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On 03/14/2014 12:46 PM, Lucas Gonze wrote:
> Let's say web servers auto generated self-signed certificates for
> any domain that didn't supply its own certificate, likely one from
> an authority.
> 
> What that would accomplish is to make the stream unreadable over
> the wire, unless the attacker was willing and able to do an MITM
> with their own auto generated self-signed certificate.
> 
> It would not be hard to do that MITM, but it would be orders of 
> magnitude more expensive than copying unencrypted bytes off the
> router. It would not be practical to do the MITM against a large
> portion of traffic. The attacker would have to pick their targets.
> 
> Thoughts?

Things like Convergence by Moxie Marlenspike and friends could make
self-signed certificates much easier and safer to use. Notaries are
the way to go IMHO.

https://www.convergence.io

Cypher


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