Anatomy of Egypt's Revolution
How Democracy Could be Hijacked
By ESAM AL-AMIN
“After climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills
to climb.”
--Nelson Mandela
January 25 was the date
the Egyptian youth decided to launch their revolution. As the fear
barrier was broken, Egyptians throughout the country and from all walks
of life joined the protests by the millions. Their main chant for
eighteen continuous days was ‘The people want the fall of the regime.’
On February 11 that demand was met in a twenty
second address by the recently appointed Vice President Omar Suleiman.
Appearing on state television, he declared that Hosni Mubarak had
resigned from his thirty-year position, transferring his authority to a
military council called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
His brief statement epitomized the end of an era
marked by vicious repression and corruption as well as the inauguration
of a new era that all Egyptians have since been celebrating in the
streets.
The military signified the last institution tied to
the deposed regime that still retained the trust and confidence of the
people. During the protests it declared neutrality between the people
and the regime. Although it demonstrated some favoritism towards the
former regime at critical junctures of the uprising, to its credit, it
rejected the call by the deposed president to crack down on the
demonstrators.
Insisting on their peaceful protests while focusing
on their main demand, the pro-democracy revolutionaries did not take the
bait of the deposed president by engaging in violence in response to
the crackdown by the security forces. When the army was called to the
streets, the public embraced it; frequently chanting ‘The people and the
army are one.’
Subsequently the groups that participated in the
revolution formed loose coalitions in order to articulate their demands.
The main coalition of the January 25 revolution, which included the
most active groups and parties, has presented 35 demands to the new
military rulers. These demands span all aspects of Egyptian life,
including the political, constitutional, judicial, security, and
economic levels.
Some of the most important demands encompassed the
transfer of power from SCAF, which is ruling the country, to a
transitional five-member civilian presidential council that would also
include the head of the military; the dissolution of the lower and upper
chambers of parliament; the dissolution of all provincial and local
councils; the dissolution of the last government appointed by Mubarak,
led by Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq; and the establishment of an elected
and representative congress to write a new constitution.
Other demands include the release of all political
prisoners- not only those who were arrested after Jan. 25 but also all
political prisoners in Egyptian prisons, the end of the notorious state
of emergency law, the dissolution of the state security apparatus that
ruled the country through intimidation and fear, the dissolution of the
ruling party and confiscation of its assets, investigation of all
corrupt politicians and businessmen, including Mubarak and his sons, who
systematically stole hundreds of billions of dollars, and putting them
on trial, as well as firing all board chairmen and chief editors of the
state print and electronic media who were cheering on the regime and
deceiving the public through their massive propaganda operations.
In their first communiqués, the military rulers
declared they would embrace, without elaboration, the demands of the
revolution. But out of the three-dozen demands of the pro-democracy
organizers, they have only explicitly supported three major demands in
the first ten days while remaining vague on many others. Some
pro-democracy leaders looked at the pace and scope of the reforms with
cautious optimism, while others were alarmed and raised genuine
concerns.
It was clear that behind the scenes the military
forced Mubarak to resign, thus playing a crucial role in satisfying the
main demand of the revolution. Subsequently, the military council
embraced a much narrower agenda by favoring limited constitutional
reform. It appointed some of the most respected constitutional scholars
in the country to amend the constitution, addressing issues related to
free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, including
limiting presidential terms.
But this was the same agenda announced by Mubarak
before he resigned, a much less ambitious feat than the public’s demand
for a new constitution. The difference was that the military, unlike
Mubarak, selected credible judges and constitutional scholars who had no
ties to the deposed president or his regime.
Another crucial demand carried out by the military
council was the dissolution of the parliament, which the deposed regime
fraudulently elected last November. Moreover, in order to diffuse some
of the public anger, the military council called on the state prosecutor
to arrest three former corrupt ministers and one senior ruling party
leader as they are being investigated for massive financial and
political corruption.
The prosecutor also banned dozens of other former
ministers and oligarchs from foreign travel, as he announced massive
investigations on huge sums of ill-gotten money, bribery, extortion, and
other acts of economic and official corruption. It appears that the
corrosive behavior of power and money during the Mubarak regime is
promising to bring down some of the most powerful and wealthy people of
Mubarak’s Egypt.
Much information that has appeared in the media
since the downfall of Mubarak, show huge financial irregularities and
corruption by the pillars of the former regime, reaching over a trillion
dollars in one conservative estimate. For instance, many senior leaders
of previous Mubarak governments, as well as ruling party leaders close
to his son Gamal, acquired state lands or factories at rock bottom
prices. In most transactions each individual made billions of dollars.
Some even made in excess of $5 billion in one land deal.
However, bringing this class of people to justice
would be a huge challenge and a critical test to the ultimate success of
the revolution. After all, in the minds of most people revolutions are
about rendering justice and punishing usurpers of the people’s rights
and wealth.
Whether the investigations would be allowed to cover
all corrupt individuals including the Mubarak family remains to be
seen. If such investigations are allowed to proceed, they will represent
significant indicators to the real independence and transparency of the
military council.
Real challenge: Revolution vs. Counter-revolution
As the French revolution was unfolding at the end of the eighteenth century,
French philosopher and diplomat Joseph de Maistre wrote, “The
Counter-Revolution will not be a reverse revolution, but the reverse of
a Revolution.” Likewise, the main challenge to Egypt’s revolution is
that it could be hijacked by counter-revolutionaries, tied to the
deposed regime, who would then reverse the revolution.
So what are the main challenges paused by counter-revolutionary forces facing
the Egyptian revolution?
The dean of Arab journalists in the Middle East is
Nasser-era Muhammad Hassanein Haykal. Banned from appearing on state
television since the days of former President Anwar Sadat, he has
recently sounded the alarm. He claimed in his first Egyptian television
interview since the early 1970s that Mubarak, who is residing in his
mansion at the Red Sea resort city of Sharm Al-Sheikh, has maintained
contacts with the current Prime Minister that he appointed in early
February. The implication is that he might be ruling by proxy.
If true, this would imply a huge betrayal of the
people’s trust. Sharm Al-Sheikh gives Mubarak a huge advantage over his
opponents. It is an isolated tourist destination by the Red Sea in the
southern tip of the Sinai peninsula, where few Egyptians live, mainly
servicing American, European and Israeli visitors.
Moreover, because of the restrictions placed on the
Egyptians by the peace treaty with Israel, the army could not send more
than 800 personnel into the entire peninsula. Most likely, there are
more armed guards protecting Mubarak and his family at Sharm than that
paltry number.
But the only way to limit any influence by Mubarak
or his cronies on the future of the country is to purge his people from
all positions of power or influence. This was the main theme of the more
than three million demonstrators in Tahrir Square who came together one
week after Mubarak’s ouster on Friday, February 18, celebrating
‘Victory Day.’
On that day the main chants of the demonstrators
were, ‘The people demand to purify the regime,’ and ‘The people demand
the values of the (Tahrir) Square,’ in a clear reference to
revolutionary demands and ethics.
To purify the regime, the revolutionaries are
demanding that the military council purge many institutions and dismiss
many senior people tied to the previous regime. Otherwise, there will be
a serious danger that the revolution could be hijacked –applying the
same policies and corrupt practices albeit using different characters.
One of the foremost challenges, which the military
council has been trying to avoid despite popular calls, is the dismissal
of the central government and all the provincial governors, those
officials appointed by Mubarak who showed intense loyalty to him through
his final days.
Further, not only was the current government
appointed by Mubarak a few days before he resigned, but many of its
members, including the oil, information, labor, and health ministers
were also known to be some of the most corrupt in the deposed regime.
Therefore the pro-democracy coalition is calling on
the military council to declare a complete break from the previous
regime and appoint an honest and capable individual to lead a
transitional government until the elections, one that comprises a
cabinet of technocrats, who were never part of any past Mubarak
government.
But the military council has been wavering on this
demand, preferring to bring about a limited reshuffle by replacing the
most corrupt ministers, perhaps with some opposition members who were
friendly with the previous regime. This is going to be a major test to
the military council, signaling to the public their seriousness
regarding the future direction of the country. Meanwhile, this challenge
has been faced by the pro-democracy leaders of the coalition, formed to
protect the revolution, by vowing to bring millions of people every
Friday to Tahrir Square until this demand is met.
Perhaps the major challenges illustrating whether
the military is serious about breaking from the past and embracing the
goals of the revolution are in three crucial areas. The first challenge
is at the security level. The main reason the deposed regime was able to
control and dominate the political scene, and rule by instilling fear
and repression is because of the state security apparatus, called the Mabahith.
Until this apparatus is totally dismantled, there is a considerable
threat that the revolution could be reversed, or at least hindered to
the point of derailing its main objectives.
Secondly, major figures in the former ruling party,
including major corrupt businessmen, are trying to regroup and re-brand
themselves as a new pro-revolution and reform party, in an attempt to
take over the levers of state power by manipulating the public, using
the huge resources at their disposal, and through their internal
knowledge of how state institutions operate. For example, the current
government, in a plain effort to appease state employees, has offered
each worker a fifteen per cent raise in order to carry favor and gain
their support in any future elections.
Thirdly, none of the pro-regime media officials
appointed by Mubarak to the numerous state print and electronic media
boards or outlets, or heads of labor unions, have been dismissed. If
allowed to stay in power, they would pose a very dangerous threat to
genuine change since, as part of the previous regime, they have every
incentive to promote their people to cover up all their corrupt behavior
and practices, even as they falsely present themselves in the interim
as reformers.
Another important test to SCAF’s seriousness with
regard to the people’s demands is the lifting of the state of emergency
law and allowing the unhindered formation of political parties. There
are many manifestations of this law that stifle personal, civil, and
political freedoms. For instance, under this law people could
administratively be detained by the government without any charges for
extended periods of time, or their houses searched without any judicial
warrants.
Further, all universities are still controlled by
the police, so that students could not organize their activities without
the prying eyes of the state. The military council has already promised
to lift the emergency law within six months. Fulfilling this promise is
considered one of the most important signs to the realization of
civilian and democratic rule.
An immediate impact of the revolution on the
political system was this week’s judicial ruling on the formation of one
of the political parties, the Wasat (or Middle), that has been fighting
to come to existence since 1996. This time the Administrative Judicial
System asserted its independence, voided the past ban, and ruled for it
to legally operate. The previous regime fought against it for fifteen
years because it was formed by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Meanwhile, the military council has promised to enact laws soon that
would make formation of political parties easy and routine.
The role judges are likely to play in the future of
Egyptian society will also be a clear indication of the direction of
the country. If Egypt establishes a strong and independent judiciary,
one whose decisions are respected and observed in society and not
undermined by the executive branch, Egypt will then become the modern
democratic state the revolution has called for.
This test will come to pass soon, as the next
elections are scheduled this year under the supervision of the
judiciary. If it is able to assert its authority and administer the
upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections freely and fairly by
truly reflecting the will of the people, then Egypt will have
accomplished a major milestone along its path on becoming a democratic
state.
In short, like all such moments in history, Egypt’s
revolution faces great challenges. But perhaps the most important is
whether the new Egypt will break from the grip of some elements of
Mubarak’s regime trying desperately to cling to power and prevent real
change. The military will certainly have a say on whether to go forward
and propel true reforms, as demanded by the revolution, or slow down and
besiege it to accommodate the interests of its opponents.
In addition, a central challenge to the revolution
will be the external pressures applied by international and regional
powers to safeguard their interests and policies, which may diverge from
or have a direct conflict with the interests and wishes of the vast
majority of the people of Egypt. For instance, Egyptians overwhelmingly
want to lift the siege on Gaza that the deposed regime helped maintain.
They also want to help the various Palestinian factions reach a
re-conciliation and end their division. Both objectives are strongly
opposed by the U.S. and Israel.
Hence, the assertion of Egypt’s independence in the
face of certain immense Western pressures would represent the ultimate
test to the success of this revolution. If the future government of
Egypt truly reflects the will of its people in internal as well as
external policies, then the revolution has indeed succeeded. If not,
then somewhere along the way counter revolutionary elements would have
hijacked it, setting the stage for another corrective revolution.
Only the vigilance of the revolutionary forces in
society and insistence on achieving their main objectives will determine
the destiny of Egypt’s revolution. As it started in Tahrir Square on
January 25, Egypt’s revolution might be destined to stay in Tahrir
Square for some time until every challenge has met its response and
every objective has become a reality.
In his farewell address in 1837, President Andrew
Jackson said it best when he reminded his people that “eternal vigilance
by the people is the price of liberty,” and that one “must pay the
price” in order “to secure the blessing.”
Here are the most recent pieces by Esam Al-Amin on the Egyptian Revolution.
www.counterpunch.org/amin02172011.html
www.counterpunch.org/amin02182011.html
Esam Al-Amin can be reached at [email protected]
http://www.counterpunch.org/
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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