On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 02:33:53PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> The current way we deal with PtrAuth is a bit heavy handed:
> 
> - We forcefully save the host's keys on each vcpu_load()
> - Handling the PtrAuth trap forces us to go all the way back
>   to the exit handling code to just set the HCR bits
> 
> Overall, this is pretty heavy handed. A better approach would be
> to handle it the same way we deal with the FPSIMD registers:
> 
> - On vcpu_load() disable PtrAuth for the guest
> - On first use, save the host's keys, enable PtrAuth in the
>   guest
> 
> Crutially, this can happen as a fixup, which is done very early
> on exit. We can then reenter the guest immediately without
> leaving the hypervisor role.
> 
> Another thing is that it simplify the rest of the host handling:
> exiting all the way to the host means that the only possible
> outcome for this trap is to inject an UNDEF.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <m...@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c         | 17 +----------
>  arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 17 ++---------
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c  | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c    | 13 +++-----
>  4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

[...]

> +static bool __hyp_text __hyp_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +     u32 sysreg = esr_sys64_to_sysreg(kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu));
> +     u32 ec = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu);
> +     struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt;
> +     u64 val;
> +
> +     if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu))
> +             return false;
> +
> +     switch (ec) {
> +     case ESR_ELx_EC_PAC:
> +             break;
> +     case ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64:
> +             switch (sysreg) {
> +             case SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1:
> +             case SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1:
> +                     break;
> +             default:
> +                     return false;
> +             }
> +             break;
> +     default:
> +             return false;
> +     }

The ESR triage looks correct, but I think it might be clearer split out
into a helper, since you can avoid the default cases with direct
returns, and you could avoid the nested switch, e.g.

static inline bool __hyp_text esr_is_ptrauth_trap(u32 esr)
{
        u32 ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr);

        if (ec == ESR_ELx_EC_PAC)
                return true;

        if (ec != ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64)
                return false;
        
        switch (esr_sys64_to_sysreg(esr)) {
        case SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1:
        case SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1:
        case SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1:
        case SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1:
        case SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1:
        case SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1:
        case SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1:
        case SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1:
        case SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1:
        case SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1:
                return true;
        }

        return false;
}


> +
> +     ctxt = kern_hyp_va(vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context);
> +     __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
> +     __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
> +     __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
> +     __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
> +     __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
> +
> +     vcpu_ptrauth_enable(vcpu);
> +
> +     val = read_sysreg(hcr_el2);
> +     val |= (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
> +     write_sysreg(val, hcr_el2);
> +
> +     return true;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Return true when we were able to fixup the guest exit and should return to
>   * the guest, false when we should restore the host state and return to the
> @@ -524,6 +580,9 @@ static bool __hyp_text fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu 
> *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
>       if (__hyp_handle_fpsimd(vcpu))
>               return true;
>  
> +     if (__hyp_handle_ptrauth(vcpu))
> +             return true;
> +
>       if (!__populate_fault_info(vcpu))
>               return true;
>  
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> index ad1d57501d6d..564995084cf8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> @@ -1034,16 +1034,13 @@ static bool trap_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>                        struct sys_reg_params *p,
>                        const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
>  {
> -     kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(vcpu);
> -
>       /*
> -      * Return false for both cases as we never skip the trapped
> -      * instruction:
> -      *
> -      * - Either we re-execute the same key register access instruction
> -      *   after enabling ptrauth.
> -      * - Or an UNDEF is injected as ptrauth is not supported/enabled.
> +      * If we land here, that is because we didn't fixup the access on exit
> +      * by allowing the PtrAuth sysregs. The only way this happens is when
> +      * the guest does not have PtrAuth support enabled.
>        */
> +     kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
> +
>       return false;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.26.2
> 

Regardless of the suggestion above, this looks sound to me. I agree that
it's much nicer to handle this in hyp, and AFAICT the context switch
should do the right thing, so:

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutl...@arm.com>

Thanks,
Mark.
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