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On 5 Jun 2013, at 23:38, Eric S Johnson wrote: > I've heard that a lot (especially "it's the Chinese") but found very little > evidence to support such allegations. There is OONI (https://ooni.torproject.org/) Open Observatory of Network Interference which is a Tor Project which is looking at proving network surveillance and fingerprinting it. (Along with a lot more). I would suspect this could/can help identifying the interference (surveillance, censorship) but I do not know yet if it can/will identify vendor. Since Jacob Appelbaum is on the list, I would not wish to comment incorrectly. Maybe he could correct me. > In Addis last fall, was told by a source with some inside information that > the Ethiopian state's cybersurveillance software came from Israel. > > The pictures which rebels shot of the Libyan cybersurveillance center's > equipment (after the Gaddafi government fell) identified it as having been > delivered as part of a (Chinese) ZTE contract. There were other vendors involved also (I've seen pictures Huawei user devices for their WiMax service being sold and used) but certainly ZTE was providing monitoring centre equipment. > It does seem reasonable to suppose almost any cybersurveillance system is > based on high-speed routers, which almost by definition came from one of a > very small number of suppliers (Cisco, ZTE, Huawei?). To carry out large scale surveillance certain level of hardware/software is needed, carrier-grade equipment, and there are a certain number of these types of companies - certainly Cisco, ZTE, Huawei, ///, NSN, Alcatel-Lucent, Juniper and a few others. Then there are the "network management" hardware vendors - the Bluecoats, F5, Redback, etc. These are not carrier network infrastructure, but certainly are carrier grade. By carrier grade I mean "hardware and software that meets certain level of quality, reliability telco operators are willing to put into their networks. The point is (for me at least): this is no longer an industry of "the big" guys. Anyone can now become a surveillance manufacturer. A beefy Linux blade server running open source network management tools (essentially what Bluecoat is). Hope that helps. Bernard >> -----Original Message----- >> From: liberationtech-boun...@lists.stanford.edu [mailto:liberationtech- >> boun...@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Brooks >> Sent: 06 June 2013 5.07 >> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu >> Subject: [liberationtech] Network surveillance >> >> Just talked with a lot of people who think network surveillance >> equipment in their countries are being bought from either >> Israelis or Chinese. It seems that they are competing for >> market share. Was not aware of Israeli companies working in this >> space. > > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech - -------------------------------------- Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRsLP7AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrH58IAK36W96/ebZbd4qKfULIyYeT TrZ7hRlAiyddw4jY0vdrroOfwcQt3sU0srRXKhHcZLqyqKr5/MhoT8Cl52Prgq5E U8uOk5UDAZ+q3AU+By3593MJkpGCmCO01Fmsaku5UdB3FLG/jdRBW4UusIcN0Abf fZhLgXl0rYjqqa/9V6ZbtmW3qGozBAyObAm2po7vdQdOdISnzjxgr00/lhsekhTb i11sYZ3DfHIvoJgz4Q7ZhdqBOMT/Fk7pxl6eKvikKAF9sGwb2IPix7QcBWSeBFtV Rsi9/snSKs4pkXDMbkT1ic3g0ZCDPwzNTah+qKnjUR3QZ3xuPdn5FLGTbwKRcfM= =fMG9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
