> On Feb 14, 2018, at 1:06 AM, Yousong Zhou <yszhou4t...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On 14 February 2018 at 11:53, Philip Prindeville > <philipp_s...@redfish-solutions.com> wrote: >> >>> On Feb 11, 2018, at 3:54 AM, Yousong Zhou <yszhou4t...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> On 9 February 2018 at 08:28, Philip Prindeville >>> <phil...@redfish-solutions.com> wrote: >>>> From: Philip Prindeville <phil...@redfish-solutions.com> >>>> >>>> Allowing password logins leaves you vulnerable to dictionary >>>> attacks. We disable password-based authentication, limiting >>>> authentication to keys only which are more secure. >>>> >>>> Note: You'll need to pre-populate your image with some initial >>>> keys. To do this: >>>> >>>> 1. Create the appropriate directory as "mkdir -p files/root/.ssh" >>>> from your top-level directory; >>>> 2. Copy your "~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub" (or as appropriate) into >>>> "files/root/.ssh/authorized_keys" and indeed, you can collect >>>> keys from several sources this way by concatenating them; >>>> 3. Set the permissions on "authorized_keys" to 644 or 640. >>>> >>> >>> If forgetting doing this means I may need physical connection like vga >>> monitor or serial connection to "unlock" the device, very likely I >>> will hate this security enforcement... It's just the inconvenience >>> regardless of whether the said situation should happen. As a user I'd >>> like to keep this level of convenience as using password >>> authentication and turn it off when I see it appropriate. >>> >>> yousong >>> >> >> >> Well, we’re at an impasse because some people have said “this should be the >> new norm and it’s a mistake not to disable it unconditionally” and others >> have said the opposite, “yes, okay, let’s do this but only as an option”. >> >> So I’m happy to go other way but we should reach a consensus. >> >> What if it *is* an option but depends on a virtual package that takes a >> value (like CONFIG_SSH_PUBLIC_KEYS) and squirts that into the >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file. >> >> Would that work for everyone? >> >> You could still lock yourself out of a box by (a) mis-formatting the keys or >> (b) getting the wrong public keys that don’t match your installed private >> keys, but getting this to be absolutely foolproof is a fool's errand. >> >> So what constitutes “good enough”? >> >> -Philip >> > > No, it's just complicating things up. When people really cares about > the default settings' security, the will override the default by also > specifying files/etc/ssh/sshd_config besides > files/root/.ssh/authorized_keys. No need to pass on such complexity > as virtual packages and another config options for others. > > yousong
The problem with that is that if OpenSSH gets updated upstream, including changing the configuration file to address a CVE, I don’t want to keep installing a slightly mangled snapshot of a now-obsolete and vulnerable configuration. That’s just exchanging one liability for another. -Philip _______________________________________________ Lede-dev mailing list Lede-dev@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/lede-dev