begin  quoting Ralph Shumaker as of Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 03:23:52PM -0700:
> James G. Sack (jim) wrote:
> >I'll be looking forward to RS's commentary on this.
> >
> >  http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/medeco-locks-cr.html
> >
> >The above was found from /. How can one resist reading any article with
> >"Shrinky Dinks" in the headline?
> 
> I may be wrong, but I believe this may actually work, to a degree.  

The best thing to every happen to the lock(smith) industry is the
invasion of crypto-geeks. :)

> Although I'm a little reluctant to believe that the plastic will be 
> thick enough to get the correct rotation of the Medeco pins (as 
> described decently in the article).  Medeco pins have to be the correct 
> height _and_ rotation before the lock can turn.

To what tolerance? 30 degrees? 15 degrees? I'm not suprised that
thickness isn't a real factor.
 
> Credit card type plastic (probably nylon actually) has already been used 
> for spare door keys made by AAA for many years now.  The plastic keys 
> were never meant to be used in the ignition (not even once), and even in 
> the doors, were only meant to be used 2 or 3 times at the most.  But 
> I've made some decent money digging that plastic out of ignitions and 
> doors.  Even _knowing_ they aren't supposed to stick it into the 
> ignition, people still do.  And even _knowing_ they shouldn't even use 
> it in the doors more than 2 or 3 times, they still do.  They don't 
> expect it to get stuck and break off, but it does.

Yup, I used to have some of those. The plastic was actually thicker
than an actual credit-card, but for a car where you were likely to
lock the keys in the car, it was a clever idea.

Opening a door with a nylon key was a tricky experience, and I can
easily see how rushing it would break the key off. I always took it
slow and careful.

As for being used in the ignition... a lot of cars are set up so
that you're not _supposed_ to turn the key itself. So if you're
careful, a nylon key would work just fine.

> Security is such that if there _is_ a break-in, it's better to know that 
> it happened.  A plastic key is *much* more likely to break off inside 
> the lock, which would quickly give you away (the next time someone tries 
> to stick their key in).  I know how to minimize that risk, but even most 
> locksmiths have probably never thought about it.

I quote from the article:

"Once the plastic key is inside the cylinder and lifts the pins, it's
not actually strong enough to turn the cylinder, so the researchers
insert a small turning wrench to turn the cylinder and open the lock."

> This would be a way around apartment house charges of $50 for a spare 
> key for the main entrance or the pool, but will end up just being extra 
> costly for management when they have to pay locksmiths to remove the 
> broken plastic.  And they'll have virtually no way of knowing who was 
> responsible, short of witnesses.

Same problem exists with 13-year-olds and epoxy.
 
Is it really that big of an issue?

> As I began reading the article, I was thinking that it would actually 
> have a decent chance of working in the Medeco locks I've dealt with, but 
> I was certain it would not work in Assa or Schlage Primus because of 
> side milling (which the article eventually mentions around the middle), 
> nor even Schlage Everest.  I'm not familiar with many other high 
> security locks.
 
Part of the problem is that there's a desire to loan out keys to give
someone temporary access to a resource, and once someone has the key
under their control, the game seems to be up.

The problem here is that *seeing* a key is sufficient to break it.

> I must admit, if I ever come across a customer who has a broken Medeco 
> key (not a mere foto) and is paying me to get him in, I might consider 
> creating a duplicate (for one-time use only) from an old credit card (or 
> hotel room key).  But I've never had such a situation before, so I doubt 
> the likelihood of ever encountering it.

Use their credit card. AFTER charging your fee to it.

-- 
Obviously, we need smart cards as crypto challenge-response keys. 
Stewart Stremler


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