Hello Nadim,
Don't be ashamed. Shit happens. I hope you don't get frustrated by all this. 
Keep working. It's easy to criticize the work of others, but whats hard is 
believing in and developing a great project such as cryptocat.
This kind of work is really important. Of course, we have to be careful with 
these things, but... Keep going ;)




gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --search-keys 
EEE5A447http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?search=0xEEE5A447&op=vindex


> From: na...@nadim.cc
> Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2013 22:34:24 +0200
> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat
> 
> 
> On 2013-07-07, at 2:25 PM, CodesInChaos <codesinch...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > > So introductory-level programming course mistakes are right out.
> > 
> > In my experience it's quite often a really simple mistake that gets you,
> > even when you're an experienced programmer. I'm quite afraid of simple 
> > off-by-one bug,
> > places which I didn't fix in copy&paste, basic logic mistakes etc.
> > IMO Nadim's main mistake wasn't the actual bug, mistakes like that can 
> > happen to anybody,
> > but it was designing a really weird API that invites mistakes. Nobody sane 
> > return decimal digits
> > from a cryptographic PRNG.
> 
> That's not what the CSPRNG does exactly, but we routed it through an 
> all-purpose function that wields it to present types of data on demand, be it 
> random ASCII lowercase, random ASCII uppercase, random digits, random bytes. 
> And then I messed up and asked it to produce random digits instead of random 
> bytes and BOOM — security disaster, end of the world etc.
> 
> For the record, I feel deeply ashamed about this blunder. But I can't give up 
> this project simply because bugs like this are bound to pop up for any 
> project with this kind of goals and ambition, and our goals are, in my view, 
> deeply necessary.
> 
> NK
> 
> > 
> > For example a really basic cryptography mistake is reusing a nonce in 
> > AES-CTR. Still it happens to people experienced
> > in both coding and cryptography. For example Tarsnap had since 
> > vulnerability for several versions, despite a competent developer.
> > http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2011-01-18-tarsnap-critical-security-bug.html
> > 
> > In my own programs I'm really careful about nonces and randomness, but 
> > still I wouldn't be surprised if a trivial bug slipped through in that area.
> > Writing tests which detect such mistakes is really hard.
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