This should help solve the problem of guests starting out with predictable RNG state.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net> --- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 0a7ac0a..bd88a24 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); */ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { - int i; + int i, slow_rng_bits = 0; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); unsigned long rv; @@ -1261,6 +1261,18 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL); } mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + u64 rv64; + + if (arch_get_slow_rng_u64(&rv64)) { + mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv64, sizeof(rv64), NULL); + slow_rng_bits += 8 * sizeof(rv64); + } + } + if (slow_rng_bits) + pr_info("random: seeded %s pool with %d bits of arch slow rng data\n", + r->name, slow_rng_bits); } /* -- 1.9.3 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html