Christian, Hello, > Another application, currently an (open) master thesis, is to develop a P2P > filesharing client that uses DAA to connect to other clients. The motivation > is to prevent modified clients that allow the platform owner to see the > connection table (and thus to uncover the anonymity of clients). But this > only makes sense if the platform owner cannot access the internal state of > applications...
Some time ago I had a discussion (with Joern Bratzke btw) about the feasibility of a TC protected tor node. That discussion made me write a small ruby script[1], which tries to correlate incoming and outgoing traffic (by reading a tcpdump-pcap file) to identify the circuits this given tor node relays. That script worked really well, althrough i never tuned the parameters. To prevent this kind of attac one has to introduce a lot of decoy dummy traffic. Never tried to prove it information-theoretically, but i have the strong feeling, that doing so will be much more resource intensive (speaking of total bandwith, not latency!) than to add a whole lot of additional relay nodes. I suspect my statement is correct, as long as one tries to implement a low latency network -- if the task given is a high latency store-and-forward problem the situation changes. (eg mail-anonymity with Mixmasters) Do you think I'm mistaken? joerg [1] http://www.capsec.org/joerg/zeuch/tor-fun/detorify.rb _______________________________________________ L4-hurd mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/l4-hurd
