http://cryptome.org/
*2013-0710.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/cia-secrets-ethics.pdf> CIA Secrets: Ethics of Concealment/Revelation June 29, 2013* (1.3MB)*2013-0709.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/cia-spying-oversight.pdf> CIA Congressional Oversight of Spying June 29, 2013* (10.7MB)*2013-0708.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/cia-scotus-spy-source.pdf> CIA Supreme Court on Spy Source Secrecy June 29, 2013* (7.4MB)*2013-0707.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/cia-secrecy-essential.pdf> CIA Where Secrecy Is Essential June 29, 2013* (7.7MB)*2013-0706.zip <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/manning-13-0628.zip> Bradley Manning: Army Releases 15 Trial Docs June 28, 2013* (5.8MB) *2013-0705.htm <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm> Two NSA IG Reports ST-09-0002 Reports Differ June 28, 2013**2013-0704.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-safepass.pdf> Edward Snowden Ecuador Safepass Update June 28, 2013**2013-0703.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf> NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection June 28, 2013* (8.4MB)*2013-0702.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf> DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans June 28, 2013* (1.4MB)*2013-0701.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tsarnaev-indictment.pdf> Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Indictment June 27, 2013* (2.2MB) *2013-0700.zip <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/manning-13-0627.zip> Bradley Manning: State Cables Download Forensic June 27, 2013* (1.1MB)*2013-0699.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/google-warrants-sample.pdf> 119 Google Search Warrants with Kid Porn Sample June 27, 2013* (2.7MB)*2013-0698.htm <http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm> Vulnerabilities of Telecomm System-2001 Repost June 27, 2013**2013-0697.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/manning-PE135a.pdf> Manning: CIA WIRe Program Contractor Testimony June 26, 2013**2013-0696.zip <http://cryptome.org/2013/06/manning-13-0626.zip> Bradley Manning: Army Releases 13 Trial Docs June 26, 2013* (2.9MB) http://www.emptywheel.net/ The 14% Domestic Phone Content Collection under the Illegal Wiretap Program<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/29/the-14-domestic-phone-content-collection-under-the-psp/> By: emptywheel <http://www.emptywheel.net/author/emptywheel/> Saturday June 29, 2013 7:08 am [image: Screen shot 2013-06-29 at 7.04.51 AM]<http://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Screen-shot-2013-06-29-at-7.04.51-AM.png>Theres something funny about the claims the NSC Draft IG Report<http://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/090324-Draft-NSA-IG-Report.pdf> makes. On page 8, the report notes: Domestic Collection. The wording of the first authorization could have been interpreted to allow domestic content collection where both communicants were located in the U.S. or were U.S. persons. General Hayden recalled that when the Counsel to the Vice President pointed this out, General Hayden told him that NSA would not collect domestic communications because 1) NSA was a foreign intelligence agency, 2) NSA infrastructure did not support domestic collection, and 3) his personal standard was so high that there would be no problem getting a FISC order for the domestic collection. Starting in February 21, 2006, DOJ pushed to get a FISC order for PSP collection, in spite of NSAs numerous reservations. As an interim solution, they changed the definition of facility from that of a specific number of email address to encompass the gateway or cable head that foreign targets use for communications. Minimization and probable cause standards would then be applied. After months of trying to finesse this, FISC signed two orders to accomplish this: The Foreign Content Order The Domestic Content Order Remember, domestic content, to the NSA, is content in which both participants are in the US (though at this point NSA may have been distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens). And when they moved to a FISC order, they had a specific order for domestic content. And, as the chart on page 16 shows, 14% of the telephony content was domestic (it was only 2% for Internet, though its number for that collection, 19,000, sure looks awfully round). Now, apparently, by 2007 when they went to a FISC order, there wasnt that much domestic collection left. The Domestic Content Order did not create a similar loss in collection [as the 73% loss on the Foreign Content side] because so few numbers were tasked at that time. It did, however, slow operations because of the documentation required, and it took considerably longer to task under the order than under the PSP. Over time, the scope of the Domestic Content Order gradually decreased to a single selector tasked for collection in January 2009. In January 2009, at NSAs request, assumed responsibility for the Domestic Content Order and became the declarant before the FISC. This says they still had these gateway facilities in place 17 months after PAA passed (and NSA likely dumped it off onto FBI at that point to clean up in anticipation of Obama taking over). The original authorization might seem to authorize domestic collection. And when they shifted to FISC rather than Presidential authorization, it continued to include domestic collection, though not so much, apparently, as when the program started. Posted in FISA <http://www.emptywheel.net/category/fisa/> | Tagged Alberto Gonzales <http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/alberto-gonzales/>, David Addington<http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/david-addington/> , Jim Comey <http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/jim-comey/>, Michael Hayden<http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/michael-hayden/> | *4* Replies<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/29/the-14-domestic-phone-content-collection-under-the-psp/#comments> OMIGOD James Clapper Has Our Gun Purchase Records<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/omigod-james-clapper-has-our-gun-purchase-records/> By: emptywheel <http://www.emptywheel.net/author/emptywheel/> Friday June 28, 2013 2:16 pm Its a testament to Ron Wydens good faith that this letter<http://wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=87b45794-0fa4-4b1a-b3a6-e659a91a5042> asking James Clapper for more information about the governments secret use of the Section 215 provision of the PATRIOT Act didnt try to inflame the NRA. Its not until the third paragraph in until Wyden (and the 25 other Senators who signed on) say, It can be used to collect information on credit card purchases, pharmacy records, library records, firearm sales records, financial information, and a range of other sensitive subjects. And the bulk collection authority could potentially be used to supersede bans on maintaining gun owner databases, or laws protecting the privacy of medical records, financial records, and records of book and movie purchases. [my emphasis] And while Wyden is right that the letter is bipartisan, I really wonder how it is that only four Republicans Mike Lee, Dean Heller, Mark Kirk, and Lisa Murkowski signed a letter raising these issues. Seriously. Not even Rand Paul? Ill come back to the loaded questions Wyden asks (Im frankly still working on some loaded questions he asked 6 months ago it has turned into a nearly fulltime beat). But in the meantime, why isnt the NRA screaming yet? Posted in PATRIOT <http://www.emptywheel.net/category/patriot/> | Tagged Dean Heller <http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/dean-heller/>, James Clapper<http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/james-clapper/> , Lisa Murkowksi <http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/lisa-murkowksi/>, Mark Kirk<http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/mark-kirk/> , NRA <http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/nra/>, Rand Paul<http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/rand-paul/> , Ron Wyden <http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/ron-wyden/>, Section 215<http://www.emptywheel.net/tag/section-215/> | *17* Replies<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/omigod-james-clapper-has-our-gun-purchase-records/#comments>How David Addington Hid the Document Implicating George Bush in Illegal Wiretapping Posted on June 28, 2013<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/> by emptywheel <http://www.emptywheel.net/author/emptywheel/> On December 16 and December 20, 2005, respectively just days after the NYT revealed its existence<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all> EPIC and ACLU FOIAed DOJ<http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_foia_complaint.pdf> for documents relating to George Bushs (really, Dick Cheneys) illegal wiretap program (National Security Archive also FOIAed, though more narrowly). Among other documents, they requested, any presidential order(s) authorizing the NSA to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance. Yet in spite of the fact that the ACLU was eventually able to get DOJ to cough up some of the OLC memos<https://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc2289/OLC%2054.FINAL.PDF> that provided a legal rationale for the program, no presidential order was ever turned over. I dont believe (though could be mistaken) it was even disclosed in declarations<http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_declaration_steveng_bradbury.pdf> submitted<http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_2nd_declaration_steven_bradbury.pdf> by Steven Bradbury in the suit. Theres a very good (and, sadly, legal) reason for that. According to the 2009 NSC draft IG report<http://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/090324-Draft-NSA-IG-Report.pdf> the Guardian released yesterday, its not clear DOJ ever had the Authorization. The White House is exempt from FOIA, and its likely that NSA could have withheld the contents of the Directors safe from any FOIA, which is where the hard copy of the Authorization was kept. Its worth looking more closely at how David Addington guarded the Authorization, because it provides a lesson in how a President can evade all accountability for unleashing vast powers against Americans, and how the National Security establishment will willingly participate in such a scheme without ensuring what theyre doing is really legal. The IG report describes the initial Authorization this way: On 4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum entitled AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIFIED ELECTRONIC ACTIVITIES DURING A LIMITED PERIOD TO DETECT AND PREVENT ACTS OF TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. The memorandum was based on the Presidents determination that after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, an extraordinary emergency existed for national defense purposes. [snip] The authorization specified that the NSA could acquire the content and associated metadata of telephony and Internet communications for which there was probable cause to believe that one of the communicants was in Afghanistan or that one communicant was engaged in or preparing for acts of international terrorism. In addition, NSA was authorized to acquire telephone and Internet metadata for communications with at least one communicant outside the United States or for which no communicant was known to be a citizen of the United States. NSA was allowed to retain, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence from the communications acquired under the authority. And while the NSA IG report doesnt say it, the Joint IG Report<https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf> on the program (into which this NSA report was integrated) reveals these details: Each of the Presidential Authorizations included a finding to the effect that an extraordinary emergency continued to exist, and that the circumstances constitute an urgent and compelling governmental interest justifying the activities being authorized without a court order. Each Presidential authorization also included a requirement to maintain the secrecy of the activities carried out under the program. *David Addingtons illegal program* While the Joint report obscures all these details, the NSA IG report makes clear that Dick Cheney and David Addington were the braintrust behind the program. The Counsel to the Vice President used [a description of SIGINT collection gaps provided by Michael Hayden] to draft the Presidential authorization that established the PSP. Neither President Bush nor White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote this Authorization. David Addington did. On page 24, the report describes President George W. Bush being cleared into the program in its first 30 days along with Addington and others, as if that werent a given. As you consider this program, always remember that it was birthed by David Addington, a guy famous for carrying a Constitution in his pocket. Not only did Addington draft this thing, he did so with very little input from NSA. no other NSA personnel [besides then Director of NSA Michael Hayden] participated in the drafting process. [DOJ] representatives were not involved in any of the discussions that [Hayden] attended and he did not otherwise inform them. The NSA IG report makes no mention whether DOJ personnel were involved; the Joint report reveals that John Ashcroft approved the Presidential Authorization the same day he got read into the program. Attorney General Ashcroft approved the first Presidential Authorization for the PSP as to form and legality on the same day that he was read into the program. John Yoo must have seen the Authorizations, as he would subsequently (starting a month after the program started) write a series of poorly crafted OLC memos supporting it. Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker was the only other non-FBI DOJ person read into the program. The head of OLC, Jay Bybee, was not. Its equally unclear whether FBI Director Robert Mueller was shown the Authorization though it seems unlikely given that on October 21, 2001 Ashcroft wrote him<http://www.emptywheel.net/timeline-collection/warrantless-wiretap-memos-timeline/> a one-page mamo confirming the program had been appropriately authorized. Once David Addingtons Authorization was completed, it got stuck away in Haydens safe and closely held. The original Authorization and renewals were kept in the NSA Directors safe, and access to the documents was tightly controlled. Addington continued to write the renewal Authorizations and would personally deliver it to the NSA (on a few occasions NSA picked it up at the White House). *Hayden hides the Authorization from those who needed to ensure compliance with it* As Hayden set about implementing this program, he shared the authorization with very few people. He initially shared it with the General Counsel, and subsequently *4 days after the program was launched* the Associate General Counsel for Operations and the NSA Deputy General Counsel, who reviewed it and said the program was legal. No one at NSAs Office of General Counsel documented these reviews. Ultimately, Hayden would share the Authorization with those NSA lawyers, Program Managers, and certain operational personnel. When he briefed the people who would implement it on October 8, 2001, he did not share the specific content of the Authorization with attendees. Rather than relying on the Authorization itself for the limits of the program, analysts used criteria provided by OGC based on it. Going forward, most NSA operations personnel, including the Chief of the [Counterterrorism] Product Line, who approved tasking for content collection, were not allowed to see the actual authorization. Within the first 18 months of the programs operations, this close hold led to two early violations of the Authorization. Only after that at the NSA IGs insistence did anyone even write up formal Delegations of Authority that explained the Authorization for those implementing it. And even then, this was only shared with the Program Managers and two Signals Intelligence Directorate CT Product Line managers. Its unclear when NSAs IG got to look at it (though he presumably did to write this report). But the IG wasnt even read into the program until August 2002. *Those other branches and the Authorization* The IG Report makes no mention of the Authorization being shared with Congress in its briefings on the program (remember that when she first got read into the torture program in February 2003, Jane Harman consistently but unsuccessfully nagged about seeing the presidential authorization tied to that program). And then there are the judges, who of course didnt review the program but did have worries about information collected under it being used in FISA applications. The NSA IG report describes Hayden providing then Chief FISA Judge Royce Lamberth a very detailed PSP briefing on January 31, 2002, with John Yoo explain[ing] the Programs legality. The Joint IG report<https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf> on the program suggests there was more to Lamberths initial briefing than that: The classified report and the full DOJ OIG report describe the circumstances under which the Presiding Judge was notified of the existence of the PSP and read into the program, and the measures subsequently taken to address the effect of the PSP on the governments relationship with the FISC. Lamberth appears to have insisted that his predecesor, Collen Kollar-Kotelly, get briefed in from the start, because he attended her May 17, 2002 briefing. At that briefing, she was shown, but not allowed to retain, a short memorandum, prepared by [John Yoo] that set out a broad overview of the legal authority for conducting the PSP. I get the feeling that didnt satisfy her, because on August 12, 2002, she was briefed at the White House. At that point, she was able to review the Authorization, apparently the only person outside of the White House and NSA (and, presumably, John Yoo, but that is unclear as well) that got to glimpse it. *The telecoms bow down before Article II* The NSA IG report makes no mention of the Authorization being shared with the telecoms who cooperated voluntarily based on formal NSA letters asking for the help, though the initial letters did state that the requested assistance was authorized by the President with the legal concurrence of the Attorney General, pursuant to Article II of the Constitution. (The later ones, which came after the President signed the Afghan AUMF, cited the Presidents Commander-in-Chief powers.) Just one company an internet provider first approached in October 2002 appears to have asked for a letter from the Attorney General certifying the legality of the PSP. That company, and another private sector company (that is, presumably not a telecom and not an internet provider) that asked to consult with an outside counsel about the legality, did not participate in the program. One telecom (probably Verizon or MCI) asked for and got an Attorney General letter stating that the program was a lawful exercise of authorities assigned to the President under Article II of the Constitution on August 8, 2003, after having participated from the start. And, of course, the letters sent to the telecoms on March 12, 2004 stated that White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, not Attorney General John Ashcroft, had approved the programs legality (interestingly, the IG Report calls Gonzales, Counsel to the President, apparently unaware of the Clinton-era ruling that WHCO works for us). And that, my friends, is how 500 government employees started cooperating to wiretap the American people with fewer than 20 people getting to see the piece of paper the President signed saying his ass was on the line for it all. *NSAs disinterest in the legal basis for it all* And while about half of the people who had seen a document with President Bushs signature were at NSA, those people seemed to be equally uninterested in seeing anyone elses real legal analysis of the program. According to the NSA IG report, at least, not a single person at NSA saw an OLC opinion on the program until 2004. General Hayden, NSA lawyers, and the NSA Inspector General agreed that it was not necessary for them to see the early opinions in order to execute the terms of the Authorization, but felt it would be helpful to do so. NSA was, however, given access and provided comments to the OLC opinion issued in 2004. Interestingly, then DOD General Counsel Jim Haynes got some kind of OLC memo<http://www.emptywheel.net/timeline-collection/warrantless-wiretap-memos-timeline/> on February 2, 2002, one that curiously spoke of hypothetical activities. And the GC of some agency (which could be Haynes again) got a memo on May 30, 2003, but this doesnt appear to have been the NSA. And its not like no one at NSA asked for OLC guidance. In 2 stunning paragraphs, the IG Report reveals that even those who wanted to read the OLC memo were not permitted to read it. *First Request*. NSA General Counsel Robert Deitz stated that he asked the Vice Presidents Counsel if he could see the opinion. Even though Mr. Deitzs request was denied the Vice Presidents Counsel read a few paragraphs of the opinion to him over the classified telephone line. *Second Request*. At a 8 December 2003 meeting with the DOJ Associate Deputy Attorney General to discuss collection of metadata and an upcoming NSA OIG compliance audit, NSAs IG and Deputy GC requested to see the OLC legal opinion. The Counsel to the Vice President, who unexpected attended the meeting, denied the request and said that any request to see the opinion had to come directly from General Hayden. This second one is particularly troubling, because we know that Pat Philbin and Jack Goldsmith were already worried about the legal authorization of the program. And it is unclear whether this December 8 meeting took place before or after one the Joint IG report describes: In December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Counsel to the Vice President Addington and White House Counsel Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns about the legal underpinnings of the program. But I trust Addington had other ways to find out about meetings he should surprisingly appear at. And while some at NSA at least acknowledged that it was odd that they were wiretapping Americans without anymore backup than they had, they never insisted on getting more. General Hayden stated he never asked for or read the OLC legal opinion supporting the PSP. The Deputy GC stated that it was his understanding that the opinion was not shared with NSA because it was considered confidential legal advice to the President. The IG, GC, Deputy GC agreed that their inability to read the OLC opinion did not prevent or impair them from executing and overseeing the Program. They were able to determine legality of the program independently from DoJ (see Appendix D). However, the IG said that he found the secrecy surrounding the legal rational to be odd. Specifically, he said that it was strange that NSA was told to execute a secret program that everyone knew presented legal questions, without being told the underpinning legal theory. The IG, GC, and Deputy GC all stated that they had yet to see the full text of the original OLC opinion. And so it happened that the spy bureaucracy just kept churning along, wiretapping Americans, without a burning curiosity whether it was all legal. - See more at: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/#more-36310- See more at: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/#more-36310- See more at: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/#more-36310- See more at: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/#more-36310- See more at: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/#more-36310- See more at: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/06/28/how-david-addington-hid-the-document-implicating-george-bush-in-illegal-wiretapping/#more-36310 [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:laamn-unsubscr...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:laamn-subscr...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:laamn-dig...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:laamn-ow...@egroups.com?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:la...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/laamn@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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