On 5/15/13 7:17 PM, Sarah Lai Stirland wrote:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/05/strongbox-and-aaron-swartz.html
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/backissues/2013/05/strongbox-the-new-yorker-investigates.html
While i really appreciate the "extremely high paranoid" approach of
"deaddrop", from a quick overview it seems a little bit overkill.
Imho:
- it goes over a reasonable/widely acceptable level of usability that an
average journalist can accept, with dedicated/specialized procedures
that maybe difficult to be effectively accepted, for example, by
volounteer journalist or activists.
- technically, it does provide an high architectural complexity (very
well done, but complex!), that increase the effort required to setup,
manage and maintain the infrastructure for the technical team (that
maybe run by volounteers).
The very highly paranoy approach of "deaddrob" is very nice, we need
diversity of approach in whistleblowing, but i think that the
operational complexity is too high for general uses.
At GlobaLeaks we're doing a whistleblowing framework that's want to
"lower the entrance barrier" to run a secure whistleblowing platform,
making it easy and cheap to run and maintain, while keeping it secure
with strong anonymity in mind, but flexible enough for different context
of use (see Threat model link in the footer at https://globaleaks.org/).
--
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights
http://logioshermes.org - https://globaleaks.org - http://tor2web.org
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