Especially useful in light of the recent publishing of https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/, which documents a variety of implementations vulnerable to downgrade attacks in SMTP and IMAP, as well as its caution that that any protocol with a STARTTLS operation (which includes NBD) needs to be aware of the potential downgrade attacks.
The NBD protocol documentation already covers what is necessary to avoid the effects of a downgrade attack, and all known implementations of NBD servers and clients with working NBD_OPT_STARTTLS have at least one mode where TLS is mandatory rather than opportunistic. So I don't see this as a CVE against the NBD protocol itself, so much as a worry about the potential for future poor implementations that disregard the documentation. --- I'm likely to push this to the NBD spec later this week if it doesn't receive any reviews beforehand. doc/uri.md | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/uri.md b/doc/uri.md index 925ad4b..28aa94d 100644 --- a/doc/uri.md +++ b/doc/uri.md @@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ One of the following scheme names SHOULD be used to indicate an NBD URI: Other URI scheme names MAY be used but not all NBD clients will understand them or even recognize that they refer to NBD. +Note that using opportunistically encrypted connections (via the `nbd` +or `nbd+unix` scheme) risks a protocol downgrade attack; whereas +requests for a secure connection (via the `nbds` or `nbds+unix` +scheme) MUST use TLS to connect. For more details, see +<https://github.com/NetworkBlockDevice/nbd/blob/master/doc/proto.md#security-considerations> + ## NBD URI authority The authority field SHOULD be used for TCP/IP connections and SHOULD -- 2.31.1 _______________________________________________ Libguestfs mailing list Libguestfs@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libguestfs