Just to clarify, are you suggesting such a feature would put the users at *greater* threat?
in my experience simply using CryptoTool™ puts you at risk of interrogation, torture, prison in certain countries. It seems that such a feature would mitigate. On the other hand, it seems like splitting hairs, until research is done, to suggest such a feature would be better than simply keeping all messages encrypted at rest. Once we are talking about rubber hose decryption methods, I think we've kind of already lost, no? B On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 12:46 PM, Nadim Kobeissi <na...@nadim.cc> wrote: > > > > NK > > > On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 3:06 PM, Brian Conley <bri...@smallworldnews.tv>wrote: > >> In this case, self-destruct would potentially save Joe and Susan from the >> "fool" Billy's lazy security culture. >> > > In this kind of scenario, adding a self-destruct feature would definitely > be useful in preventing communications from leaking through certain vectors > after the messages have served their purpose. > > However, they also shift the threat. If Authoritarianstan police know that > CryptoToolX deletes messages after a while, they are likely to feel more > justified in further interrogating the suspect, knowing that if the > messages aren't there now, it's likely that they were there earlier. > > It's hard to discuss those features not because they aren't cool and > useful (they are!) but because they make it difficult to maintain a sense > of priority. Measuring how a feature will help, how it'll change the threat > and whether it will eclipse attention from greater threats and concerns is > kind of trick AFAICT. > > >> >> Certainly this is not a be all and and all, but does seem like a >> potentially valuable feature based on my own broad observation of "fools" >> amongst many activist and journalist groups. >> >> Brian >> >> >> On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 11:11 AM, Jacob Appelbaum <ja...@appelbaum.net>wrote: >> >>> Brian Conley: >>> > Apparently Silent Circle is also proposing such a feature now. >>> >>> Such a feature makes sense when we consider the pervasive world of >>> targeted attacks. If you compromise say, my email client today, you may >>> get years of email. If you compromise my Pond client today, you get a >>> weeks worth of messages. Such a feature is something I think is useful >>> and I agreed to it when I started using Pond. It is a kind of forward >>> secrecy that understands that attackers sometimes win but you'd like >>> them to not win everything for all time. >>> >>> Seems rather reasonable, really. Hardly malware but hardly perfect. >>> >>> All the best, >>> Jake >>> >>> -- >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> >> Brian Conley >> >> Director, Small World News >> >> http://smallworldnews.tv >> >> m: 646.285.2046 >> >> Skype: brianjoelconley >> >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- Brian Conley Director, Small World News http://smallworldnews.tv m: 646.285.2046 Skype: brianjoelconley
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