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From: Leeds United Supporters Trust <chair...@lufctrust.org> 
Date: 09/04/2014  18:27  (GMT+00:00) 
To: John <j...@boocock.net> 
Subject: Trust financial analysis of LUFC account 2013 
 
Leeds United Supporters Trust Statement
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Trust financial analysis of LUFC account 2013
FINANCE UPDATE - 2013
Now that the latest accounts (to June 2013) have finally landed we have 
undertaken a review and have the following summary for our members.

HEADLINES
- Turnover decreased by 8% from £31.1m to £28.6m (compared to 4% in 2011/12)
- Gate receipts decreased by 17% from £11.3m to £9.7m (compared to 12% in 
2011/12) with average attendance down by 7.7% - perhaps reflecting lower ticket 
prices as a factor
- Staff costs to turnover ratio increased from 57% to 70% (51% in 2010/11)
- Overall admin costs increased from £9.8m to £13.3m (£8.6m in 2010/11)
- “Unknown” admin costs increased from £5.2m to £6.2m (£4.5m in 2010/11)
- Directors received £794k compared to £347k in 2011/12, with one director 
awarded a £440k bonus.
- Yorkshire Radio has had an impact of £1.5m on the loss in the year as LUFC 
have been forced to write off all the amounts they were owed by them.
- Profits from net player trading of £2.0m helped reduce the overall loss from 
£11.6m to £9.6m.
- The current debt stands at £24.7m compared to £14.6m on a like for like basis 
1 year ago
- Money gained from the court case win against WYP (of £1m) was put towards 
clearing payments of the preference shares – controlled by Ken Bates

These accounts show the situation at Leeds United as at the end of June 2013 
which was before the widely reported further funding that has been injected 
into the club by Cellino, so in all likelihood the debt has grown since.

Despite what has been claimed, GFH have actually invested nothing into Leeds 
United but have instead loaded further debt onto the club and managed to record 
the biggest annual loss since 2004 (the immediate post-Ridsdale era).

While Ken Bates and Shaun Harvey were in control for 50% of this period and 
undoubtedly laid the foundations for the performance in areas such as the 
decreased gate receipts, it is only during the second half of the year that we 
see the debt escalating at a pace, which would suggest that this is when the 
costs started to spiral. As we have stated in the past, it was always our view 
that performance was going to be worse in 2012/13 (had the old regime remained 
in place) than the season before it, but even we are shocked at just how 
dramatically it has deteriorated.

Summary of Leeds United Football Club Limited Numbers
Excluding Player Trading
 

        2013    2012    Variance        Variance
        £’000   £’000   £’000   %
Turnover        28,568  31,080  (2,512) (8%)
Cost of Sales   (5,558) (5,582) (24)    0%
Admin Exps      (33,304)        (27,672)        (5,632) 20%
Operating Profit/(Loss) (10,294)        (2,174) (8,120) (374%)
                                 
Staff Costs     20,004  17,828  2,176   12%
Other Admin*    13,300  9,844   3,456   35%
                                 
*Includes:                               
Rent    1,893   1,861   32      2%
Depreciation    1,477   1,193   284     24%
Accountancy Fees        140     112     28      20%
Other Known     3,570   1,444   2,126   148%
Unknown 6,220   5,234   986     19%  
Post Administration Figures for Leeds City Holdings (Excluding Player Trading)
         
2013     
2012     
2011     
2010     
2009     
2008
        £’000   £’000   £’000   £’000   £’000   £’000
Turnover        29,322  33,097  34,475  27,533  23,535  23,249
Cost of Sales   (6,190) (6,559) (6,376) (5,883) (4.930) (4.166)
Admin Exps      (33,760)        (29,557)        (26,486)        (22,789)        
(21,384)        (18,217)
Operating Profit/(Loss) (10,628)        (3,019) 1,613   (1,139) (2,779) 866
                                                14 months  
Turnover
Turnover has steadily declined since its peak under the Bates Regime back in 
2011/12 season, as some fans decided to vote with their feet in order to 
protest against the running of the club. This meant that we were always 
expecting a fall this season as GFH were tasked with trying to repair the 
relationship with the fans. Gate receipts fell 17% and account for £1.6m of the 
£8.1m increase in losses during the season. Unsurprisingly merchandising fell 
by a similar percentage (and added a further £875k to the deficit); the 
remainder of the Turnover items (TV revenue, Central distribution and 
Commercial activities) more or less netted out meaning that total decrease in 
Turnover accounted for £2.5m of the overall increase in losses.

Wages to Turnover
While turnover decreased, the badly needed investment in the playing squad did 
happen. However, the figures suggest that it was more of an investment in total 
number of playing staff rather than an increase in quality. The overall squad 
grew from 46 playing staff (including apprentices) to 58 during the year (a 26% 
increase). Overall wages increased by 12% in comparison; there was some 
reduction in other staff, but given that the largest part of the wage bill 
relates to Playing staff and management (which also increased from 17 to 20 
people), it seems safe to assume that the average amount paid to the playing 
staff actually decreased.

While we have always called for an increase in the wages to turnover ratio, the 
method under which this has been achieved during the year in question is not 
really what we had in mind. With turnover down (by £2.5m) and the number of 
playing and management staff increasing dramatically (at an additional cost of 
£2.2m), the ratio went from 57% to 70%. It is highly unlikely that Leeds United 
will have the lowest ratio in the division anymore but, while the quantity side 
of this equation has been fulfilled, the quality of the additional spending 
does not seem to have noticeably improved. We would not call for this ratio to 
be exceeded next season (or beyond), in fact if anything it needs to decrease, 
but we would definitely suggest to the new management that a reduction in 
quantity and increase in quality needs to be the focus.

Costs of the Directors has increased dramatically which can largely be 
explained by the increase in number of Directors, as well as the significant 
bonus payment made to one of them (£440k). 

Other Costs
It is this area where we have seen the most shocking situation. We have always 
maintained that the ‘other’ costs at Leeds United were excessive, therefore to 
see a £3.4m increase in these was deeply concerning. In terms of the increase, 
we can see that £1.5m of this relates to a one-off cost associated with the 
closure of Yorkshire Radio (where the debt owed to Leeds United by the radio 
station had to be written off), a further £0.6m relates to increased admin 
costs associated with player transfers and £0.3m relates to the legacy of Bates 
building works. The remaining £1m of additional costs is unknown, taking what 
was already a bewildering £5.2m figure up to £6.2m. Undoubtedly much of these 
are likely to be legal costs associated with the takeover but it seems any hope 
of light being shed on these unknown expenses under the regime of GFH has been 
disappointingly shattered.

We still believe this is an area Massimo Cellino can find savings in and hope 
that it will go some way to reducing future losses.

Cash
As we expected cash has been in short supply at Elland Road, and this became 
even more apparent with the recent reports of a wages crisis at the club. Given 
the huge increase in costs and the reduction in revenues this is no surprise, 
but it is obviously a situation that cannot be sustained. Just how close we 
came to another Administration event may never come to light but the accounts 
reflect a situation where the club was living a hand to mouth existence for 
some time and this situation would have had to come to a head but for the 
introduction of a new cash injection.

Group Companies
The Group situation is perhaps the one area where it appears that GFH took the 
painful decisions and acted correctly. Yorkshire Radio was closed down having 
made further losses (which impacted the football operations) and some 
consolidation appears to have occurred making the family a bit more manageable 
in size. However, the eternal promise made by Ken Bates regarding non matchday 
incomes has still yet to materialise as the combined efforts of the non 
footballing side of things resulted in a turnover of £754k and costs of £1.09m 
(an overall loss of £334k). 

Debts 
In six months GFH appear to have added a further £10m (net) to the debt left 
behind by Ken Bates, much of which is in the form of short term loans. The list 
below details the current situation regarding debts at the club.
 
Preference Share payment to Lutonville  £0.1m
Ticketus 2 LLP Loan Repayment   £2.3m
Compass £1.3m
Brendale        £11.3m
Berrydale       £2.0m
Director Bonus  £0.2m
Sport Capital   £1.8m
Working Capital Shortfall       £5.7m
TOTAL DEBT      £24.7m
If the contingent payment of £4.8m to the Administrators is included this 
figure increases to £29.5m (assuming we get promoted by 2018).

Conclusion
If we thought when we parted company with Ken Bates that things could not get 
any worse, that has quickly been dispelled by these numbers. This does not mean 
that Ken was in anyway better for the club, nor is he absolved from blame in 
our opinion. Many of the issues relate directly to the state of the club that 
he handed over (falling revenues, disgruntled fans) and the long term decisions 
he took (Yorkshire Radio and the building obsession), but what is clear is that 
GFH did not seem equipped to manage these situations and had no obvious plan to 
do it. They took over the club with no funding and have had to react to each 
cash crisis as it arose by finding loans as and where they could. It seems 
obvious why they needed so desperately to sell. However, perhaps the profitable 
running of the club was never a real concern, as the GFH financial statements 
appear to show that in spite of all this they have managed to make a profit out 
of this sorry state of affairs. GFH reported that they made a US$6m profit out 
of their holding in Leeds United by selling shares in the club (Leeds United 
Holdings) to strategic investors. Like Leeds United, those investors seem not 
to have been quite as fortunate as GFH in terms of profit as reports suggest 
the club has been sold to Massimo Cellino at a value nearer to what they 
originally paid.

As is always the case finances never tell the full story but, while GFH do not 
appear to be able to run a profitable club, they do seem to be able to make a 
profit out of a loss making enterprise.
 

-----------------

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John 'Grampa' Sykes
Rest In Peace old lad
28th Oct 1938 - 12 Nov 2013
MARCHING ON TOGETHER

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