At Wed, 10 Jan 2007 02:08:07 +0300, Anton Tagunov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Pierre> I think the backdoor is an *unsafe* default, actually. > > You're quite right. > > We should decide what is more dangerous to an average Joe: > data loss/vendor lock-in or data disclosure?
This generally depends on the type of data, even for average Joe. If you assume a right for absolute privacy, even if only under some conditions, then there should be a mechanism which allows to keep some information absolutely private. It seems that most people think that there should be a right to absolute privacy under some conditions. This does not affect the "trusted computing" (more specifically: remote attestation) scenario, where data is not held private but disclosed under tightly controlled circumstances. In this sense, "trusted computing" is the anti-thesis of privacy. What I don't understand is what you mean by backdoor. To me, an utmost secure OS and the ability to inspect are not in contradiction, and where you seem to want to see a backdoor I just want to see authorized access. One example is Owner Override described in: http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/trusted_computing/20031001_tc.php Thus, I am not sure what this is all about, I am looking forward to your mail describing backdoor design. Thanks, Marcus _______________________________________________ L4-hurd mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/l4-hurd
