Global Campaign of Solidarity with the Syrian Revolution
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Global-Campaign-of-Solidarity-with-the-Syrian-Revolution/147353662105485

*
*

<https://www.facebook.com/events/176697015820498/?ref=22>
*MAY 31st - GLOBAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE SYRIAN
REVOLUTION<https://www.facebook.com/events/176697015820498/?ref=22>
*
May 31 <https://www.facebook.com/events/calendar/2013/May/31>
Beirut, Lebanon<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Beirut-Lebanon/106188806084417>
 in Beirut, 
Lebanon<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Beirut-Lebanon/106188806084417>
Join <https://www.facebook.com/events/176697015820498/> · 1,732 people are
going

May 31 - Global Day of Solidarity with the Syrian Revolution from Montreal

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=B-WWJfWqi0E


*------------------------------------------*

*AQSA Mosque in Jerusalem chanting against Hezbollah today,
"we are all the same religion"*

*http://www.youtube.com/watch?v..*.<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjF3dlFV3WI>

-----------------------------------------


http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=pbIcqTMVoTc



A TRULY SURREAL SCENE. A MAN IS BEING DUG FORM HIS WOULD BE GRAVE AND
FLASHES A VICTORY SIGN. Damascus (Sbineh): May 22, 2013 - His home was
shelled by Asasd’s forces and it cam crashing down on him. Locals are
digging him out of what could have been his grave, as he is still trapped
and being rescued he sees the camera and flashes a victory sign.

There are few words. Actually there are no words on Earth to describe the
resilience of the people of Syria in the face of Assad’s brutality.

This is why Syrians will defeat Assad. This is why we will eventually be
free.

------------------------------------------------


Syria Today: Assad Plays the Pan-Arab
Card<http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2013/5/24/syria-today-assad-plays-the-pan-arab-card.html>



 inShare

Friday, May 24, 2013 at 8:19 | Scott
Lucas<http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/author/scott-lucas>
 in EA Live <http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/category/ea-live>, EA
Middle East and
Turkey<http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/category/ea-middle-east-and-turkey>
, Middle East and
Iran<http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/category/middle-east-and-iran>

*Anti-regime rally in Bustan al-Qasr section of Aleppo on Friday*

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=0t-RFBHX8LI*
*



------------------------------

*Trying to counter moves for an international conference --- including Arab
States --- to force President Assad from power, the Syrian regime has
played its own Arab card.*
*

In a meeting with a Tunisian delegation on
Thursday<http://sana.sy/eng/21/2013/05/24/483748.htm>,
Assad "stressed the important role which the national and pan-Arab parties
and forces can play in facing extremist and takfiri [apostate] thinking and
confronting the foreign plots targeting the Arab people".

Assad's declaration came as the Friends of Syria coalition, which includes
Arab States, Turkey, the US, and European countries, renewed its call for
the President's departure after a meeting in Jordan. Elements of the Syrian
opposition are in the midst of a three-day meeting setting out its plans
for a political transition
*

*Assad countered with an assertion of the "the necessity of adhering to the
Arab principles and identity and the values of Arabism to stand up to the
changes witnessed in the Arab arena".*
------------------------------

*Insurgent Takeover of Regime Base*

More claimed footage of the insurgent takeover of a major regime base in
Idlib Province, noted in EA's coverage on Thursday:

Syria Idlib Armoured Unit Camp Captured by FSA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=PZv-gGYwRK0


*Russia Elevates Regime, Denounces Opposition Over International Confernence
*

The Russian Foreign Ministry has praised the Assad
regime<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/05/20135248428250959.html>
for
agreeing in principle to attend an international peace conference, while
claiming that the opposition is blocking efforts for a resolution.
"We note with satisfaction that we have received an agreement in principle
from Damascus to attend the international conference, in the interest of
Syrians themselves finding a political path to resolve the conflict, which
is ruinous for the nation and region," Alexander Lukashevich said.

Lukashevich said last week's UN General Assembly resolution that praised
the opposition and condemned President Assad's forces has "essentially
pushed [the opposition] to reject negotiations":

**

*Demands to immediately name a specific date for the conference without
having clarity about who, and with what authority, will speak in the name
of the opposition, cannot be taken seriously.*

The opposition Syrian National Coalition has said it will only go to the
conference if Assad steps down as President, a condition rejected by Moscow.

*Casualties*

The Local Coordination Committees claim 86 people were killed  on Thursday,
including 27 in Damascus and its suburbs, 18 in Aleppo Province, and 14 in
Homs Province.

The Violations Documentation Center
<https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/> reports
that 61,372 people have been killed in the Syrian conflict since March
2011, an increase of 103 from Thursday. Of the deaths, 47,819 were
civilians, a rise of 58 from yesterday.



Sheikh al-Yaqoubi Elected to the NC—its first non-Brotherhood-aligned
religious 
figure<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/sheikh-al-yaqoubi-elected-to-the-nc/>Posted
by Matthew Barber on Wednesday, May 22nd, 2013
*The Rise of the Sufis*

*[image: Matthew Barber]*

by Matthew Barber—*This story first appeared onSyria
Comment<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/sheikh-al-yaqoubi-elected-to-the-nc>
*



*Newly-elected to the Syrian National Coalition, Sheikh Mohammad al-Yaqoubi
is moderate, influential, and ready to go to work*



>From the beginning of the uprising, mainstream Syrian Sunni *‘ulema*—the
traditional scholars who have spoken for Islam for centuries and who most
Syrians recognize as the quintessential voices for religious
interpretation—have been marginalized in the Syrian opposition, as
Islamists of Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood persuasion steamrolled their way
to dominance in both the SNC and the National Coalition. But an emerging
Sufi current within the Syrian resistance could soon provide an alternative
to Muslim Brotherhood hegemony and change the dynamics of the political
opposition.

Sheikh Muhammad al-Ya’qoubi has just been elected to the National
Coalition, the first figure of the Sufi *‘ulema* to break through the
Islamist exclusivity that has kept them out until now. His appointment will
be announced shortly at a National Coalition conference. Along with other
Sufi sheikhs, al-Ya’qoubi is heading up efforts to solidify a Sufi bloc of
political leadership and nationalist-oriented rebel groups fighting in
Syria who give allegiance to the leadership of Sufi *‘ulema*. He also
supports efforts to train Syrian rebels in Jordan.

Early on in the uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood worked to dominate the
political opposition. The SNC primarily consisted of parties loyal to the
Muslim Brotherhood. The National Coalition was later created to break this
one-sided disparity, but ended up being dominated by others with Muslim
Brotherhood connections, as well.
[image: Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi]

Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi

While this was the reality of the external opposition, an imbalance also
formed on the ground inside Syria, as Islamist rebels received more foreign
support and rose to prominence. Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi feels that the U.S. made
the mistake of “leaving of the ‘Syrian file’ to the regional powers,” which
allowed this trend to intensify as Gulf powers targeted Islamist groups
with their aid. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been primarily involved in
arming rebels, but the Saudis recently pulled back their level of support.
They have an ambivalent relationship with Islamist movements; on the one
hand, they support the proliferation of one of the most extreme and
anti-Sufi forms of Islam, Wahhabism, throughout the Muslim world.
Simultaneously, they fear Islamist movements such as the MB who pose a
political threat to monarchy. As the character of the militarized
opposition has evolved increasingly toward Islamism, with a recent climax
of Jabhat al-Nusra announcing allegiance to al-Qaida and declaring an
Islamic state in
Syria<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/al-qaida-and-jabhat-al-nusra-declare-islamic-state-in-syria/>,
reports suggested that the Saudis decided to cut off support they had been
offering.

Declining aid, however, has ironically resulted in the end of much of the
support that nationalist-oriented rebels were receiving, and many rebels
havecomplained <http://www.whec.com/article/stories/S3009269.shtml?cat=0> that
the remaining contributions from
Qatar<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-02/qatar-attention-starved-teen-of-the-middle-east.html>
are
reaching only the Islamist fighters. Continuing trends solidifying Islamist
domination of both the political and military oppositions have further
weakened the desire of the international community for intervention in
Syria, though the fact that several regions are now controlled by
al-Qaida-linked groups has prompted some to call for the preparation of a
drone strategy for Syria, prompting fears that it will end up looking like
another Afghanistan.

Sheikh Muhammad al-Ya’qoubi’s entrance into the political opposition marks
a development running counter to the dominant Islamist trend. Al-Ya’qoubi
is respected as one of the leading scholars and Sufi clerics in Syria, and
has beenranked <http://themuslim500.com/e2012/current-edition> as the
second-most influential Muslim religious figure of the country. The brand
of Islam he represents is expressed in a statement of
sympathy<https://www.facebook.com/shaykhabulhuda/posts/10151546222912580>
he
issued following the Boston Bombing. He studied in the West and is fluent
in English and Swedish.

Traditional *‘ulema* like Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi served for centuries as the
interpreters of Islamic sources and traditions, but after the fall of the
last Islamic empire, the process of modernization that accompanied the rise
of the nation state presented a challenge to their role of traditional
authority. The erosion of their power was further aggravated by the
emergence of Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood who introduced
new interpretations of Islamic texts, contrary to the classical traditions
that had existed for centuries.

Under the Ba’athists, some of Syria’s *‘ulema* became seen as coopted
figures who stayed close to the regime and lent it legitimacy. Others
however, remained at arm’s length from the regime, and when the uprising
began, they asserted their criticism of it, as did Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi. In
addition to his widespread recognition among Syria’s majority Sunni
Muslims, his credibility is bolstered by being the cleric who issued the
first *fatwa* against Bashar al-Assad, in July of 2011.

After publically criticizing the regime’s violence against demonstrators in
two sermons delivered at mosques in April and May 2011, he fled Syria and
issued his *fatwa* against the regime. Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi represents the
kind of moderate, traditional Islam that most Syrians are familiar with,
the Islam challenged by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Though
taking an unambiguous stance against the regime’s violence, injustice, and
terror, he also continues to exert his influence encouraging rebels to
avoid terrorism through *fatwas* condemning tactics such as car-bombings,
kidnapping, landmines, the killing of prisoners, and violence against
non-combatants politically aligned with the regime. Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi has
combatted the*fatwas* of extremist clerics who have called for the targeted
sectarian killing of Alawite women and children by issuing his own
*fatwas* prohibiting
the killing of civilians of the Alawite minority. He maintains a very clear
position defending the rights of all minorities, including those condemned
by extremists as heterodox.

Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi also differs with the Islamist agenda to “Islamize”
Syria’s laws. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups promote a kind of
activism that seeks to implement a greater degree of Islamic law in the
state. The growing use of “Islamic law” by Jabhat al-Nusra and other
Islamist groups in territory controlled by rebels likely prompted the
announcement by Mu’az al-Khatib of an effort to introduce a “code” of
Islamic law sanctioned by the opposition that the rebels could implement—an
apparent attempt to assuage this desire manifesting in a stampede toward “*
shari’a*” while ensuring that such a law would be relatively moderate.
Where does Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi stand on this issue? He thinks Syria’s
current family laws are just fine, and are already sufficiently compatible
with the *shari’a*. He also believes that legal reform should not be
pursued before a constitutionally-based committee can be formed which would
tackle any needed changes, *after* the regime has fallen and a new Syrian
government has been created.

Despite being well-known in Syria and playing an important role in the
history of the uprising, Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi and other Sufi *‘ulema* like
him have been excluded from the political opposition. Desperation following
the slow, groaning crisis of the opposition’s ineffectiveness, as well as
fears that figures like al-Ya’qoubi may band together and form an
alternative opposition have led to his appointment to the National
Coalition, following a letter he drafted to Mu’az al-Khatib, signed by 25
Sufi sheikhs and containing an ultimatum about the need for their
participation in the political process.

One obvious question is: what level of real influence will the Sheikh have?
Does his participation mark the beginning of a trend, or will he merely be
the NC’s token member of the *‘ulema*?

In addition to having already played an important role throughout the
uprising, Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi and other Sufi leaders have been building
influence lately, working together for about six months to form an umbrella
organization for rebel groups comprised of Sunnis and Sufis aligned with
Syria’s mainstream values, rather than Islamist agendas. The organization
is called the Movement for Building Civilization. He and his peers have
produced a charter document which rebels groups can sign, pledging
agreement with a set of foundational principles, including:

   1. Removing the regime while not destroying the state—protecting public
   institutions;
   2. The rejection of revenge, retaliation, and execution during the
   uprising, keeping the trials of war criminals for after the collapse of the
   regime and the establishment of a new government;
   3. After the collapse of the regime, rebel groups should cease to carry
   arms and their members should return to civilian life or join the national
   army;
   4. All ethnic and religious communities are to be defended as equal
   citizens under the law;
   5. No ethnic or religious group is to be held responsible for the crimes
   of the regime;
   6. A future Syrian government must operate according to a separation of
   judicial, legislative, and executive powers;
   7. The future government must be a democracy of political multiplicity
   and the 1950 Constitution should be in effect during the interim period
   until a new parliament is elected and a new constitution is agreed upon.

Many young sheikhs who joined the Syrian uprising are frustrated with their
lack of options regarding conservative political movements to be aligned
with. The three main options are Salafis, Hezb al-Tahrir, and Muslim
Brotherhood movements, none of which well-represent mainstream Syrian
Sunnis who look for the legitimacy of *‘ulema* leadership. This concern was
a primary motivation for the creation of the Movement for Building
Civilization. Al-Ya’qoubi and the sheikhs he works with are in contact with
over 200 rebel groups who consult them regarding principles, goals, and
methods, but many of these groups are disillusioned with the inability of
the Sufi and *‘ulema* leadership to offer them any kind of practical
monetary support. Lacking funding, groups that would like to follow
moderate figures of the *‘ulema* will remain vulnerable to recruitment by
Islamist forces.

The formation of a Sufi bloc within the opposition could provide an
alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood, one that would represent far greater
numbers of Syrians. Sheikh Ya’qoubi has stated that he supports a
government in which the Muslim Brotherhood can operate, but that he opposes
a monopoly of any one faction. He told me in a recent conversation: “We may
have to deal with an Ikhwaani prime minister in the future Syria. That is
democracy. But the real question is: will the government be of all one
color, or will it be inclusive?”

There’s no question about which demographic will win this war: the next
power in Syria will be Sunni. And the question goes beyond “how big” a
Sunni win will occur. The real question is: which Sunni group’s brand of
Islam will define the political paradigm of the new state? The influence of
*‘ulema* who respect Syria’s diversity, promote a tolerant social sphere,
and support an inclusive government structure will be extremely important
in the nation’s future, and the international community should be in
conversation with them.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/sheikh-al-yaqoubi-elected-to-the-nc/
Is Jabhat al-Nosra breaking
apart?<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/is-jabhat-al-nosra-breaking-apart/>Posted
by Aron Lund on Wednesday, May 22nd, 2013

*by Aron Lund for Syria Comment*

[image: 
Flag_of_Jabhat_al-Nusra]<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/Flag_of_Jabhat_al-Nusra.jpg>There’s
been some very interesting reports about conflicts within Jabhat al-Nosra,
the salafi-jihadi rebel group that has been designated an
al-Qaida-connected terrorist organization by the USA and several other
countries.

*The background*

If you follow Syria, you’re already familiar with the outlines of this, but
here’s the very short version:

In a recorded voice statement released online on April 10, 2013, Jabhat
al-Nosra’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani confirmed that his group had been
created with assistance from the Iraqi al-Qaida wing (called the Islamic
State of Iraq, ISI). He also ”renewed” his pledge of allegiance to Ayman
al-Zawahiri, the international al-Qaida leader, leaving little doubt that
he had been a sworn al-Qaida member all along. At the same time, Abu
Mohammed distanced himself from the suggestion that a total merger had been
agreed between Jabhat al-Nosra and the ISI. This was in response to a
statement put out on the previous day (April 9) by the ISI emir, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, who had said that both groups would now merge into something
called the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (let’s abbreviate it ISIS).

*[image: 
200px-Flag_of_Islamic_State_of_Iraq.svg]<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/200px-Flag_of_Islamic_State_of_Iraq.svg_.png>
*In sum, there was no dispute between the Syrian and Iraqi leaders about
the fact that Jabhat al-Nosra is an al-Qaida faction ultimately loyal to
Zawahiri, but they differed on whether it would be absorbed into a regional
umbrella (ISIS) constructed from the Iraqi franchise (ISI) or retain its
own separate identity within the international al-Qaida framework.

Syrian opposition groups reacted negatively, including the main Islamist
formations, although most tempered their criticism by stressing the
positive contributions of Jabhat al-Nosra to the uprising so far. For some
responses to the Abu Mohammed and Abu Bakr statements by Islamist groups in
Syria, see a previous post of mine on Syria
Comment<http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/major-salafi-faction-criticizes-jabhat-al-nosra/>,
and these translations on Hassan Hassan’s
site<http://www.hhassan.com/2013/04/jihadists-warn-that-unification-of.html>
.

*Says Sands*

After Abu Mohammed al-Joulani’s strange semi-rebuttal to Abu Bakr on April
10, both groups fell silent, and everybody seemed to be waiting for an
explanation. None came. Now, suddenly, several media reports have been
published, suggesting that the dispute hasn’t been resolved but is in fact
growing worse. In some of these reports, purported Jabhat al-Nosra fighters
even talk about the group splitting apart or losing members, although they
differ on who is leaving and for what reason.

Phil Sands – who wrote this sadly beautiful last letter from
Damascus<http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/a-journalist-takes-a-road-from-damascus-after-five-years>
a
couple of months ago – offers one take on these events in *The
National*<http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-loyalty-pledge-unsettles-nusra-front#full>
.

He quotes a Jabhat al-Nosra member from Damascus as saying that ”everyone I
know was surprised by the statement; it was more than we’d expected to
hear”, meaning the pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri. The Jabhat al-Nosra
member now worries that there will be clashes between Jabhat al-Nosra and
the Western/Gulf backed factions grouped under the FSA label, after Jabhat
al-Nosra came out of the closet as an official al-Qaida franchise.

The gist of Sands’s article is that locally recruited and/or pragmatic
fighters are upset with Abu Mohammed al-Joulani’s pledge of allegiance to
Zawahiri and al-Qaida, because it will make it harder for them to focus on
fighting Assad. (They’re probably right about that.) There’s no claim of an
open split in the group, yet, but it does indicate internal tension between
locally-minded grassroots fighters and the globalist, Qaida-connected
leadership.

*Claims Karouny*

Writing for 
Reuters<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/us-syria-crisis-nusra-idUSBRE94G0FY20130517>,
Mariam Karouny has a much more spectacular take on what is going on. She
also quotes people in and close to Jabhat al-Nosra, as well as some rivals
to the group.

The narrative that emerges is one of a full-blown split within the group,
threatening to unravel the Syrian al-Qaida network. According to this
version, Jabhat al-Nosra is now torn between the adherents of Abu Mohammed
al-Joulani and his Iraqi counterpart and self-styled superior, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi.

In this version, the ISIS project is going ahead despite Abu Mohammed’s
objections, and has already incorporated a significant chunk of Jabhat
al-Nosra’s organization. Abu Bakr is said to have moved into the Aleppo
region to rally his own adherents, while fighters loyal to Abu Mohammed
refuse to submit to his dictates or surrender the Jabhat al-Nosra brand.
Karouny quotes a Nosra source close to Abu Mohammed al-Joulani as trying to
minimize the pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri and saying that it came about
in an “attempt by [Abu Mohammed al-Joulani] to keep his distance from
Baghdadi.” According to another Nosra source quoted in the article, ”The
situation has changed a lot. Baghdadi’s men are working but Nusra is not
working formally anymore”.

If this is true, we’re talking about a Fukushima-level ideological meltdown
in one of Syria’s most important rebel groups.

*ISIS vs. Jabhat al-Nosra?*

Phil Spencer in the* Daily
Telegraph*<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10067318/Syria-Jabhat-al-Nusra-split-after-leaders-pledge-of-support-for-al-Qaeda.html>
makes
a similar claim, based on Aleppo sources outside of Jabhat al-Nosra, and
says that its fighters are withdrawing from the Aleppo frontlines. An
opposition activist in Raqqa is cited by
theAFP<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/20/Watchdog-Syrian-opposition-chief-kidnapped.html>.
He makes the same case, depicting an Iraqi takeover that is being resisted
by a rump faction of Jabhat al-Nosra:

*The activist said that in Raqa, even within jihadists’ ranks there is
division.*

*“The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria is becoming more powerful
than al-Nusra Front in some areas,” he said.*

*He said the* [Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham]* had tried to bring the
jihadist al-Nusra Front under its full control, but could not.*

*“Now they are two groups, competing against each other for influence,”
said the activist, who is well-informed on political developments in
rebel-held areas.*

*al-Manara al-Beida clams up*

Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nosra’s only approved source of public communications,
the online media organization al-Manara al-Beida, has fallen silent since
the April 10 release by Abu Mohammed al-Joulani. The ISI’s media wing,
al-Furqan, is also out of commission since the April 9 statement by Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi. (I’m thankful to Aaron Zelin, who helped me check this.
His invaluable site Jihadology provides a full list of Jabhat
al-Nosra<http://jihadology.net/category/jabhah-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah/>
 and ISI <http://jihadology.net/category/islamic-state-of-iraq/> statements
in PDF format, drawn from the main jihadi web forums.)

Jihadi communications can be very irregular indeed, for all sorts of
reasons, but the total shutdown of both these media offices simultaneously
is such a striking coincidence that of course it is no coincidence.
al-Manara al-Beida used to publish a batch of field reports about their
(oh! glorious!) victories almost weekly, with occasional video releases and
the odd media statement in between. But now, when it seems they would be
most eager to explain what is going on, there’s been nothing but ghastly
silence for a month and a half.

The only thing we’ve heard from Jabhat al-Nosra since April 10 has come
through unofficial channels, like leaders speaking to the media, contrary
to their own stated policy. There’s also been two statements purportedly
from Jabhat al-Nosra’s section in the Deraa region, published on May 7 and
May 22. But they didn’t arrive through al-Manara al-Beida. The Deraa
statements aren’t reporting attacks either. Rather, they are an
odd-sounding laundry list of complaints and sharia rulings about stuff that
the Deraa jihadis are fed up with, such as people spreading rumors,
fence-sitting Druze people, out-of-control salafi clerics posing as Jabhat
al-Nosra representatives, swindlers scamming jihadis for money, and
low-quality recruits from Jordan. As if fighting Assad wasn’t enough! But
they include nothing directly related to the al-Qaida brouhaha.

*Confusion all around*

In the absence of any clarification from the actors themselves, nobody
seems sure about what is actually going on. Does ISIS exist? Has there been
a split in Jabhat al-Nosra? If so, is it between Abu Mohammed al-Joulani
and his locally recruited followers, who take issue with his declaration of
allegiance to Zawahiri? Or is it between Abu Mohammed and the Iraqi emir
Abu Bakr, who has mounted an internal coup against his leadership? And to
whom would Zawahiri give his blessing, as supreme commander of al-Qaida?

Maybe it isn’t a nation-wide Syrian split, but a division which plays out
differently in different parts of the organization? Maybe it’s just a
little local rebellion? Or maybe it’s a huge deal, and the undertow from an
ISI thrust into Syria will seep back across the border, and onwards through
the global Qaida network?

Maybe. Maybe! Or maybe this is all a simple misunderstanding, a little
communications mishap which will be sorted out once the three leaders
involved – Abu Mohammed al-Joulani of Jabhat al-Nosra, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
of the ISI, and Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaida’s general command – have
decided on the proper language for a joint statement.

Despite the fact that both the Jabhat al-Nosra and the ISI media wings seem
to have been knocked out cold by the April 9-10 controversy, the fighters
themselves are still soldiering on. Some Jabhat al-Nosra members are said
to have died in the battle in al-Quseir just the other day. And bombs are
still going off at an impressive pace in Iraq, leaving little doubt that
ISI is still around. Meanwhile, a thin trickle of videotapes in the ISIS
name has started to show up online, although not through “official”
channels, making it doubtful what or who they really represent. (On the
fine Brown Moses
blog<http://brown-moses.blogspot.se/2013/05/jabhat-al-nusra-and-islamic-state-of.html>,
Aymenn Al Tamimi writes a guest post about this.)

*Un-conclusion*

So what to make of it? Oh, I have no idea. And my guess is that no one else
does either, despite the tsunami of speculative hypotheses that is already
starting to build at the far end of the Internet.

As far as I’m concerned, the only thing we can assume with a reasonable
degree of certainty is that (1) the contradictory statements, and (2) the
sudden interruption of Jabhat al-Nosra and ISI communications, and (3) the
flood of reports about internal discontent and splits is means that there
actually is or has been a significant internal disagreement between two or
more of these Qaida factions.

And whatever it is, because of (2) and (3), they will now have to deal with
rumors and hostile propaganda too. Even if they’ve now sorted it all out,
they have a serious public relations crisis on their hands. That’s no small
matter in a situation as media-driven as the Syrian conflict.

Perhaps we will now simply get a statement setting the record straight by
affirming that Jabhat al-Nosra and the ISI either have or haven’t merged
into ISIS. And if so, maybe they’ll shutter al-Manara al-Beida and
al-Furqan and present a new media wing for them both, explaining the long
silence.

If, on the other hand, there are indeed irreconcileable differences between
two or more of the players involved, then I guess there will be several
statements, which will make for very interesting reading. Zawahiri should
have the final word, but he’s off in Pakistan somewhere, and who knows how
long he can keep his Mashreqi lieutenants in line after they’ve outgrown
him politically and militarily.

At some point we’ll certainly know more about what’s happening, and then we
can start to draw conclusions. But right now, we don’t, and we can’t. So
let’s just sit here and listen to the eerie silence of al-Manara al-Beida –
the sound of one of the worst Syrian communication gaffes since March 30,
2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cKXUbOxU5U>.

*— by Aron Lund*


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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