> > However, according to SecDev cyber analysts, a damaged cable alone should > not have caused the Border Gateway Protocols (BGP) routes for netblocks to > be withdrawn. Rather, the fact that these routes disappeared suggests that > the regime ordered the disconnect for reasons that are unknown. Analysts > have previously speculated that internet shutdowns have been used to > prevent communications amongst rebel groups. Alternatively, the shutdown > could have been used to install new monitoring equipment.
It's nearly comical how "cyber activists" don't know how routing works. In BGP, when a link goes away, the route is withdrawn. That's how it works. If there was a fiber cut, intentional or unintentional, the route to the AS that contained the netblock becomes unavailable and peers for that AS switch to secondary routes, if they exist. If the failed link was the sole uplink (or uplinks) to the AS in which the netblocks in question resided in, then the route is withdrawn because there are no peers capable of routing to the AS. This would be an entirely different story if they'd replaced "withdrawn" with "null routed', because that indicates an administrative change to the routing policy. Alternatively, the shutdown could have been used to install new monitoring > equipment. Citation needed. If you wanted to monitor an active, high bandwidth connection, you would not have to disconnect the network for a sustained amount of time. Ever hear of a span port or an optical splitter? Entering the network and copying all traffic to another port is a seamless operation. I know there's problems in Syria and I know that their government disconnects the network, but get the facts straight. -j
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