On Thu, Jul 10, 2014 at 03:59:43AM -0700, kan.li...@intel.com wrote: > From: Kan Liang <kan.li...@intel.com> > > x86, perf: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying > > With -cpu host, KVM reports LBR and extra_regs support, if the host has > support. > When the guest perf driver tries to access LBR or extra_regs MSR, > it #GPs all MSR accesses,since KVM doesn't handle LBR and extra_regs support. > So check the related MSRs access right once at initialization time to avoid > the error access at runtime. > > For reproducing the issue, please build the kernel with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL = y > (for host kernel). > And CONFIG_PARAVIRT = n and CONFIG_KVM_GUEST = n (for guest kernel). > Start the guest with -cpu host. > Run perf record with --branch-any or --branch-filter in guest to trigger LBR > #GP. > Run perf stat offcore events (E.g. LLC-loads/LLC-load-misses ...) in guest to > trigger offcore_rsp #GP
This is still not properly wrapped at 78 chars.
> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.li...@intel.com>
>
> V2: Move the check code to initialization time.
> V3: Add flag for each extra register.
> Check all LBR MSRs at initialization time.
> V4: Remove lbr_msr_access. For LBR msr, simply set lbr_nr to 0 if check_msr
> failed.
> Disable all extra msrs in creation places if check_msr failed.
> V5: Fix check_msr broken
> Don't check any more MSRs after the first fail
> Return error when checking fail to stop creating the event
> Remove the checking code path which never get
These things should go below the --- so they get thrown away when
applying the patch, its of no relevance once applied.
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h | 45
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> index 2bdfbff..a7c5e4b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> @@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config, struct
> perf_event *event)
> continue;
> if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask)
> return -EINVAL;
> + /* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/
> + if (!x86_pmu.extra_msr_access[er->idx])
> + return -EFAULT;
This is not a correct usage of -EFAULT. Event creation did not fail
because we took a fault dereferencing a user provided pointer. Possibly
ENXIO is appropriate.
> reg->idx = er->idx;
> reg->config = event->attr.config1;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> index 3b2f9bd..992c678 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> @@ -464,6 +464,12 @@ struct x86_pmu {
> */
> struct extra_reg *extra_regs;
> unsigned int er_flags;
> + /*
> + * EXTRA REG MSR can be accessed
> + * The extra registers are completely unrelated to each other.
> + * So it needs a flag for each extra register.
> + */
> + bool extra_msr_access[EXTRA_REG_MAX];
So why not in struct extra_reg again? You didn't give a straight answer
there.
> +/*
> + * Under certain circumstances, access certain MSR may cause #GP.
> + * The function tests if the input MSR can be safely accessed.
> + */
> +static inline bool check_msr(unsigned long msr)
> +{
This reads like a generic function;
> + u64 val_old, val_new, val_tmp;
> +
> + /*
> + * Read the current value, change it and read it back to see if it
> + * matches, this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators
> + * (qemu/kvm) that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s.
> + */
> + if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_old))
> + goto msr_fail;
> + /*
> + * Only chagne it slightly,
> + * since the higher bits of some MSRs cannot be updated by wrmsrl.
> + * E.g. MSR_LBR_TOS
> + */
> + val_tmp = val_old ^ 0x3UL;
but this is not generally true; not all MSRs can write the 2 LSB, can
they? One option would be to extend the function with a u64 mask.
> + if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) ||
> + rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new))
> + goto msr_fail;
> +
> + if (val_new != val_tmp)
> + goto msr_fail;
> +
> + /* Here it's sure that the MSR can be safely accessed.
> + * Restore the old value and return.
> + */
> + wrmsrl(msr, val_old);
> +
> + return true;
> +
> +msr_fail:
> + return false;
> +}
Also, by now this function is far too large to be inline and in a
header.
> + /*
> + * Access LBR MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
> + * E.g. KVM doesn't support LBR MSR
> + * Check all LBT MSR here.
> + * Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed.
> + */
> + if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr) {
> + if (check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos)) {
> + for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
> + if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i) &&
> + check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i))) {
> + x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + } else
> + x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
That's needlessly complex and indented.
if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos)
x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i) &&
check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i)))
x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
}
You don't need to wrap the for loop in a lbr_nr test and you don't need
a break to terminate. Once you set lbr_nr = 0, the for loop will
terminate on its own. If it was already 0 it would've never started.
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