On 22/05/18 16:06, Marc Zyngier wrote:
As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the
discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation.
A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a
config option.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyng...@arm.com>
+static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
+ int scope)
+{
+ struct arm_smccc_res res;
+ bool supported = true;
+
+ WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
+
+ if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * The probe function return value is either negative
+ * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero
+ * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the
+ * last case.
+ */
+ switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+ case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+ arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
+ if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+ supported = false;
+ break;
+
+ case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+ arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
+ if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+ supported = false;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ supported = false;
+ }
+
+ if (supported) {
+ __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
+ do_ssbd(true);
+ }
Marc,
As discussed, we have minor issue with the "corner case". If a CPU
is hotplugged in which requires the mitigation, after the system has
finalised the cap to "not available", the CPU could go ahead and
do the "work around" as above, while not effectively doing anything
about it at runtime for KVM guests (as thats the only place where
we rely on the CAP being set).
But, yes this is real corner case. There is no easy way to solve it
other than
1) Allow late modifications to CPU hwcaps
OR
2) Penalise the fastpath to always check per-cpu setting.
Regardless,
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poul...@arm.com>
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