Jacob also shared his map tool (updated every 5m): http://freehaven.net/~ioerror/maps/v3-tormap.html
-Ali On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 PM, <liberationt...@lewman.us> wrote: > On Sun, 10 Mar 2013 11:32:20 -0700 > Yosem Companys <compa...@stanford.edu> wrote: > > > http://hackertarget.com/tor-exit-node-visualization/ > > > > Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped > > Tor includes a Network Map which also maps nodes across a Mercator > projection of the globe. I don't understand this fetish with Google > mapping everything (why not openstreetmap? why not doing lat/long > coordinate mapping on your own map?). However, it apparently exists. Ok, > moving on. > > The usage of blutmagie is an interesting choice, when > https://metrics.torproject.org/ and https://compass.torproject.org/ and > https://atlas.torproject.org/ all exist with gobs more data, including > the raw source data on which all of those sites are built. Freegeoip.net > uses the same MaxMind GeoList database we do. Google has it's own GeoIP > database as well. I wonder which one is most accurate. > > What's more valuable to me is the list of exit relays by ISP. > Intuitively, it makes sense. Cheap, well-connected server providers are > going to be attractive to those running Tor relays (exits or not). I > take this list to mean, "this is the list of ISPs who care about > Internet freedom". It sure seems small. > > The other implication here is that Tor exits can be monitored. Yes, we > know. We've been saying this for a decade. Here's one blog post about > it, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/plaintext-over-tor-still-plaintext. > It's part of the reason the EFF and Tor write HTTPS Everywhere for > Chrome and Firefox, https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere. > > Your ISP can watch your traffic too, and inject ads or redirect DNS. In > fact, there's a billion dollar market for traffic management at ISPs. > I'm assuming this means the providers are looking to manage Tor traffic > as well. > > For me, the visualization is a cool map, a product pitch for > hackertarget llc, and just raises some implications for operational > security. > > Larger questions it raises in my mind are about AS-aware routing, > what does it mean to have a large concentration of exit relays in > pro-freedom ISPs, and what about legal jurisdictions and MLATs? > > There is some on-going work on the AS-awareness question, see > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09 and > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#oakland2012-lastor and > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#ndss13-lira > > As for some measurement of anonymity and risk modulo concentration of > exit relays? Who knows. Sounds like a fine project. > > And I know of at least one group working on the MLAT and legal > arbitrage question as it relates to tor circuits and relays. > > I look forward to more analysis and proposed research theories to > improve the Tor network in the future. > > -- > Andrew > http://tpo.is/contact > pgp 0x6B4D6475 > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >
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