At Sat, 6 Jan 2007 19:51:01 +0100, Pierre THIERRY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > [1 <multipart/signed (7bit)>] > [1.1 <text/plain; us-ascii (quoted-printable)>] > Scribit Marcus Brinkmann dies 06/01/2007 hora 19:20: > > Consider a web browser which I want to debug or monitor, for example > > using intrusion detection techniques. If the malicious code can hide > > in opaque memory, this fails. > > Obviously, as I have authority on the memory used by the browser, if he > can read/execute it, I can also. If it hands that memory to another > process while losing read access to it, I won't be able to read it > neither, but the browser cannot execute code in the opaque region. > > So you still can give the browser a space bank able to opacify and > monitor it's code.
That only works if you assume that only certain privileged processes (like the network server) can allocate opaque memory from a non-transparent spacebank. This is essentially what I described. Or do you have something else in mind? What prevents in your idea the browser from simply allocating opaque memory? Thanks, Marcus _______________________________________________ L4-hurd mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/l4-hurd
