This should help solve the problem of guests starting out with
predictable RNG state.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0a7ac0a..bd88a24 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
  */
 static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 {
-       int i;
+       int i, slow_rng_bits = 0;
        ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
        unsigned long rv;
 
@@ -1261,6 +1261,18 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
                mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
        }
        mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
+
+       for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+               u64 rv64;
+
+               if (arch_get_slow_rng_u64(&rv64)) {
+                       mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv64, sizeof(rv64), NULL);
+                       slow_rng_bits += 8 * sizeof(rv64);
+               }
+       }
+       if (slow_rng_bits)
+               pr_info("random: seeded %s pool with %d bits of arch slow rng 
data\n",
+                      r->name, slow_rng_bits);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
1.9.3

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