On Tue, Apr 01, 2008 at 06:18:07PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> and very few application domains are allowed to access them. THe KVM/QEMU
> policy will not allow this for example. Basically on the X server, HAL and
> dmidecode have access in current policy. It would be undesirable to have to
> all KVM guests full access to /dev/mem, so a more fine grained access method
> would have benefits here. 

But pci-passthrough can give a root on the host even to the ring0
guest, just like /dev/mem without VT-d, so there's no muchx difference
with using /dev/mem as far as security is concerned. Only on the CPUs
including VT-d it's possible to retain a mostly equivalent security
level despite pci-passthrough.

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