitalism is a better system." Le Monde diplomatique ----------------------------------------------------- February 2001 THE PRICE OF EU ACCESSION Poland counts the cost _________________________________________________________________ The Poles expected economic dividends from their political courage in being the first to break free from communism, helping to release the West from the costly Soviet threat and paving the way for German reunification. Yet now they are being asked to foot the bill for joining Nato and taking on board the acquis communautaire, the accumulated legislation of the EU. by BRUNO DRWESKI * _________________________________________________________________ Poland is the only member of the former Eastern bloc to boast a gross domestic product well above the 1989 level. Most western observers regard it as the good pupil in the unruly class of countries in "transition" to capitalism. There are certainly plenty of enthusiastic businessmen, but under the surface the public mood after a decade of restructuring is sombre. The children of Solidarity are now in power and it is their turn to be disillusioned, while the ex-communists draw support from those who are nostalgic for the good old days of the People's Republic as well as from some business circles. To understand how President Aleksander Kwasniewski came to be re-elected in the first round last October with 53.9% of the vote, and why Lech Walesa polled only 1.1%, we need to realise that 44% of Poles have good memories of the People's Republic. Indeed, according to another survey, 47% think that socialism is a good idea that went wrong in practice, while only 41% think capitalism is a better system (1). These views are based on the real social cost of transition. It is not surprising that Kwasniewski did best in areas with high unemployment. And if Poles show a healthy scepticism for the almost uniformly excellent macro-economic indices published in Warsaw, it is because the effects of globalisation and adjustment to the Maastricht criteria, far from bringing some respite in the process of "reform", require them to make even greater efforts. Pervenche Berès, Socialist MEP and rapporteur, says that "new members of the European Union must brace themselves for a considerable economic shock in the first few years after accession" (2). In Warsaw, the 1998 Russian crisis did not really halt growth (3) and the zloty has not suffered from predatory speculation. Inflation is down, industrial production is up and health is improving (4). In 1998 Poland attracted about 40% of all direct foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe, representing more than $22bn at the end of 1999 (5). According to the forecasts, growth is expected to be between 5% and 6% in future years. This rosy picture has a dark side, however. Unemployment has risen again to more than 13% and there are plans for restructuring in farming, mining, the steel industry, telecommunications, oil refining, electricity, public transport, etc. The elite are worried by the rising tide of discontent, as growth has been accompanied by social polarisation and a return of regional inequalities. In some areas unemployment is more than 20%. The reduction in transport subsidies also makes commuting difficult and people cannot afford to move to the major conurbations where the work is because no reasonably priced accommodation is being built for rent. The principles of social justice and solidarity, proclaimed by the communists and Solidarity, are being abandoned. Not only that, the Poles are discovering that national sovereignty is meaningless in the new world of globalisation. Foreign capital now controls 76.9% of the banking sector, in terms of own resources. The best firms have often been sold at less than their true value - sometimes production plant has simply been broken up. In a shop in the village of Sufczyn, near Warsaw, one of the saleswomen said: "Hortex fruit juice has become undrinkable. The Americans bought the factory, kept on 300 of the 3,000 workers who used to be employed there, and started importing and bottling concentrated juice from the United States. Now our fruit-growers have no market for their produce." Developments like this explain the nostalgia for socialist principles and the resurgence of nationalist tendencies. Social budgets have been pared down, the only thing that is going up is the cost of buying "Nato-compatible" western weapons, incorporating the acquis communautaire into the legal order, and keeping the borders tight shut. Ten years after "transition" started, it is becoming hard to maintain that the increase in the trade deficit - from $2.955bn in 1992 to $18.522bn in 1999 - is simply caused by the need to invest in infrastructure. A senior official in the ministry of labour and former adviser to Lech Walesa says: "We are taking out loans just as we did under Gierek, but at least he invested some of the money he borrowed. Today only 15% of the trade deficit is down to expenditure on infrastructure, only no-one dares say so for fear of frightening off western investors." A safe haven ? The impoverished Poles are living on credit. This poses a threat to the macro-economic balance and debt repayments are set to rise from $2.8bn in 2000 to $4bn in 2004. Is that why the government wants to accede to the EU in 2003? All the major parties want to speed up the process of integration, which they believe will guarantee stability for the economy, the institutions established since 1989 and the elite who run them. With its trade outlets, its jobs market and the massive injection of capital attracted by cheap skilled labour, they see the EU as a safe haven. But this is by no means a sure bet. Fifty-nine per cent of Poles are in favour of accession, 25% against. Forty-four per cent think the EU will gain most from the change, 8% think Poland will, and 29% think both will benefit (6). Some artists are thinking about the repercussions of opening Polish culture to the world market. Film actor Wojciech Siemion supports the campaign for culture to be regarded as a special case, while the president of the painters' association, Geno Malkowski, says: "I have always believed that any culture that was cut off from life was dead and would never make its mark in history." The editor-in-chief of the daily Trybuna, Janusz Rolicki, launched the idea of a congress of intellectuals for the defence of culture but has since been forced to stand down under pressure from the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which takes a liberal-social line on this issue as on others. The European Phare programme has not so far been subject to democratic scrutiny, but the expenses incurred in adopting EU rules already exceed the funds that have been obtained (7). In the course of the exercise to incorporate the acquis communautaire, Warsaw will have to comply with more than 100,000 pages of European directives and adopt more than 180 laws between now and 2002. Some Poles are asking why, without massive subsidies from the Fifteen, their country has somehow managed the changeover better than the former GDR (German Democratic Republic). The East Germans benefited enormously from the move - even though they have had to put up with the consequences of submitting to the wider European market and the injunctions of their fellow Germans in the West. Germany's insistence on pushing Polish accession through quickly is beginning to look suspect. The more so, as the negotiations will be much more difficult than with the smaller countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Having increased customs duties in 1999 to restore its trade balance, Poland has now been warned by the European Commission's director-general responsible for agricultural relations with aspiring members of the EU: "We think raising duties is going down the wrong track. What is needed is restructuring, not avoiding the reality of competition" (8). Following delicate negotiations, it was finally agreed last September that customs duties on 75% of agricultural products would be abolished in 2001 (9). By last June the files had been "provisionally" closed in 11 areas, but 18 remained to be negotiated, including free movement of goods, persons and capital, company and competition law, taxation, agriculture, fisheries, customs, energy, culture and the environment, not to mention the thorny problem of Schengen. The Poles are unwilling to be cast in the role of policeman, acting as a filter for immigration between the "poorer part of Europe" and the third world on the one hand, and the "tight-knit coterie of the wealthy" on the other (10). Businessmen in Bialystok have come out strongly against this policy. Former Solidarity leader Henryk Wujec sums it up: "All the EU leaders want is to keep the border closed" (11). Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, who represents Poland in the negotiations with Brussels, says: "We are not interested in continuing to be the last outpost on the outer edge of the EU. The eastern border should be a bridge, not a wall" (12). In fact, the Poles are well aware that Europe is a Eurasian peninsula and that no real progress will be made without bold joint policies to establish safe, rapid and open channels of communication between Paris and Beijing, via Berlin, Warsaw, Minsk and Moscow. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (Unido) is to open an office in Warsaw this year, which will be responsible for aid to Europe's "developing countries" (Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, etc). The EU, in particular France, advocates tighter controls, with computerised data, stealth helicopters and detention camps (13). Such moves would be bound to provoke nationalist reaction among the Eurasians. Warsaw has already helped to arouse this dangerous response by joining Nato and supporting the bombing in Yugoslavia. Many Polish farms depend for their survival on cross-border trade with the former USSR. Products are obtainable on favourable terms from traders in all the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Many shops would go out of business without the 10m CIS citizens who cross the border into Poland each year. A flourishing subsistence economy on both sides of the border would disappear if visas were introduced. A peasant woman in Chelm is dismayed. "Who will buy our vegetables if the border is closed? I'm against it. After all, the Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians are closer to us than the Germans. We understand them." The extreme right made no impact in Poland after 1989, but insidious campaigns in the public TV networks and supposedly liberal newspapers appear to be exploiting a sense of insecurity and a fear of epidemics to encourage distrust of incomers from the east. Genuine liberal impulses may unfortunately bring a xenophobic backlash, and conscience-salving anti-racist campaigns only help to foster distrust. ______________________________________________________________ * Senior lecturer at the Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (Inalco), Paris. (1) See Le Point, 6 October 2000, and the CBOS survey in Le Sondoscope, Paris, July 2000. (2) "Economic 'shock' warning for new EU member states after accession", European Report, Brussels, 2 September 2000. (3) The growth rate rose from 2.6% in 1992 to 7% in 1995, dropping back to 4.1% in 1999. Patrick Lenain, "Poland's successful transition", OECD Observer, 10 April 2000, and UN Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, Geneva, June-July 2000. (4) The rate of inflation fell from 45.3% in 1992 to 7.4% in 1999, UN Economic Commission for Europe, op.cit. (5) Patrick Lenain, op.cit., UN Economic Commission for Europe, op.cit. (6) CBOS survey, op.cit. (7) Stephen Holmes, "No quick fix", Unesco Courier, Paris, November 1999. (8) Helmut Stadler, European Report, Brussels, 5 July 2000. (9) "Accord agricole entre la Pologne et l'Union Européenne", Le Figaro économie, 28 September 2000. (10) Gilles Lepesant, "La Pologne et son Est", in "Les confins de l'OTAN", Nouveaux Mondes, Geneva, no 9, autumn 1999, pp. 241-256. (11) Natalie Nougayrède, "Les travailleurs au noir de l'ex-URSS affluent en Europe centrale", Le Monde, 12 October 2000. (12) Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, "Nous voulons une vraie politique orientale de l'Union Européenne", Le Monde, 8-9 October 2000. (13) Robert Graham, John Reed, Michael Smith, "France takes tough line over Polish border security", Financial Times, 18 May 2000. Translated by Barbara Wilson
